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This dissertation consists of three distinct, although conceptually related, public 
sector topics: the Transportation Security Agency (TSA), U.S. Customs and Border Patrol 
(CBP), and the Georgia Trauma Care Network Commission (GTCNC). The topics are 
unified in their mathematical modeling and mixed-integer programming solution 
strategies.  
In Chapter 2, we discuss strategies for solving large-scale integer programs to include 
column generation and the known heuristic of particle swarm optimization (PSO). In order 
to solve problems with an exponential number of decision variables, we employ Dantzig-
Wolfe decomposition to take advantage of the special subproblem structures encountered 
in resource allocation problems. In each of the resource allocation problems presented, we 
concentrate on selecting an optimal portfolio of improvement measures.  In most cases, the 
number of potential portfolios of investment is too large to be expressed explicitly or stored 
on a computer.  We use column generation to effectively solve these problems to 
optimality, but are hindered by the solution time and large CPU requirement.  We explore 
utilizing multi-swarm particle swarm optimization to solve the decomposition 
heuristically.  We also explore integrating multi-swarm PSO into the column generation 
framework to solve the pricing problem for entering columns of negative reduced cost.   
In Chapter 3, we present a TSA problem to allocate security measures across all 
federally funded airports nationwide.  This project establishes a quantitative construct for 
enterprise risk assessment and optimal resource allocation to achieve the best aviation 
security. We first analyze and model the various aviation transportation risks and establish 
 xi 
their interdependencies. The mixed-integer program determines how best to invest any 
additional security measures for the best overall risk protection and return on investment. 
Our analysis involves cascading and inter-dependency modeling of the multi-tier risk 
taxonomy and overlaying security measurements. The model selects optimal security 
measure allocations for each airport with the objectives to minimize the probability of false 
clears, maximize the probability of threat detection, and maximize the risk posture (ability 
to mitigate risks) in aviation security. The risk assessment and optimal resource allocation 
construct are generalizable and are applied to the CBP problem.  
In Chapter 4, we optimize security measure investments to achieve the most cost-
effective deterrence and detection capabilities for the CBP. A large-scale resource 
allocation integer program was successfully modeled that rapidly returns good Pareto 
optimal results. The model incorporates the utility of each measure, the probability of 
success, along with multiple objectives. To the best of our knowledge, our work presents 
the first mathematical model that optimizes security strategies for the CBP and is the first 
to introduce a utility factor to emphasize deterrence and detection impact. The model 
accommodates different resources, constraints, and various types of objectives.  
In Chapter 5, we analyze the emergency trauma network problem first by 
simulation.  The simulation offers a framework of resource allocation for trauma systems 
and possible ways to evaluate the impact of the investments on the overall performance of 
the trauma system. The simulation works as an effective proof of concept to demonstrate 
that improvements to patient well-being can be measured and that alternative solutions can 
be analyzed. We then explore three different formulations to model the Emergency Trauma 
Network as a mixed-integer programming model. The first model is a Multi-Region, Multi-
 xii 
Depot, Multi-Trip Vehicle Routing Problem with Time Windows.  This is a known 
expansion of the vehicle routing problem that has been extended to model the Georgia 
trauma network.  We then adapt an Ambulance Routing Problem (ARP) to the previously 
mentioned VRP.  There are no known ARPs of this magnitude/extension of a VRP.  One 
of the primary differences is many ARPs are constructed for disaster scenarios versus day-
to-day emergency trauma operations. The new ARP also implements more constraints 
based on trauma level limitations for patients and hospitals.  Lastly, the Resource 









CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION 
The public sector is comprised of a variety of governmental services, including law 
enforcement, infrastructure, security, and health care.  These services provide functions 
such as airport security, border security, and emergency trauma care, which are responsible 
for protecting millions of people on a day-to-day basis.  Within an industry of this size and 
critical importance, the need for efficient optimization solutions is high. Practical solutions 
can result in significant modifications to airport security and border security as well as 
increase response times in emergency injury incidences.  Due to the significant operational 
scale, complex rules, and various parameters, the resulting optimization problems are 
complicated and time consuming to solve.   
1.1 Background 
In each of the resource allocation problems presented, we concentrate on selecting 
an optimal portfolio of improvement measures.  The number of portfolios of improvements 
that are formed is too large to be expressed explicitly or stored on a computer.  Therefore, 
we apply multiple solution strategies based on column generation and particle swarm 
optimization (PSO).   
Integer programming is used to model and solve a variety of complex problems to 
include routing, planning, investing, and scheduling. One distinguishing characteristic of 
integer programming is that the decisions to be made are quantified by integer values, such 
as ’include this asset in your investment portfolio (1) or not (0)’.  The problem is a mixed-




integer programming to real-world applications can be said to involve two phases; one –
the modeling phase – that consists of the interaction with the owners of an optimization 
problem to be solved, and the other –the solution phase – that relies on computer software 
to solve the problem stated in the modeling phase. 
In the modeling phase, all aspects to be considered to solve the problem must be 
defined and quantified to create a mathematical model describing the problem. When faced 
with complex real-world problems, it can be challenging to construct a solvable model that 
mirrors reality and whose solutions are of practical interest. It is critical to determine how 
to provide the model with input data of good enough quality for the solution to be sound 
while balancing the trade-off between building a solvable model and including as much 
realistic detail as possible. 
The solution phase aims to provide a solution to the problem described by the 
mathematical model constructed in the modeling phase. This is typically done by the 
appropriate use of standard optimization software. When even software is not capable of 
effectively solving the problems, new solutions methods are developed, or existing 
methods are tailored.  
After finding a solution or several to the problem, they are presented to the decision-
makers for feedback on the quality of the solutions. It is natural that feedback will result in 
changes in the model and can result in changes to the solution method, establishing an 
interdependency between the two. After finishing this iterative process, the resulting model 




repeatedly and automatically provides and uses solutions to problem instances generated 
in real-time. 
The level of effort involved to solve a problem can range from combining well-
known solution strategies in a new scenario or application to applying an idea that creates 
an entirely new area of research. In integer programming research, both the modeling and 
solution phases are challenging in their own right; therefore, progress needs to be made in 
both areas.  
In column generation, the columns correspond to which portfolio of resources to be 
allocated. For problems of this size, models often have an exponential number of variables.  
The main advantage of column generation is that not all portfolio possibilities need to be 
enumerated upfront, but instead can be generated on the fly. The original problem is first 
continuously relaxed and then divided into a master problem, and a subproblem called the 
pricing problem. The master problem, when defined on a subset of all possible portfolios, 
is called the restricted master problem. The optimal set of portfolios is found in an iterative 
process by alternating solving the restricted master problem and the pricing problem. 
In the pricing problem, new portfolios are generated and then added to the restricted  
master problem. The pricing problem can be solved for one airport/sector/region at a time, 
and hence several different and separate pricing problems are typically solved in each 
column generation iteration. Since the quality of the solution highly depends on which 
portfolios are generated, the pricing problem is an essential step of the column generation 
algorithm. The objective of the pricing problem is to generate portfolios that are cheap to 




portfolios found in the pricing problem must be legal in the sense that they fulfill all 
scenario-specific rules, and no illegal portfolios are allowed to enter the restricted master 
problem. 
Due to the mentioned properties, heuristics are often used to solve the pricing 
problem, and therefore, it is interesting to investigate alternative methods to discover if the 
performance can be enhanced. The aim is to find, implement, and compare alternative 
methods for solving the pricing problem. The new methods should be evaluated within the 
existing column generation framework. 
Relating the above description to the contributions of this thesis, Chapter 3 
describes the application of integer programming for the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) security measure allocation problem and involves both the modeling 
and the solution phases. Chapter 4 describes the application of integer programming to 
Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) security measure allocation problem and involves both 
the modeling and solution phases. Chapter 5 describes the application of simulation and 
integer programming to emergency trauma care, respectively, and include both the 
modeling and solution phases.  The goal of this research is to contribute to the development 
of modeling techniques and solution strategies that can be applied to common problem 
structures in large scale integer programming.  
1.2 Limitations 
This dissertation is focused on solving critical, challenging, real-world problems, and 
comparing solutions techniques.  The methods implemented in this thesis are compared 




some consideration to computational time must be taken into account, and therefore, for 
computational reasons, some solution methods might not be appropriate to implement. 
Apart from that, no specific run time limitations apply. The methods should work for any 
given problem instance, i.e., it should be possible to apply the techniques using data 
regardless of the application.  
1.3 Dissertation Outline 
Chapter 1 gives a short introduction to the application of integer programming to 
resource allocation problems. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a background to the 
areas of application that are the focus of Chapters 3, 4, and 5, which themselves give a 
short introduction to the integer programming modeling of each scenario. The papers 
discussed are not presented in their journal format, but rather in an extended and more 
cohesive format suited to the dissertation.  
Chapter 2 introduces the fundamentals of integer programming column generation 
and Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO). It then discusses the solution methodologies for 
each public sector problem, first Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition, and then the exact solution 
technique of column generation and the PSO heuristic.  
Chapter 3 covers all the details of prior TSA work to include an in-depth literature 
review of optimization models for the TSA (Leonard et al., 2019). It is also in Chapter 3 
where we discuss Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) and any relative quantitative 
techniques and how best to incorporate ERM into an OR problem. Chapter 4 provides a 




Chapter 5 reviews of all the literature regarding the development of models for emergency 
trauma networks (Lee et al., 2020) and (Leonard & Lee, 2020). This development includes 
trauma network simulation, multi-region, multi-depot, multi-vehicle, multi-trip, vehicle 
routing problems, ambulance routing problems, and finally, a combination portfolio 
optimization ambulance routing problem. This also includes simulation type constructs to 
approach the emergency trauma network problem. In chapters 3, 4, and 5 we define a 
mixed-integer resource allocation problem and solve using both multi-swarm PSO and 
column generation with and an embedded multi-swarm PSO pricing problem. And lastly, 
Chapter 6 provides summaries, conclusions, and areas of future research.  
1.4 Contributions 
1.4.1 Transportation Security Agency 
This project aims to establish a quantitative construct for enterprise risk assessment 
and optimal portfolio investment to achieve the best aviation security. We first analyze and 
model the various aviation transportation risks and establish their interdependencies. Using 
the security measures and their capabilities, we formulate the multi-objective portfolio 
investment model via a MIP framework. The portfolio risk model determines the best 
capabilities of the current budget and can also pinpoint potential capabilities when changes 
in budget occur. The computational framework allows for marginal cost analysis, which 
determines how best to invest any additional resources for the best overall risk protection 
and return on investment. Our analysis involves cascading and inter-dependency modeling 




optimal security measure portfolios (which type and how many) to distribute across 
airports nationwide with the objectives to minimize the probability of false clears, 
maximize the probability of threat detection, and maximize the risk posture (ability to 
mitigate risks) in aviation security. This study presents the first comprehensive model that 
links all resources across the 440 federally funded airports in the United States. We 
experiment with several computational strategies, including Dantzig-Wolfe 
decomposition, column generation, multi-swarm particle swarm optimization, and a greedy 
heuristic. We present results to contrast the current baseline performance versus some of 
the near-optimal solutions obtained by our system. Our results demonstrate higher risk 
posture, lower false clear, and higher threat detection across all the airports, indicating a 
better risk enterprise strategy and decisions obtained from our system. The risk assessment 
and optimal portfolio investment construct is generalizable and can be readily applied to 
other risk and security problems. 
The risk evaluation methodology is new and approached differently. It was developed 
to build a quantitative framework for non-quantitative risk topics. We now have a 
consistent analysis framework that is easily adaptable for other ERM type scenarios. To do 
this, we reviewed all of the current TSA enterprise risks, tracked their associated risk 
appetites, and defined the interdependency relationships between all of the risk factors.  
Since we do not have reliable estimates for the correlation or historical data to derive them 
from, we adapted network analysis techniques to make a pseudo correlation matrix. We 
implemented a topological overlap matrix that is typically used for biological networks and 




optimization model. Lastly, an adaptable risk posture metric was developed as the primary 
objective and incorporated to assess the risk factors and security measures.     
1.4.2 Customs and Border Patrol 
A large-scale resource allocation integer program was successfully constructed that 
quickly runs to optimality and provides results. This CBP model was directly influenced 
by the current state-of-the-art TSA security screening research that we have designed in 
(Leonard et al., 2019). The overall model continues to be very flexible and can comfortably 
accommodate different resources, new constraints, and additional objectives. The solution 
methodologies that are being put in place are complex, current, and effective. They will 
allow further development of a mathematically supported decision analysis computational 
tool for the CBP to give more justification for their capability gaps and develop smart 
investments. 
With a strong model foundation in place, this formulation is very flexible and can 
comfortably accommodate additional and/or different objectives and constraints. We 
acknowledge our model estimates the following input: false alarm detection rate for 
surveillance devices; list of new and potential technologies to be considered; different 
measures of performance that can be included; Accurate list of current methods that are 
employed and their locations. 
A substantial research gap is due to existing ERM optimization models only perform 
at an operational level and not at a strategic level. As far as we know, the TSA model is 




CBP model is more manageable with 13,888 integer variables (448 of those are binary) 
and is capable of covering a full multi-tier ERM framework (strategic, tactical, and 
operational levels). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first model to mathematically 
determine security strategies for the Customs and Border Patrol, as well as to introduce a 
utility factor to emphasize deterrence/detection impact. The model continues to be very 
flexible and can easily accommodate different resources, new constraints, and additional 
objectives. 
 This dissertation offers an application to the large-scale system we developed for 
TSA risk analysis and determines an optimal solution methodology for solving the security 
measure resource allocation model across multiple border sectors. Under physical/cyber/ 
resource/logistics constraints, this model optimizes the allocation of limited quantities of 
deterrence and detection security measures across the entire southern continental U.S. 
border to maximize the total utility of the measures utilized, maximize the probability of 
deterrence and/or detection, and minimize cost. A utility factor is introduced to rate the 
impact of a security measure. Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition is used to solve the nonlinear 
MIP problem instances, where optimal solutions are shown to be obtained in several 
seconds through several computational examples. Working with CBP, there is an 
opportunity to integrate a multi-tier risk taxonomy framework, (Lee et al., 2019), e.g., 
incorporating migrants, cargos, materials, etc. and their risk interdependencies within the 
resource allocation framework problem to structure a risk-based screening strategy that 




only addresses operational and logistics challenges, and complicated human factors remain 
to be investigated.  
1.4.3 Emergency Trauma Networks 
The emergency trauma network was first analyzed by simulation to handle the size 
of the problem.  The results are subject to change for a different trauma system, with 
different parameters, cost structures, and submissions. However, the most significant 
contribution of this study is that it offers a framework of investment allocation for trauma 
systems and possible ways to evaluate the impact of the investments on the overall 
performance of the trauma system.  It is a top-down approach on a strategic level, but it 
uses the tactical level decisions to evaluate several strategies to improve the system. 
Simulation is a powerful tool to perform a thorough analysis and systematic update of the 
system with given investments and facilitates the decision-making process of decision-
makers in the trauma network. This simulation was intended as a proof of concept to 
demonstrate that improvements to patient well-being can be measured in some manner and 
that alternative solutions can be analyzed. 
The problem then went through three different modeling formulations to reach a 
mixed-integer formulation that resembles the simulation but can provide more accurate 
results.  The first formulation state was developing the Multi-Region, Multi-Depot, Multi-
Trip Vehicle Routing Problem with Time Windows.  This is a known variation of the 
vehicle routing problem but was only portrayed on a smaller scale with two regions and 
was further expanded for the Georgia trauma network.  The Ambulance Routing Problem 




magnitude/extension of a VRP.  One of the primary differences is many ARPs are 
constructed for disaster scenarios versus day-to-day emergency trauma operations. The 
new ARP also implements more constraints based on trauma level classifications for 
patients and hospitals.  Lastly, the resource allocation ARP was constructed to reflect the 
decision capabilities from the simulation. This model final allows us to compare the results 
with the original trauma simulation.  There no known models of this type, combining 
portfolio optimization with VRP. 
1.4.4 Solution Techniques 
All models presented in this dissertation were evaluated in the same manner due to 
having similar foundations.  The solution techniques were chosen specifically because of 
their characteristics.  They all have multiple objectives that represent different goals of the 
decision-makers.  Additionally, they all contain some type of resource allocation or 
portfolio optimization construct. 
The standard method of column generation was utilized for exact solutions if 
problems were too large to be solved with a standard solver.  This was necessary for nearly 
all the problems, with the exception of the CBP problem.  Even though column generation 
can be applied, it is still computationally intensive and very time-consuming. Although it 
is helpful to model difficult problems, in any case, it’s not very helpful if the problems 
cannot be solved effectively.  In order to generate strong solutions efficiently, PSO was 




The PSO for problem set was implemented for discrete optimization and required 
extra consideration for the binary and integer variable boundaries. Many modifications 
and/or potential improvements for PSOs have been studied over the years. In our PSO 
format, we incorporated the velocity controlled hybrid PSO algorithm (VC-HPSO) 
(Yaakob & Watada, 2010). VC-HPSO is a modified standard PSO with the addition of the 
mutation operator of Genetic Algorithms and controlled velocity adjustment. PSOs 
typically perform well in early iterations but have issues reaching near-optimum solutions.  
A standard PSO for our set of large-scale problems was only moderately effective due to 
not being able to reach near-optimal solutions and was also computationally intensive due 
to the size of the data.  
Multi-swarm optimization is derived from standard PSOs but uses multiple sub-
swarms rather than the standard single swarm. Multi-Swarm PSO (MSPSO) were then 
investigated and applied.  The purpose of MSPSO is to divide the population of potential 
into subswarms.  Each subswarm utilizes a different global best for particle movements. 
After each subswarm is run for a set number of iterations, the global best with a better value 
is copied for all of the swarms. This helps broaden the search space and improve 
convergence towards better solutions. 
Lastly, given a traditional exact methodology and an efficient heuristic method, the 
two were combined into one solution method.  We implemented the MSPSO inside column 
generation to solve the pricing problem.  The pricing problem is often the most time-
consuming element of the column generation procedures due to needing to solve a large 




within the column generation framework.  The MSPSO is a much more efficient method 
to select potential columns or portfolios to enter the potential portfolio solution subset.  As 
mentioned previously, the following chapter will cover the literature review of all of the 




CHAPTER 2.  SOLUTION METHODOLOGY 
 This chapter introduces the fundamentals of mixed-integer programming column 
generation and PSO. The problems explored in this dissertation are prohibitively large in 
terms of their data requirements and model formulation and require reformulation prior to 
solving. After reformulating the problem, we found success in solving large instances with 
traditional column generation and PSO. The downside to both methods is solution time. 
Due to the number of subproblems in the pricing problem, column generation takes an 
excessive amount of time. Due to the number of variables in the problem, PSO also takes 
an excessive amount of time to complete.  
 In order to make solving extremely large problems more accessible, we 
implemented a multi-column generation and multi-swarm PSO. Neither of these methods 
is new at this time, but uniting the two methods into a multi-column generation with a 
multi-swarm PSO is. In the following sections, we will cover the full background of the 
solution techniques implemented.  
2.1 Dantzig-Wolfe Decomposition 
A decomposition was necessary to linearize the risk structures or nonlinear portions 
of the model. A Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition is applied and discussed further in the 
following section. The Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition makes sense based on the problem 
structure. It allows division of the optimization problem into two groups of “easy” and 




the LP by making it nonlinear and more difficult to solve. When these hard constraints are 
removed from the problem, then more efficient techniques can be applied to solve the 
remaining linear program or, in this case, IP. 
Mathematical programs that contain a large space of integer variables are particularly 
suited for Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition that reformulates the original compact problem to 
provide a tighter linear programming relaxation bound. This decomposition relies on a 
delayed column generation algorithm. Many programs are too large to consider all the 
variables explicitly, and most of the variables will be neglected in the optimal solution, so 
the algorithm only considers a subset of variables when solving the problem. Column 
generation only generates the variables with negative reduced costs that have the potential 
to improve the objective function. The primary use of Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition here 
is to reformulate the portfolio of selected resources (security measures or emergency 
resources) and employing the column generation algorithm or PSO.  
The Dantzig-Wolfe reformulation results in a master problem and subproblems, 
whose typically large number of variables are dealt with implicitly by using an integer 
programming column generation procedure, known as a branch-and-price algorithm. 
Solving the master problem does not require an explicit enumeration of all its columns 
because the column generation algorithm allows one to generate columns if/when needed. 
Often, this allows one to solve huge integer programs that were previously considered 
intractable. The combination of the Dantzig-Wolfe reformulation and column generation 





Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition is a valuable tool to solve large structured models that 
cannot be solved using standard algorithms due to the limited capacity of solvers and the 
underlying CPUs. The main idea behind the technique is to decompose the original 
problem into several independent subproblems, whose solutions are then assembled by 
solving a so-called restricted master problem. The restricted master problem is then solved 
iteratively. In our scenarios, we can identify the natural decomposition of the problem: for 
different values of k (i.e., for each airport/border sectors/emergency regions), the 
corresponding sets of constraints are independent, because they contain disjoint sets of 
variables. If we were able to assume that all k (airports/border sectors/emergency regions) 
are homogeneous, all those subproblems would be identical, and we would have a 
particular case where solving the subproblem once is enough. However, this is not the case, 
which is part of what makes these problems extremely large.   
In the Dantzig-Wolfe reformulation, the final result is a master problem which 
contains one variable for each solution to the original formulation. In our scenarios, such a 
solution represents a valid security measure portfolio to be installed at the respective 
airports, or a valid security measure portfolio to be installed at the respective border sectors, 
or a portfolio of upgrades to be made within the emergency trauma regions.   
2.2 Column Generation 
After completing the decomposition, a result is a massive number of decision 
variables with a very small number of constraints.  The main advantage of using column 




the decision variables are included in the model, and the rest are taken into account 
implicitly.   
Assume that the following problem, with m constraints and n decision variables, is 
to be solved by the simplex method for linear programs.  This problem is the master 
problem (MP) seen below in equations (2.1) - (2.3),  




s.t.       ∑ 𝑎𝑗𝑥𝑗 ≥ 𝑏𝑗𝜖𝑁  
(2.2) 
 
𝑥𝑗 ≥ 0, 𝑗𝜖𝑁 
(2.3) 
Let 𝑥𝑗 , 𝑗𝜖𝑁, be a non-negative, continuous decision variable and 𝑐 ϵℝ
𝑛, 
𝑥𝑗  ϵℝ
𝑛, 𝑎𝑗  ϵℝ
n, and 𝑏 ϵℝ𝑚. The vector, u, represents the dual variables associated with the 
linear constraints. The pricing step of a simplex iteration performs the following evaluation 
(equation (2.4)) on a non-basic variable xj′ such that 
 𝑗′ = 𝑎𝑟𝑔 𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝑐?̅? = 𝑐𝑗 − 𝑢
𝑇𝑎𝑗 ∶  𝑗 ∈ 𝑁} 
(2.4) 
is chosen to enter the basis if 𝑐?̅?′ < 0. If 𝑐?̅?′ ≥ 0, an optimal solution has been found, and 
the algorithm terminates. 
In a column generation application, the set of columns N is assumed to be very large 
such that it is practically challenging or not possible to store all columns explicitly. Instead, 
only a subset of the columns ?̅? ⊆ 𝑁 is initially used, forming a restricted master problem 




Let ?̅? and ?̅? be an optimal primal solution and the corresponding complementary dual 
solution, respectively, to RMP.  In the pricing step, a subproblem is solved over set P, 
which uses constraints to describe the feasible columns implicitly instead of an explicitly 
searching among variables 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁\?̅?. The cost of the column is represented by 𝑐𝑗, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁 . 
The objective of the subproblem (SP) is to find 
(𝑆𝑃) 𝑐̅∗ =  𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝑐𝑗 − 𝑢
𝑇𝑎𝑗: 𝑎𝑗 ∈ 𝑃, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁} (2.5) 
The problem formulation using MP and SP introduced above in (2.5), is called an 
extensive formulation of a problem.  
Depending on the structure of the coefficient matrix and the cost coefficients, 
different techniques can be used to solve the subproblem. The only requirement for a 
column to enter the RMP is that it should have a negative reduced cost. Therefore, it is not 
necessary to solve the pricing problem to optimality as long as one column with a negative 
reduced cost can be selected to enter the RMP.  A potential downside to selecting the first 
column to enter the RMP with a negative reduced cost is the possibility of missing a 
“better” column with a more negative reduced cost.  
Assuming the solution method for solving the pricing problem finds the column 
with minimal reduced cost, then when no column with a negative reduced cost can be 
found, the optimal solution to the original problem has been found.  
Ronnberg (Ronnberg, 2012) provided a thorough, yet brief summary on the little 
literature available on branch-and-price alternatives for obtaining integer solutions in a 
column generation setting. The original reference is (Barnhart et al., 1998) and for 




Murphy, 1979).  (Barnhart et al., 1998) and (Lübbecke & Desrosiers, 2005) provide an 
excellent survey of integer programming and column generation, and are essential to 
building the foundation. Wilhelm (Wilhelm, 2001) provides another excellent survey that 
includes several detailed examples. 
Ronnberg (Ronnberg, 2012) also identified the following papers as the foundation 
of column generation as an IP solution technique. Ford and Fulkerson (Ford Jr & 
Fulkerson, 1958) first suggested that the variables of a multicommodity flow problem 
should be dealt with only implicitly. Dantzig and Wolfe were able to develop this initial 
column generation strategy when they introduced Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition (Dantzig 
& Wolfe, 1960). Gilmore and Gomory presented the first complete implementation of a 
column generation strategy in (Gilmore & Gomory, 1961) and (Gilmore & Gomory, 1963). 
Appelgren then discussed the challenges of combining column generation and linear-
programming-based branch-and-bound in (Appelgren, 1969). 
2.3 Discrete Particle Swarm Optimization 
In the past 25 years, the PSO algorithm has established itself as a very efficient global 
optimizer. PSO was first introduced in (Eberhart & Kennedy, 1995) as a population-based 
technique for solving continuous optimization problems.  It was inspired by the swarming 
behavior found in bird flocks and fish schools.  The problem is iteratively solved by moving 
an improving a set of candidate solutions (particles) towards previously known good 
solutions. Each particle has an associated position and velocity within the search space.  In 
each iteration, a linear combination of each particles’ previously known local best position 




Kennedy and Eberhart (Kennedy & Eberhart, 1997) proposed binary (discrete) PSO 
(BPSO) to solve binary optimization problems. The particle velocity is passed through a 
continuous transfer function taking values in the interval [0,1] or, in the case of discrete 
integer values greater than one, in the interval of [0, upper bound]. The output of the 
function is the probability of the particle position in the next iteration.  
The general BPSO algorithm is presented in a very succinct manner in (Curry, 2018) 
and is described below. Let N be the number of particles in the swarm, and d represents the 
dimension/s of the decision variable. The position and the velocity of the particle are then 
pi = [𝑝1
𝑖 , 𝑝2
𝑖 , … , 𝑝𝑑
𝑖 ] and vi = [𝑣1
𝑖 , 𝑣2
𝑖 , … , 𝑣𝑑
𝑖 ] respectively with i = 1, 2, . . . , N.  The algorithm 
begins by initializing the position and velocity of each particle and evaluating the objective 
function, f, using the position of each particle, f(pi) ∀ i = 1, 2, . . . , N. The best position 
found by each particle i and the best position found by the entire swarm are stored as 𝑝𝑝𝐵𝑒𝑠𝑡
𝑖  
and pgBest respectively. The functions (2.6) and (2.7) take the particles’ current position, p
i, 
and update 𝑝𝑝𝐵𝑒𝑠𝑡
𝑖  and pgBest in each iteration.  
 if  f (pi) < f (𝑝𝑝𝐵𝑒𝑠𝑡
𝑖 ), then 𝑝𝑝𝐵𝑒𝑠𝑡
𝑖 ← pi (2.6) 
 if  f (pi) < f (𝑝𝑔𝐵𝑒𝑠𝑡), then 𝑝𝑔𝐵𝑒𝑠𝑡← p
i (2.7) 
Using the best positions found so far, the velocities and positions for each particle i = 
1, 2, . . . , N are updated using equations (2.8) and (2.9) below.  The cognitive component 
and the social component are the constants c1 and c2 and r1 and r2 are random numbers in 





𝑖  − 𝑝𝑖
𝑡) + 𝑐2𝑟2(𝑝𝑔𝐵𝑒𝑠𝑡,𝑡  − 𝑝𝑖








If w > 1, exploration is favored and if w < 1 exploitation is preferred by 
drawing the particles towards the current best position. For our purposes, we maintain a w 
> 1 to encourage exploration of a very large search space. Selecting an appropriate value 
of w, along with common values, is presented in (Wahde, 2008). A different approach 
encourages exploration at the beginning of the algorithm to provide a broader global search 
and then reducing w towards the end to exploit previously known good areas. The 
adjustment is made by reducing w by a constant factor in each iteration until it reaches a 
lower bound. In future research, it might be beneficial to adjust w to see if the optimality 
gap can be reduced.  
Although the velocities are calculated with each iteration, they are bound by the 
interval [−vmax, vmax], and depending on the sign; they are set to the upper or lower bound 
if they fall outside the interval. Generally, the particle is more likely to move towards a 
previously known good solution, but by using a transfer function, the particle, with some 
probability, will move in another direction. The velocities passed through the transfer 
function, explained in the next section in equations (2.13) and (2.14), are used to update 
the particle positions. The new position is then used to update the velocity once again, 
according to the update rule in equation (2.8). The velocity is also used to determine new 
probabilities by using the transfer function. The sequence of calculating probabilities, 
updating positions, and updating velocities is repeated until the maximum number of 
iterations has been performed, or some other stopping criterion is met, such as no 




This is a relatively simplistic metaheuristic that applies to many problem types and 
can search very large spaces of candidate solutions. Unfortunately, it does not guarantee 
an optimal solution is found, but the goal is to see relatively quick convergence of the 
particles towards a solution. In multi-objective problems, Pareto dominance is taken into 
account when moving the particles and non-dominated solutions are stored as to 
approximate the Pareto front. 
The original design (Eberhart & Kennedy, 1995) and (Kennedy & Eberhart, 1997) 
have been regularly modified (Shi & Eberhart, 1998) and (Engelbrecht, 2010) and analyzed 
extensively in (Van den Bergh & Engelbrecht, 2006). For our work, the velocity controlled 
hybrid PSO (VC-HPSO) algorithm was included in our overall PSO framework (Yaakob 
& Watada, 2010).  This update was specifically included due to Yakoob’s application of 
the PSO for the portfolio selection problem, which is essentially what the problems in this 
dissertation result in after decomposition.  Yakoob incorporated the mutation operator to 
encourage PSOs to converge on local points. Without the appropriate operator, if a 
particle’s current position is similar to the global best and its inertial weight and previous 
velocity are not equal to zero, the particle will actually move away from the global best.  If 
the previous velocities are very close to zero, then all the particles will stop moving around 
the current best solution, possibly leading to premature convergence and stopping the 
algorithm short of completion.  If all of the particles converge to only the best solution thus 
far (not the optimal), the algorithm has reached stagnation. A mutation operator helps the 
algorithm avoid stagnation by introducing new genetic material in the existing individual. 




to avoid overly distorting reasonable solutions. Using a large pm initially ensures that ample 
search space is covered, while pm rapidly decreases when individual particles begin 
converging to the optimum, seen in equation (2.10) below.   
 𝑝𝑚
′ = 𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥 −
𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝐺𝑚𝑎𝑥
× 𝑡 (2.10) 
The multi-swarm is one of the most popular approaches for PSO modification (Liang 
& Suganthan, 2005), (Ostadrahimi et al., 2012), and (Solomon et al., 2011).  
2.3.1 Multi-Swarm PSO 
 The multi-swarm PSO (MS-PSO) is based on the local version of PSO with a new 
neighborhood topology.  One of the important differences is that many existing 
evolutionary algorithms require larger populations, while PSO needs a comparatively 
smaller population size. A PSO with a population of three to five particles can achieve 
satisfactory results for simple problems (Zhao et al., 2008). According to many reported 
results on the local version of PSO (Kennedy, 1999) (Broyden, 1970), small neighborhoods 
perform better on complex problems. Therefore, the MS-PSO using small neighborhoods 
can slow down convergence speed and increase diversity to achieve better results on 
multimodal problems.  
In the multi-swarm approaches, the population is divided into multiple sub-
populations (sub-swarms) with different levels of communication. This allows the 
population to maintain divergence, search various promising regions, and partially 




swarm) size is discussed in great detail. Pluhacek proposed that six particles per swarm 
might be the optimal number for PSO based algorithms (Pluhacek 2016).  
It was demonstrated in (Pluhacek, 2016) that the multi-swarm performance was 
superior to the single swarm PSO in all cases.  Based on the comparative study of single 
swarm PSO versus multi-swarm PSO performed in (Pluhacek, 2016), we decided to utilize 
multi-swarm PSO, with five sub-swarms, with varying particle sizes from 5 to 10 particles 
per swarm. Out standard control parameters were set as follows: 
• Population Size: 5 to 10 particles (solutions) in each population 
• Iterations: 10 
• vinitial:  10% of position (new velocity of the ith particle in iteration t+1) 
• wmax:  0.9 (maximum inertia weight value) 
• wmin:  0.4 (minimum inertia weight value) 
• c1, c2 = 1.49445 (learning factors or acceleration constants) 
• pBest – Local (personal) best solution found by the ith particle 
• gBest – Best solution found in a population 
• x, z = current positions of the ith particle 
• rand = Pseudo-random number, interval (0,1) 
The searching within a subswarm is a repeated with stop criteria occurring when 
the maximum number of iterations has been reached, or the minimum error condition is 
satisfied. The process continues across all subswarms, where the global best is now 
recorded amongst all of the subswarms and compared to one another. An advantage of PSO 
is not many parameters require tuning.  The dimension of the particles (dimension of 
solution set) is prohibitively large in this case, require keeping the number of particles to a 
minimum size.  The upper and lower bounds of the decision variables determine the range 




iteration.  We require two different velocities to track along with our binary and integer 
variables. 
 The multi-swarm optimization algorithm works as follows in Algorithm 1:  
Algorithm 1: MS-PSO()                     
Input: MP (1) 
Swarm_size: number of the swarm particles 
No_subswarms: number of subswarms 
Step 1:  Calculate Subswarm size= Swarm_size/No_subswarms 
Step 2:  For subswarm = 1 to No_subswarms do 
For t=1 to Max_iterations do 





Return final result in 𝑝𝑔𝐵𝑒𝑠𝑡 
Append the result to the results list 
             End For 
Select best global subswarm result 
 
2.4 Solving the Pricing Problem Using MS-PSO  
In Section 2.2, we reiterate that the pricing problem consists of finding columns with 
negative reduced costs. For our problems, a column corresponds to a portfolio of security 
measures/trauma investments, and the pricing problem is solved separately for each 
airport/border sector/region, 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾.  
During each MSPSO iteration, each particle has its own position vector that is 
comprised of a set of columns 𝑝𝑗  , 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽𝑘, where Jk is the set of all column indices for each 
airport/border sector/region, 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾. The position of the particle is determined by the unique 




iteration, the particle is associated with a new set of potential columns. The number of 
investment measures to be installed for the respective installation site, k, are determined 
within each iteration and are different for all particles and represented by zdkj. Therefore, 
each variable requires its own particle position, denoted by pi ∈ {0, 1}|T| and its velocity by 
vi ∈ R|T | with i = 1, 2, . . . , N.  
We begin by randomly generating the initial N particle positions from the set of the 
potential investment portfolios for each k, 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽𝑘. The algorithm is considered to be a type 
of local search (Pirlot, 1996) due to new columns being influenced by the best-known set 
of columns. The velocity vector for each particle is initialized within the predefined lower 
and upper bounds, [−vmax, vmax], and the algorithm continues to search for new columns 
until the stop criteria is reached. 
Each column is evaluated within our column generation code, and the reduced cost 
for each particle is computed for each iteration. A column is saved to the list of entering 
columns to the RMP if it has a negative reduced cost. The reduced costs of the previously 
known best positions are compared to the reduced cost of each particle’s current position 
to potentially update both 𝑝𝑝𝐵𝑒𝑠𝑡
𝑖  and 𝑝𝑔𝐵𝑒𝑠𝑡. Then, as previously mentioned, the velocities 
are updated according to equations (2.11) and (2.12) below. 
 if  𝑣𝑡
𝑖 > 𝑣𝑚𝑎𝑥 , then 𝑣𝑡
𝑖 ← 𝑣𝑚𝑎𝑥  (2.11) 
 if 𝑣𝑡
𝑖 < −𝑣𝑚𝑎𝑥 , then 𝑣𝑡
𝑖 ← −𝑣𝑚𝑎𝑥 (2.12) 
Lastly, the particle positions are updated by applying a transfer function. Transfer 
functions are selected such that each particle is encouraged to stay in its current position 




function first presented in the original BPSO (Kennedy & Eberhart, 1997), below in (2.13). 
The function in (2.13) is a sigmoid limiting transformation, and the position in the next 









1           𝑖𝑓 𝑟 < 𝜎(𝑣𝑡
𝑖),




The complete PSO for generating new columns with MSPSO is presented in 
Algorithm 2.  
Algorithm 2: CG Pricing with MS-PSO()                     
Result: Columns with negative reduced cost, that represent potential 
portfolio options are added to the set of feasible portfolios 
 
Input: MP (1) 
Swarm_size: number of the swarm particles 
No_subswarms: number of subswarms 
Step 1:  Calculate Subswarm size= Swarm_size/No_subswarms 
Step 2:  Initialize all particle positions   
Step 3:  For subswarm = 1 to No_subswarms do 
While  t=1 < Max_iterations do 
                                         For particles i do  
                                                Apply PSO algorithm as in Eqs. (2.8) and (2.9) 
                                              if costi < 0 then 
                                                 NewColumns ← saveColumnToRMP(pi) 




       End For 
End While 
Return final result in 𝑝𝑔𝐵𝑒𝑠𝑡 
Append the result to the results list 
             End For 
Select best global subswarm result 




CHAPTER 3. TSA RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
3.1 Introduction 
Aviation security has been a regular topic of study for the last two decades. In the 
aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the evolution of risk-based 
aviation security began. In response to the attacks, the Aviation and Transportation 
Security Act went into effect, requiring that a computer-assisted passenger prescreening 
system evaluate all passengers. This system has been through several development cycles, 
starting with the Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS), then the 
second-generation CAPPS II (operated by TSA), and now Secure Flight. Secure Flight is 
a risk-based passenger prescreening program that matches passengers' names against 
trusted traveler lists and watchlists and then identifies them as high or low-risk 
(Administration, n.d.). Based on information derived from both government and 
commercial databases, Secure Flight conducts risk assessments to determine which 
passengers might be eligible for TSA precheck screening or standard screening. The results 
also prevent potential passengers on the No Fly List and Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention Do Not Board List from boarding an aircraft. (Sadler, 2016) 
Security constructs have been designed as multi-layered systems to incorporate 
several security measures for screening methods. We are now able to integrate passenger, 
baggage, and cargo screening operations to model complex airport security paths. Over the 
past 18 years, there have been regular changes to all aspects of aviation security systems. 




for all travelers throughout the United States. Billions of dollars were initially invested in 
security measures before official plans were put in place. Initial analysis was completed 
after the fact, and changes have been necessary to ensure that we are doing our best to 
protect all travelers as technology and research have evolved. 
Although there are many familiar elements of this research, there are new 
contributions attributed to the DHS’s current ERM efforts and the desire to implement an 
all-encompassing model. The Office of Management and Budget has established 
government-wide ERM in recent years. However, two years prior, TSA was already 
experimenting with their implementation of ERM (TSA, 2014). Most organizations that 
have been able to implement ERM are traditional corporations that are looking to change 
their organizations’ decision-making constructs to reduce risk and maximize profits. In this 
case, TSA is taking a security-based approach to implementing ERM by reducing risk and 
maximizing their risk posture. The overall understanding of ERM is the same across all 
organizations, however. ERM will be used to determine how the organization approaches 
decision-making, resource allocation, and all of its operations. The goal of ERM is not to 
eliminate all risk, but to effectively prioritize the response to issues an organization faces. 
For TSA, especially, the focus is on how ERM can help organize their resources to achieve 
their organizational and strategic objectives.  
3.2 TSA Prior Work 




 DHS defines risk as “the potential for an unwanted outcome resulting from an 
incident, event, or occurrence, as determined by its likelihood and the associated 
consequences” (Council, 2010).  By incorporating ERM into its strategy, TSA hopes to use 
a consistent analysis framework to balance risk and cost on a common basis across the 
enterprise (Minsky, 2013). Risk assessments must be connected to goals and activities 
within a risk taxonomy to give purpose and measurement of effectiveness. The TSA ERM 
program will provide a balanced quantitative approach in their RM program. Only by 
quantifying risks and tolerances upfront and using a common framework can the allocation 
of resources be applied to the methods that manage them effectively. 
 With regard to applying ERM to the TSA organization, Fletcher and Abbas 
provided a case study in 2017 (Fletcher & Abbas, 2018). The primary benefit of the case 
study is that it defines a clear alternative objective to profit by using Public Value (made 
up of multiple attributes). The same analysis was performed using Value-at-Risk (VaR) to 
determine the effect of focusing on risk thresholds (probability of exceeding a negative 
outcome). The authors show that the public value approach is preferred. However, for our 
research, the element of VaR can easily be translated to a similar measurement, such as 
maximizing the successful security alert (true alarm) rate. Although the research topics are 
similar, there is a significant difference in our quantitative approaches and the desired 
output. We are interested in a resource allocation optimization model to optimize risk and 
reward, and the Pareto frontier will represent the tradeoffs between the multiple objectives. 




of the catastrophic destruction of a mid-flight large commercial aircraft due to a terrorist 
detonation of an improvised explosive device (IED). (Fletcher & Abbas, 2017). 
3.2.2 Risk-Based Security 
Passengers are categorized by risk to receive either less or more security screening from 
a notional baseline applied to any passenger with unknown risk.  Passengers are grouped 
into four categories, with travelers in either of the first two groups subject to reduced 
screening.   Trusted travelers have successfully completed an extensive background check. 
Low-risk passengers have completed a less comprehensive background check. Unknown 
Risk passengers are subject to the same level of primary screening currently applied to all 
passengers. High-risk passengers undergo far more extensive security screening due to 
suspected ties to terrorist organizations or individual terrorists (Fletcher, 2011). The risk-
based approach seeks to find an appropriate balance between identifying individuals with 
ill intent and broadly applied searches for weapons and other prohibited items. The risk-
based approach further develops the trusted traveler’s program by reducing primary 
screening measures for low-risk passengers and implementing more significant security 
measures for high-risk passengers. 
3.2.3 Topological Networks 
Network topology refers to how network nodes are physically or logically 
organized with respect to one another. If you think of your network as a city, and the 
topology as the road map, there are several ways to arrange a network, each with its own 




arrangements can provide a greater degree of connectivity and security (What Is Network 
Topology?, 2019). 
A topological network is formed by two sets of elements: nodes (or vertices), 
which are connected points in the network, and links (or edges), which are physical or 
defined, connections between pairs of nodes. Within each set, elements are non-
distinguishable, and can have non-directed and have equal weighted links or are 
distinguishable with potentially directed and unequal weighted links. 
A real-world example is a structure consisting of atoms and bonds which represent 
the nodes and links, respectively. A path is a series of sequentially connected nodes and 
links without overlap, and a ring is simply a closed path. Yuan (Yuan, 2002) presents an 
efficient algorithm for finding primitive rings in a topological network. A ring with n links 
is called an n-ring. For each node (link), there should exist a local cluster of rings that 
contains that node (link). We call such a set of rings a ring-cluster of that node (link). A 
primitive ring is simply a ring without a shortcut.     
In Kos (Kos et al., 2002), they focus on topological planning of large-scale 
communication networks like those used by telecom operators. Due to the high costs of 
network equipment and the large geographical spread of the networks, finding an optimal 
topology is critical. They present a 3-stage network design process that decides which 
network elements to include in the backbone, selects network topology, and determines 
node and link capacities needed for traffic management and routing. 
Rai (Rai, 2019) considers the problem of inferring the topology of a network using 




They provide a simple method to obtain path interference, which identifies whether two 
paths in the network intersect with each other.  They take this information and formulate 
the topology inference problem as an IP and develop algorithms to solve it optimally. The 
method is applicable for networks with tree and ring topologies.    
In Gounaris (Gounaris, 2015), they propose the use of mixed-integer linear 
optimization modeling and solution methodologies to address the Network Generation 
Problem. They present several useful modeling techniques and apply them to 
mathematically express and constrain network properties in the context of an optimization 
formulation. They then develop complete formulations for the generation of networks that 
attain specified levels of connectivity, spread, similar node connectedness, and robustness. 
Topological networks are prominent in biological structures. Yip (Yip, 2007) 
introduces a general class of node dissimilarity measures based on the notion of 
`topological' overlap. The resulting generalized topological overlap measure (GTOM) 
generalizes the standard topological overlap measure (TOM) introduced by Ravasz et al. 
(Ravasz, 2002). Specifically, the m-th order version of this family is constructed by 
counting the number of m-step neighbors that are shared by a pair of nodes and normalizing 
it to take a value between 0 and 1. The TOM was introduced to analyze metabolic networks 
with distinct organisms that are organized into connected topological modules that combine 
in a hierarchical manner (Ravasz, 2002).  The primary use of the GTOM measures is the 
identification of network modules (sets of tightly connected nodes). But it can also be used 
to define novel measures of node connectivity. These GTOM based connectivity measures 




order connections. In (Yip 2007), they discuss the properties of the GTOM measures and 
provide empirical evidence that they are useful in the context of gene co-expression 
network analysis.  
 A topological representation of the TSA risk factors became a natural fit for the 
problem.  It provides a method to detail the interdependencies and hierarchy for a correlated 
network that operates without quantitative values.  From here, the GTOM method utilized 
for gene co-expression (Yip, 2007) was successfully applied to the risk factors and then 
integrated into the primary objective for the integer program.   
3.2.4 TSA Integer Programming Problems 
Early discrete optimization research for aviation security dates back prior to 
September 11, 2001. However, the first screening optimization models appear to develop 
post 9/11. These models included checked baggage for high-risk passengers screened for 
explosives, selectee, and non-selectee screening, where the goal was determining how to 
deploy and use limited baggage screening devices optimally. These models led to the 
development of the following baggage security models (McLay, 2011). First, the 
Uncovered Flight Segment Problem (UFSP), which found a subset of flights to screen such 
that the total amount of covered flights subject to a screening capacity is maximized. Next 
came the Uncovered Passenger Segment Problem (UPSP), which found a subset of flights 
to screen such that the total amount of passengers of covered flights subject to a screening 
capacity was maximized. Last, the Uncovered Baggage Segment Problem (UBSP) found a 





The research continued to develop and expand every year, as did the growing 
concern for the safety of travelers and citizens. The next iteration of models included how 
to match the limited security measures to the number of passengers that needed to be 
screened. (Poole & Passantino, 2003) proposed a risk-based airport security system that 
depends on sorting passengers and their bags into two or more risk classes with screening 
resources applied to each class according to its risk level. The significant finding was that 
such a risk-based system might be more effective than the system where all passengers and 
bags receive equal scrutiny. (McLay, 2011) considered the multilevel allocation problem 
(MAP) where every would-be passenger is assigned an assessed threat value, which 
quantifies the risk associated with the characteristics of the passenger. The assignment of 
passengers to a given number of classes of checking devices is done to maximize the true 
alarm rate, subject to budget constraints. (Sewell et al., 2012) used a similar idea to consider 
how to allocate explosive screening devices for checked baggage in multiple airports 
setting where passengers are divided into classes according to their perceived risk levels. 
A different approach was taken by (Babu et al., 2006) who assumed that passengers 
are indistinguishable with respect to risk attributes, and considered how to assign 
passengers to different combinations of check stations such that the false alarm rate is 
minimized while keeping the false clear rate within specified limits. A major conclusion 
was that passenger grouping is beneficial even when the threat probability is assumed 
constant across all passengers. (Nie, et al., 2009) took Babu’s model one step further, and 
instead of assuming that all passengers maintain a constant threat probability, they assumed 




minimize the probability of false alarm, and they compared it to Babu’s model through 
performance measures of the overall probability of false alarm and the total number of 
screeners needed. 
3.3 Our Contributions 
This research takes into consideration many of the previous operational level airport 
security models and their security resource allocation objectives and aggregates and 
expands their objectives and constraints into a single large scale mixed integer 
programming portfolio optimization problem with a primary objective of maximizing the 
risk posture of the TSA. The risk posture of the TSA is determined by their risk levels and 
risk factors, none of which I will go into detail in this article due to the necessary discretion. 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section “TSA Prior Work” provides a background of 
the various types of security models that have been proposed/implemented and a brief 
history of ERM and risk analysis. Section “Mathematical Model” models the problem as a 
multi-objective nonlinear integer program. Section “Solution Methodology” describes 
using a Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition type of approach to handle the nonlinear constraints 
and objective and the binding constraint of allocating the devices across the set of airports. 
It also describes implementing a column generation approach to solve the model to 
optimality due to a large number of decision variables. Section “Computational 
Challenges” reports computational results from several problem instances that demonstrate 





3.4 Risk Design 
In considering risk, we needed to explore the effect of risk correlation (Kendrick, 
2008). The overall risk across all projects depends on correlation. For programs or 
portfolios of related projects, the risks are correlated, and uncertainty may increase. For 
portfolios of independent projects, risks may be offset and possibly decrease uncertainty. 
This initial information was critical in helping to identify all “projects” and the project-
level risks that represent significant exposure. All program risks were listed related to 
complexity or scale, and all shared resources were identified too. On a strategic level, all 
project interconnections or interdependencies were fully mapped out. Portfolio correlation 
factors can be attributed to the reliance on similar technologies or resources and also due 
to having common project risks. So we pursued risk correlation analysis to lower the 
program and portfolio risk and begin the process by generating a correlation matrix, 
including all of the organizational risk factors. 
Developing the interdependencies in enterprise risk was an intricate process. It 
required a certain level of understanding of TSA as an enterprise, their risk appetite, and 
the associated risks. Due to the nature of the organization and the security of our nation, I 
will discuss the evolution of a risk interdependency mapping but will exclude any pertinent 
information. Although TSA is a governmental organization that does not ascribe to a 
capitalist set of objectives, ERM is still a very critical tool for organizations to implement. 
The tricky part is making ERM work for “you.” With that said, we reviewed all of the 
current TSA enterprise risks, tracked their associated risk appetites, and then defined 




After developing the initial risk level and risk factor construct, the model 
development was the next critical stage. Portfolio optimization is the optimal assignment 
of limited capital to available financial assets to achieve a reasonable trade-off between 
profit and risk objectives. The classical Markowitz model uses the variance as the risk 
measure and is a quadratic programming problem (Markowitz, 1952). Although we are not 
constructing traditional portfolio optimization models, there are similar thoughts in 
assigning limited capital to available security measures.  Portfolio models are typically 
adapted from this original construct, and correlation matrices play a critical role in risk 
management. Since we do not have reliable estimates for the correlation or historical data 
to derive them from, we will adapt network analysis techniques to make a pseudo 
correlation matrix. 
A network can be represented by an adjacency matrix, 𝐴 = [𝑎𝑖𝑗], that encodes 
whether or how a pair of nodes is connected (Ravasz et al., 2002). Let A be a symmetric 
matrix with entries in [0,1]. For an unweighted network, entries are integer values of 0 or 
1 depending on whether or not two nodes are adjacent (connected). A more complex 
network might depend on the degree of interaction between nodes. The matrices are then 
normalized such that the diagonals are equal to 1. The off diagonals are scaled values, 
thereby extending the adjacency matrix from the binary case to values in the range of [0,1]. 
Generalized Connectivity equals the row sum of the adjacency matrix. For unweighted 




A critical aim of network analysis is to detect subsets of nodes (modules) that are 
tightly connected to each other (Yip & Horvath, 2007). The topological overlap matrix 
(TOM) is a similarity measure for biological networks. In a hierarchical network, nodes 
can be connected by links carrying a weight 𝐽𝑖𝑗. The weighted degree of node i is defined 
as: 𝑤𝑖 = ∑
𝑁
𝑗=1:𝑗≠i 𝐽𝑖𝑗. 
The original TOM does not account for the presence of weights 𝑂𝑖𝑗 =
|𝑁(𝑖)∩𝑁(𝑗)|+𝐴𝑖𝑗
min{|𝑁1(𝑖)|,|𝑁2(𝑗)|}+1−𝐴𝑖𝑗
 The presence of weights can be accounted for by modifying the 
previous equation by replacing the unweighted adjacency matrix with the normalized 






, as seen in Table 3.1. If 𝑂𝑖𝑗 = 1 
then the node with fewer connections satisfies the conditions that all of its neighbors are 
also neighbors of the other node, and it is connected to the other node. Alternatively, 𝑂𝑖𝑗 =
0 if 𝑖 and 𝑗 are un-connected and the two nodes do not share any neighbors. 
Table 3.1 - Weighted Topological Overlap Matrix 
 
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12 R13 R14 R15 R16 R17
R1 1.00 0.22 0.13 0.17 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R2 0.17 1.00 0.17 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R3 0.07 0.17 1.00 0.00 0.17 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R4 0.11 0.14 0.14 1.00 0.14 0.11 0.33 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00
R5 0.00 0.07 0.17 0.00 1.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R6 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.20 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R7 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.33 0.06 0.06 1.00 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.00
R8 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.30 0.24 0.24 0.33 1.00 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.20 0.11 0.00
R9 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.00 0.33 0.33 0.00 0.33 1.00 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.20 0.11 0.00
R10 0.18 0.26 0.22 0.10 0.22 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00
R12 0.27 0.21 0.27 0.19 0.27 0.33 0.22 0.22 0.30 0.33 0.29 1.00 0.41 0.33 0.41 0.24 0.22
R13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.11 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.38 0.00 0.00
R14 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.33 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R15 0.26 0.36 0.30 0.33 0.30 0.23 0.22 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 1.00 0.14 0.07
R16 0.21 0.18 0.26 0.14 0.26 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.17




As previously mentioned, TSA employs a system of interconnected security layers 
to deter, detect, and prevent exploitation of commercial aviation by terrorists. This analysis 
incorporates all current measures and newly tested measures but is not a comprehensive 
list of security measures employed. There are likely to be additional measures or new 
technology that will be considered for model inputs. Each security measure has an 
interdependent relationship with the enterprise risk factors identified by TSA. An 
additional assignment matrix, Table 3.2, can be constructed to show direct relationships 
between them.  From here, we generate an assignment matrix allowing us to relate the risk 
taxonomy to the security measures put in place. Depending on the security measure, a 
failure to detect a threat could impact multiple risk elements of the taxonomy.   
Table 3.2 - Security Measure Assignment (SMA) Matrix 
  
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12 R13 R14 R15 R16 R17
SM1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1
SM2 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1
SM3 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1
SM4 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1
SM5 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0
SM6 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0
SM7 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0
SM8 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0
SM9 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
SM10 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
SM11 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
SM12 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
SM13 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
SM14 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
SM15 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
SM16 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
SM17 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0
SM18 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0
SM19 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0
SM20 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0
SM21 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0
SM22 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
SM23 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
SM24 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
SM25 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0




 We developed a method to calculate the risk posture evaluation metric as a means 
to integrate the risk factors and security measures that are put in place by TSA. Based on 
the type of information that we are working with and the data available, our primary focus 
will be to maximize our Risk Posture versus minimizing a Risk Score. Risk Posture is used 
to describe overall readiness to take the risk, which is an accurate description of TSAs’ 
strategy to always be prepared. Our goal is to maximize the overall risk posture by 
minimizing our risk. We chose this approach because it allowed us to utilize the probability 
of detection versus the probability of attack.  Although we do not know exact values for 
the probability of detection, there are estimated values of the conditional probability of 
detection given there is a particular type of threat, 𝑝𝑑 ∀ 𝑑 ∈ 𝐷. These values are derived 
from manufacturer capability tests.  The risk posture is then calculated by multiplying the 
adjusted risk values by the selected security measures.  We approached the calculation of 
the risk posture in the equations (3.1) - (3.3) below.  The result of equation (3.2) is the 
Adjusted Risk Values, a reduced set of coefficients for each security measure resource. 
• The product of Security Measure Assignment (SMA) matrix and TOM  
Risk Impact Values (RIV) = TOM*SMA 
(3.1) 
• A formula that calculates the score 
Adjusted Risk Values (ARV) = 𝑝𝑑 × 𝑅𝐼𝑉𝑑 
(3.2) 
• A set of thresholds that help translate the calculated score   
Risk Posture =  ∑𝐷𝑑=1 𝑥𝑑 × 𝐴𝑅𝑉𝑑   
(3.3) 
3.5 Data Collection 
In this chapter, we re-examine, integrate, and expand the works of (Nie et al., 2009) 




exemplified by Secure Flight, we want to determine the optimal allocation of threat 
detection devices and measures for screening checked baggage, carry-on baggage, and 
passengers across a set of airports such that we maximize risk posture, maximize the 
number of threats to be detected, and minimize the overall false alarm rate while 
considering passenger threat classification. We imposed constraints on time available at 
each check station, flow capacity at security stations, budget, as well as staffing needs at 
each check station. 
At airports, all passengers and items pass through various check stations, each 
outfitted with several security measures for threat detection. It is standard practice for all 
passengers, and items are subjected to a series of screening at mandatory check-ins. For 
example, document verification, walk through metal detectors, water bottle scanners, etc. 
After inspection of a passenger/item, the screening measure or personnel will give a clear 
signal (No Threat) or an alarm signal (Threat). There are four types of alarms, and while 
all four are critically important, the two alarms that we are concerned with are true alarms 
and false clears. True alarms correctly detect existing threats, and false alarms give an 
alarm when no threat exists. 
False alarm and false clear probabilities are performance measures for the screening 
system. Higher performance means lower values of these probabilities. False clears are 
potentially fatal for allowing threats to go undetected, and false alarms increase inspection 




Risk-based security paradigms classify passengers into different security classes 
based on the perceived risk of each passenger, where the passengers and their checked and 
carry-on baggage are screened using pre-specified combinations of detection devices (e.g., 
magnetometer, x-ray machine) and procedures (e.g., hand search, pat-down). Within each 
security class, a passenger or bag may undergo screening from multiple devices or 
procedures. A passenger or bag clears the security checkpoint only if all devices and 
procedures used in this class detect no threat. If a threat is detected or if reasonable 
suspicion of a threat arises, then the passenger or bag undergoes additional screening, 
usually through a more threat-specific, time-consuming process. The use of devices as part 
of the security operations endure costs associated with installing, operating, and 
maintaining the devices. The preponderance of costs associated with screening procedures 
is associated with employing personnel and implementing these procedures. The fixed 
costs are associated with installing devices and maintaining the devices for screening 
procedures. The costs associated with operating the devices are based on the expected life 
and time in the operation of each device, while the implementation costs of screening 
procedures are based on the employee compensation of security personnel. In addition to 
these cost restrictions, each device is manufactured to provide a maximum throughput 
capacity. Thus, the expected number of passengers in each security class aids in 
determining the capacity requirements for deploying existing and new detection devices at 
each airport. Sewell’s device allocation model aids in the inherent trade-off decision 
between using faster, more accurate, and expensive devices versus slower, less reliable, 




highly influenced by resource constraints, including cost, personnel, and space availability, 
hence the decision as to the type and number of devices and procedures to use for screening 
high-risk and low-risk passengers to maximize the total security (probability of threat 
detection) can be very challenging. This is especially so when considering a limited number 
of devices available to deploy across a set of airports, each with its own individual resource 
constraints. 
3.6 Mathematical Model 
Several assumptions must be made to formulate a mathematical model for this 
problem. First, a passenger prescreening system is used in a risk-based security screening 
approach to quantify the perceived risk of each passenger. Second, the resulting threat 
assessment is viewed as an accurate representation of the passenger’s true risk to the air 
transportation system, based on intelligence gathered by the TSA pertaining to prior travel 
history, origin and destination itinerary, ticket purchase method, current behavioral 
attributes and other security-sensitive information. Third, the detection devices used to 
screen passengers and their baggage operates independently of one another, such that the 
use of one type of device does not affect the cost or threat detection performance associated 
with any other device under consideration. Lastly, while there is a cost associated with 
deploying new devices at an airport, it is assumed that there is no cost associated with 




This section outlines the notation, constraints, and objective function used to 
describe the screening device allocation model. The notation for the parameters and 
decision variables used in the model are as follows: 
The parameters and decision variables used in the model are as follows: 
Parameters Description 
T The total number of airports under consideration  
k Index for airport k=1,2,…,T  
D The number of screening device types 
d Detection device type d=1,2,…,D 
J Number of screening groups  
j Screening group j = 1,2,3,4 
D(j) Detection devices d within screening group j 
Mc Number of passenger classes at airport k 
c Index for passenger class c=1,2,…,Mc 
Ack Average value of perceived risk for passengers assigned to class c at 
airport k 
Bck Number of checked bags per hour screened in class c at airport k 
Cj Maximum throughput (passengers or bags/hour) within screening class j 
Edk Number of existing devices of security measure type d at airport k 
Fd Fixed Cost ($/device) associated with device type d 
Gck Number of carry-on bags per hour screened in class c at airport k 
Hck Number of passengers per hour screened in class c at airport k 
Kdk The capacity of device d at airport k 
Id Installation cost ($/device) associated with device type d 
Od Operating cost ($/device) associated with device type d 
Pd Conditional probability of detecting a threat given there is a threat for 
device type d 
cpc Probability of a passenger belonging passenger class c 
𝛼𝑐 The conditional probability that passenger carries a threat given they 
belong to class c carries a threat 
𝛽𝑗𝑐 The conditional probability that there is a threat in screening group j given 
a class c  
qd Conditional probability of clearing a non-threat item given there is no 
threat for device type d 
TBk Total hourly budget ($) available at airport k 
td Time taken to check one passenger or bag at device d 
Ud Number of device type d available for installation 








xcdk Binary variable where xcdk = 1(0), if security measure type d is (not), used 
to screen class c bags at airport k 
ydk Number of security measure type d to be used at airport k (integer) 
sdk Number of security measure type d to be installed at airport k (integer) 
The explosive screening device allocation model proposed in (Sewell et al., 2013) 
assigns the types, 𝑑, and numbers, 𝑥𝑐𝑑𝑘, of detection devices to each class at each airport. 
To accomplish this, the number of devices of type 𝑑 to be installed at each airport, 𝑠𝑑𝑘, is 
found by subtracting the number of devices of type 𝑑 currently existing from the number 
of devices of type 𝑑 used in total at each airport, equation (3.4). Therefore, 
 𝑠𝑑𝑘 = 𝑦𝑑𝑘 − 𝐸𝑑𝑘, (Device Installation Constraint) (3.4) 
provided 𝑦𝑑𝑘 ≥ 𝐸𝑑𝑘 (and 0 otherwise), for 𝑑 = 1,2, … , 𝐷 and 𝑘 = 1,2, … , 𝑇. 
Using the notation provided, the installation, operating, and total fixed costs at each 
airport 𝑘 can be found such that the combined installation, operating, and fixed costs satisfy 
the total hourly budget, 𝑇𝐵𝑘, for airport 𝑘 = 1,2, . . . , 𝑇, since it is assumed that there is no 
cost associated with uninstalling a screening device. Next, in equation (3.5) the number of 
new devices to install at each airport, 𝑦𝑑𝑘, must be considered. This relies on the capacity 
performance of the screening devices, captured by the number of bags each device type 
can handle per hour, 𝐶𝑑, and the number of bags screened in each class within a particular 
airport, 𝐵𝑐𝑘. Dividing the hourly rate of bags screened in class c at airport k by the 
maximum throughput of device type 𝑑 yields the number of security devices of type 𝑑 =






𝑐=1 𝐵𝑐𝑘𝑥𝑐𝑑𝑘/𝐶𝑑⌉                                ∀𝑑 = 1,2, … , 𝐷 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑘 = 1,2, … , 𝐾 
 (Resource Capacity Constraint) 
(3.5) 
Lastly, the number of new devices installed at all airports must be less than or equal 
to the total number of new devices available, equation (3.6), and so, the device resource 




𝑠𝑑𝑘 ≤ 𝑈𝑑 , ∀𝑑 = 1,2, … , 𝐷   (Resource Availability Constraint) (3.6) 
In Nie’s (Nie et al., 2009) mathematical model, their objective was to determine the 
fraction of passengers that are assigned to threat class c and the staffing needs at each check 
station within each screening group. Changing the parameters into our notation, we have 
















𝑥𝑐𝑑𝑘 × (1 + 𝑧𝑑 (𝑝𝑑∑
𝑀𝑘
𝑐=1
𝛽𝑐1𝛼𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑐 + (1 − 𝑞𝑑)∑
𝑀𝑘
𝑐=1
(1 − 𝛼𝑐)𝑐𝑝𝑐))𝑡𝑑 ≤ ∑ 𝐶1
𝑑∈𝐷(1)







𝑥𝑐𝑑𝑘 × (1 + 𝑧𝑑 (𝑝𝑑∑
𝑀𝑘
𝑐=1
𝛽𝑐2𝛼𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑐 + (1 − 𝑞𝑑)∑
𝑀𝑘
𝑐=1
(1 − 𝛼𝑐)𝑐𝑝𝑐))𝑡𝑑 ≤ ∑ 𝐶2
𝑑∈𝐷(2)







𝑥𝑐𝑑𝑘 × (1 + 𝑧𝑑 (𝑝𝑑∑
𝑀𝑘
𝑐=1
𝛽𝑐3𝛼𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑐 + (1 − 𝑞𝑑)∑
𝑀𝑘
𝑐=1
(1 − 𝛼𝑐)𝑐𝑝𝑐)) 𝑡𝑑 ≤ ∑ 𝐶3
𝑑∈𝐷(3)







𝑥𝑐𝑑𝑘 × (1 + 𝑧𝑑 (𝑝𝑑∑
𝑀𝑘
𝑐=1
𝛽𝑐4𝛼𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑐 + (1 − 𝑞𝑑)∑
𝑀𝑘
𝑐=1
(1 − 𝛼𝑐)𝑐𝑝𝑐))𝑡𝑑 ≤ ∑ 𝐶4
𝑑∈𝐷(4)















Constraint (3.7) ensures that the false clear probability is within the upper bound, 
𝛿, set by the appropriate security authority. Constraints (3.8) - (3.11) guarantee that 
checking of baggage or passengers at each screening group is completed before the allotted 
time. The objective function, equation (3.12), minimizes the probability of false alarm 
across each airport. 
The objective defined for the device allocation model is based on the probability of 
a device correctly detecting a threat, the underlying risk level of the bags screened, and the 
number of bags screened within each security class. (Sewell et al., 2012) defines the 
probability of detecting a threat within security class 𝑐, 𝐿𝑐𝑘, (at airport 𝑘) as the probability 
that at least one of the device types used in that class detects the threat, equation (3.13),  
𝐿𝑐𝑘𝑗 = 1 − ∏
𝑑∈𝐷(𝑗)
(1 − 𝑥𝑐𝑑𝑘𝑃𝑑)          ∀ 𝑐 = 1,2, … ,𝑀𝑘, 𝑘 = 1,2, … , 𝑇, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽  
(3.13) 
and where 𝑃𝑑 is defined as the conditional probability that a threat is detected by security 
device type d, given that a threat is present. 
The risk level of each class, 𝑅𝑐,𝑘, is defined as the average perceived risk value of 
the passengers in security class 𝑐 at airport 𝑘 times the rate of baggage screened within that 
class. This value is normalized between zero and one by dividing over the total risk 











The risk level of each security class relies heavily on the assumption that the prescreening 
system provides an accurate risk perception of the passenger population. 
The objective function for the device allocation model is obtained by weighting 
each airport by the rate at which passengers/bags/carry-on bags must be screened at that 
airport and the risk level associated with screening these bags using either new or existing 
detection devices. Using equations (3.13) and (3.14), the objective value of each airport is 







By summing over all the airports under consideration, the total security level 
captures the expected total number of detected threats, equation (3.16), 
 ∑ 𝑆𝐿𝑘
𝑇




𝑘=1 +𝐿𝑐𝑘2𝐵𝑐𝑘𝑅𝑐𝑘+𝐿𝑐𝑘3𝐺𝑐𝑘𝑅𝑐𝑘+𝐿𝑐𝑘4𝐻𝑐𝑘𝑅𝑐𝑘 (3.16) 
Combining the objectives from equations (3.3), (3.12), and (3.16), the device 
allocation problem for multiple airports are defined by the nonlinear integer program, 
      Maximize  
 ∑𝑀𝑘𝑐=1 ∑
𝐷
𝑑=1 𝑥𝑐𝑑𝑘𝑝𝑑 × 𝑅𝐼𝑉𝑑                                               ∀𝑘 = 1,2, … , 𝑇 (3.17) 
 −∑
𝑀𝑘
𝑐=1 (1 − 𝛼𝑐)𝑐𝑝𝑐 ∑
𝐽
𝑗=1 (1 − ∏𝑑∈𝐷(𝑗) 𝑞𝑑𝑥𝑐𝑑𝑘)           ∀𝑘 = 1,2, … , 𝑇 (3.18) 
 ∑𝑀𝑘𝑐=1 ∑
𝐷
𝑑=1 𝑆𝐿𝑘𝑥𝑐𝑑𝑘                                                         ∀𝑘 = 1,2, … , 𝑇 (3.19) 
 

































𝐻𝑐𝑘𝑥𝑐𝑑𝑘/𝐶𝑑⌉ , ∀𝑑 = 1,2, … , 𝐷(4), and   𝑘 = 1,2, … , 𝑇 
(3.24) 
 

















𝑥𝑐𝑑𝑘 × (1 + 𝑧𝑑 (𝑝𝑑∑
𝑀𝑘
𝑐=1
𝛽𝑐1𝛼𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑐 + (1 − 𝑞𝑑)∑
𝑀𝑘
𝑐=1
(1 − 𝛼𝑐)𝑐𝑝𝑐))𝑡𝑑 ≤ ∑ 𝐶1
𝑑∈𝐷(1)







𝑥𝑐𝑑𝑘 × (1 + 𝑧𝑑 (𝑝𝑑∑
𝑀𝑘
𝑐=1
𝛽𝑐2𝛼𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑐 + (1 − 𝑞𝑑)∑
𝑀𝑘
𝑐=1
(1 − 𝛼𝑐)𝑐𝑝𝑐))𝑡𝑑 ≤ ∑ 𝐶2
𝑑∈𝐷(2)







𝑥𝑐𝑑𝑘 × (1 + 𝑧𝑑 (𝑝𝑑∑
𝑀𝑘
𝑐=1
𝛽𝑐3𝛼𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑐 + (1 − 𝑞𝑑)∑
𝑀𝑘
𝑐=1
(1 − 𝛼𝑐)𝑐𝑝𝑐)) 𝑡𝑑 ≤ ∑ 𝐶3
𝑑∈𝐷(3)







𝑥𝑐𝑑𝑘 × (1 + 𝑧𝑑 (𝑝𝑑∑
𝑀𝑘
𝑐=1
𝛽𝑐4𝛼𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑐 + (1 − 𝑞𝑑)∑
𝑀𝑘
𝑐=1
(1 − 𝛼𝑐)𝑐𝑝𝑐))𝑡𝑑 ≤ ∑ 𝐶4
𝑑∈𝐷(4)





𝑠𝑑𝑘 ≤ 𝑈𝑑      ∀  𝑑 = 1,2, … , 𝐷 
(3.31) 









Constraint (3.20) is the airport budget constraint (3.21) - (3.24) are the resource 




(3.25) is the device installation constraint.  Constraint (3.26) ensures that the false clear 
probability is within the upper bound, 𝛿, set by the appropriate security authority. 
Constraints (3.27) - (3.30) guarantee that checking at each station is completed before the 
allotted time. Constraint (3.31) is the overall resource availability constraint. The integer 
program is nonlinear due to the product of the 𝑥𝑐𝑑𝑘 decision variables contained in the 
threat detection term, 𝐿𝑐𝑘, in (3.13). Constraint (3.31) effectively ties together the decision 
variables across all airports, potentially impacting the ability to decouple the problem and 
solve for each individual airport. The following section presents a Dantzig-Wolfe 
decomposition type of approach to solving the device allocation problem across multiple 
airports. 
3.7 Solution Methodology 
The optimization problem, in the form given by (3.17)-(3.34), is computationally 
intractable for a large number of airports. The objective function is nonlinear in the 𝑥𝑐𝑑𝑘 
decision variables, but is separable due to being a sum of the threat detection probability 
performance measures of each individual airport security system. 
Constraints (3.20) - (3.30) correspond to the individual airports 𝑘 = 1,2, … , 𝑇, 
indicating a potential solution methodology of optimizing the device allocation problem 
for each airport independently. However, constraint (3.31) contains an interaction among 
the devices used in all the airports, by ensuring that all new devices allocated to be installed 




The device allocation problem in (3.17)-(3.34) cannot be solved by a standard 
integer programming package because of the nonlinear objective function. (Sewell, et al., 
2012) presents a heuristic approach to solving this nonlinear integer program by forming a 
Lagrangian relaxation of the device allocation model. In determining all of the feasible 
portfolio options, we also calculate all of the potential values for constraints (3.20) - (3.30), 
allowing us to remove the nonlinear constraints and further reduce the number of potential 
device combinations. We utilize the previous Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition (Sewell et al., 
2013) approach on constraints (3.20) - (3.30).  This allows us to eliminate the nonlinearities 
in the objective function, and if the model were small, it is shown to provide an optimal 
solution in a short time on a set of small computational examples. In our case, the model is 
significantly larger due to the increase in the airport network and the inclusion of the 
additional objectives and constraints. For the current Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition, we 
define the constraints for airport k. 
After the decomposition, we can eliminate j as the index for the screening group. 
Let index j represent the portfolio of security measures selected for allocation at airport k. 
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 be a binary 
vector of length 𝑀𝑘𝑥𝐷, where 𝑋𝑘 = 𝑥: 𝑥 is feasible for airport k = 𝑥
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− 𝐸𝑑𝑘), for 𝑑 = 1,2, … , 𝐷. Also, define 𝑛𝑘 as the number of feasible 




𝑥𝑘𝑗 is defined to be feasible for airport 𝑘 if 𝑥𝑘𝑗 , 𝑦𝑘𝑗, 𝑠𝑘𝑗 can satisfy the constraints for 
airport 𝑘. Notice that all of the feasible solutions for airport 𝑘 can be generated by 
generating all binary vectors 𝑥𝑘𝑗 of length 𝑀𝑘 × 𝐷, computing 𝑦
𝑘𝑗 and 𝑠𝑘𝑗 from 𝑥𝑘𝑗, and 
then determining if 𝑥𝑘𝑗 , 𝑦𝑘𝑗, 𝑠𝑘𝑗 is feasible for airport 𝑘. 
Next, we define a binary variable 𝑟𝑘𝑗 for each feasible solution for each airport, 
where 𝑟𝑘𝑗 = 1(0) if solution 𝑥
𝑘𝑗 is (not) selected to be used at airport 𝑘. The master 
problem can now be written as the binary integer program seen below in equations (3.35)-
(3.40), 





𝑑=1 𝑟𝑘𝑗𝑥𝑐𝑑𝑘𝑝𝑑 × 𝑅𝐼𝑉𝑑                                   ∀ 𝑘 = 1,2, … , 𝑇 (3.35) 
−∑
𝑀𝑘
𝑐=1 (1 − 𝛼𝑐)𝑝𝑐 ∑
𝐽




𝑘𝑗𝑟𝑘𝑗                                                                  ∀ 𝑘 = 1,2, … , 𝑇 (3.37) 
 












𝑟𝑘𝑗 = 1                      ∀ 𝑘 = 1,2, … , 𝑇 
(3.39) 
𝑟𝑘𝑗 ∈ {0,1}  ∀ 𝑘 = 1,2, … , 𝑇 and 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽 (3.40) 
The objective functions in (3.35) - (3.37) now select the solutions that maximize 
the total security level of the airports and that maximize the overall risk posture of the DHS, 
taking into account all airports. Constraint (3.38) ensures that the total number of new 




binding constraint in (3.31)), while constraint (3.39) ensures that precisely one solution is 
chosen for each airport. The parameters for the master problem, 𝑆𝐿𝑘𝑗 and 𝑠𝑑
𝑘𝑗
, were created 
by using a combinatorial algorithm to generate all the possible solutions (feasible and 
infeasible) for each airport, and then selecting the feasible ones. The master problem is a 
binary integer program that can be solved by any standard solver (Gurobi 9.0). After 
solving the master problem, the optimal solution to the original problem can be constructed 
for each airport 𝑘 from the 𝑥𝑘𝑗 corresponding to variable 𝑟𝑘𝑗 that equals one. 
3.8 Computational Challenges 
 As previously mentioned, solving a model of this type is difficult purely due to the 
computational complexity. Much of this research effort is dedicated to designing solution 
strategies that will provide strong solutions to massively large mixed-integer programs. In 
the original model, the MIP includes 45,760 decision variables and 35,666 constraints. In 
order to linearize the risk structures or nonlinear portions of the model, a decomposition 
was necessary. A Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition is applied and discussed further in the 
following section. The Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition makes sense based on the problem 
structure. It allows division of the optimization problem into two groups of “easy” and 
“hard” constraints. The “hard” constraints are not necessarily difficult, but they complicate 
the LP by making it nonlinear and more difficult to solve. When these hard constraints are 
removed from the problem, then more efficient techniques can be applied to solve the 




Our primary solution technique is column generation due to the number of decision 
variables being exponentially large. After the Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition was applied, 
the original three decision variables were reduced to a single composite binary decision 
variable representing whether or not a specific security measure combination for the threat 
classes at airport 𝑘 was applied. The number of possible portfolios of security measures is 
enormous. Rather than enumerating all the possibilities, we can generate only relevant 
patterns by solving the subproblem. We encounter this scenario in our problem. Even 
though the Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition did reduce the overall number of portfolio 
options, we were still left with 259k possibilities. The number of potential portfolios in this 
situation is enormous, and while it is possible to enumerate all of the possibilities, it is 
nearly impossible to generate a model that large or even solve one. 
In the column generation method, only a (usually small) subset of the variables is 
used initially. The method sequentially adds columns (i.e., variables), using information 
given by the dual variables for finding the appropriate variable to add. In the most recent 
approach, the Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition presented in (Sewell et al., 2013), Sewell 
enumerated all the possible combinations of security measures for small screening area for 
a limited number of airports. However, we encounter some very limiting issues when trying 
to expand the problem to include all screening areas, all security measures, and all airports. 
The number of potential portfolio combinations must be significantly reduced to make this 
problem remotely approachable. The previous number of solutions was small, which 
allowed solving to optimality. As mentioned, in the larger model formulation, the number 




perfect candidate for column generation. The main idea is that typically only a subset of 
variables are required in the basis to reach optimality, while other variables are non-basic 
and have a zero value. Column generation exploits this by only considering variables with 
the potential to improve the objective function value, indicated by the negative reduced 
costs. In each iteration of the column generation method, two problems are solved 
successively; the RMP and the SP.  By solving the RMP, the master problem using a subset 
of variables, we obtain a vector of the dual values associated with the constraints. The dual 
information is then inputted into the SP, with the goal of identifying a new variable and an 
associated coefficient column with a negative reduced cost, which could potentially 
improve the objective function value. If such a variable and column are identified, then 
they are added to the RMP. The RMP is then optimized again, and the process is repeated. 
Otherwise, an optimal solution of the RMP is also an optimal solution to the original 
problem. 
Even with the reduced number of potential combinations and swapping the 
constraints from the primary linear program to the decomposition, the number of variables 
and constraints is still enormous. In order to truly make this problem useful, a strong 
combination of pre-solving and employing column generation as a solution technique is 
necessary. 
The decomposition changes the structure and looks at a full enumerated security 
measure combination list for all 440 airports. There are 1,048,576 possible security 
measure combinations for two classes of passengers and 26 security measures. The 




variables are binary or positive integers. The number of feasible combinations can be 
reduced to 259k through additional preprocessing based on sensible decision making. This 
reduces the number of decision variables to 128,480,000. Decomposition increases the 
number of decision variables, but drastically decreases the number of constraints. 
However, the model is still too large to be solved outright, which continues to motivate 
research on solution methods. Having an accurate and close to the optimal solution is 
essential since the solution represents the best set of security measures, concerning the 
objectives, for each airport. 
3.9 Optimization 
Many comparisons have been performed, comparing, and contrasting the various 
optimization approaches for multi-objective models. (Sawik, 2011) provides a 
comprehensive analysis of weighting, lexicographic, and reference point approaches to 
multi-objective portfolio optimization. A hierarchical or lexicographic approach assigns a 
priority to each objective and optimizes the objectives in decreasing priority order. At each 
step, the best solution is found for the current objective, but only from the solutions that do 
not degrade the solution quality for higher-priority objectives. Lexicographic optimization 
generates efficient solutions found by sequential optimization of the objectives. For our 
current problem, we want to avoid numerical issues, so we normalize our objectives into 
comparable, unitless values and, afterward, equally weight the objectives. 




As previously mentioned in Chapter 2, we will employ PSO as one of our solution 
methods. This computational method optimizes a problem by iteratively trying to improve 
a candidate solution (particle) with regard to a measure of quality. The problem is solved 
by having a population of candidate solutions (swarm) and moving the particles around in 
the search space based on the particles’ position and velocity. The swarm in PSO consists 
of a population, and each member of the population is called a particle, which represents a 
portfolio in this study.  
The algorithm is guided by personal experience (pBest), overall experience (gBest), 
and the present movement of the particles to decide their next positions in the search space 
described by Kennedy.  Each particle remembers its best previous position and the best 
previous position visited by any particle in the whole swarm. In other words, a particle 
moves towards its best previous position and towards the best particle.  Further, the 
experiences are accelerated by two factors c1 and c2, and two random numbers generated 
between [0, 1], whereas the present movement is multiplied by an inertia factor w varying 
between [wmin, wmax]. This is a relatively simplistic metaheuristic that applies to many 
problem types and can search very large spaces of candidate solutions. Unfortunately, it 
does not guarantee an optimal solution is found, but the goal is to see relatively quick 
convergence of the particles towards a solution. In multi-objective problems, Pareto 
dominance is taken into account when moving the particles, and non-dominated solutions 
are stored as to approximate the Pareto front (Cura, 2009). 
 Using PSO to solve a discrete optimization problem, the PSO is initialized with a 




optima by updating the generations of particles. In each iteration, the particles are updated 
by two “best” values.  First, we record the best solution (fitness, objective function value) 
that has been achieved so far. The objective value is also stored as pbest. Second, the 
algorithm records the best value obtained so far by any particle in the population, known 
as a global best and stored as gbest. When a particle takes part of the population as its 
topological neighbors, the best value is a local best and is called lbest. The formulation of 
the swarm is determined by the specific problem, and in this case, each particle represents 
the complete set of portfolios selected for all of the airports. Therefore, each particle of a 
swarm (denoted by index i) must include all of the variables rikj and zidk are the variables 
denoting the quantity of each security measure assigned to each airport. 
 After finding the two best values, the particle updates the velocity and positions of 
its variables with the set of equations below (3.41) - (3.43), as discussed previously in 
Chapter 2.  Both 𝜔1 and 𝜔2 denote uniform random numbers between 0 and 1.  t denotes 
the iteration number while 𝑣𝑧𝑖𝑑𝑘
𝑡  denotes the velocity of variable z within particle i, and 
𝑣𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑗
𝑡   denotes the velocity of variable r within particle i.  𝑣𝑧𝑖𝑑𝑘
𝑡   will be updated if security 
measure d is selected by the portfolio of security measures within particle i at iteration t+1. 
Thus particle i moves at iteration t+1 as follows: 
𝑣𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑗
𝑡+1 = 𝑣𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑗
𝑡 + 𝑐1𝜔1(𝑟pbest − 𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑗
𝑡 ) + 𝑐2𝜔2(𝑟𝑔𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡 − 𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑗
𝑡 ) (3.41) 
𝑟𝑝𝑖
𝑡+1 = 𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 (
1
1+𝑒−𝜃
− 𝛼) ,𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝜃 = 𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑗
𝑡 + 𝑣𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑗




𝑡 + 𝑐1𝜔1(𝑧𝑝𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡 − 𝑧𝑖𝑑𝑘
𝑡 ) + 𝑐2𝜔2(𝑧𝑔𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡 − 𝑧𝑖𝑑𝑘
𝑡+1)  𝑖𝑓  𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑗
𝑡+1 = 1,
𝑣𝑧𝑖𝑑𝑘
𝑡                                                                                     𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒      





For a given particle, if the velocity on the dimension r𝑖𝑘𝑗
𝑡  is zero, this particle will not move 
in that dimension at iteration 𝑡 + 1. Suppose 𝑣𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑗
𝑡 = 0 and r𝑖𝑘𝑗
𝑡 = 0, hence 1/(1 + 𝑒0) =
0.5 and round(0.5) = 1, which means that particle i will move in dimension 𝑟𝑖 (𝑟𝑝𝑖
𝑡+1 = 1) 
at iteration t+1.  To avoid such an unwanted move, we can use 𝛼, as seen in equation (3.42). 
The searching is a repeat process with stop criteria occurring when the maximum 
number of iterations has been reached, or the minimum error condition is satisfied. An 
advantage of PSO is not many parameters require tuning.  The number of particles 
(solutions to record) is in the range of 20 to 40; difficult problems may require 100 – 200; 
however, we don’t have that luxury due to the size of the actual model. The dimension of 
the particles (dimension of solution set) is prohibitively large in this case, requiring us to 
keep the number of particles to a minimum size.  The range of particles is determined by 
the upper and lower bounds of the decision variables. vmax determines the maximum change 
one particle can take during one iteration.  We require two vmax due to having binary and 
integer variables. 
The multi-swarm PSO modification is a more recent popular approach.  In the 
multi-swarm approaches, the population is divided into multiple sub-populations (sub-
swarms) with different levels of communication.  The benefit of this approach is that the 
population can maintain divergence, search for multiple promising regions, and partially 
converge into multiple optima. In (García-Nieto and Alba, 2012), the optimal swarm (sub-
swarm) size is discussed in great detail. It is proposed that six particles per swarm might 




Pluhacek demonstrates that the multi-warm performance was superior to the single 
swarm PSO in all cases  (Pluhacek, 2016).  Based on the comparative study of single swarm 
PSO versus multi-swarm PSO performed in (Pluhacek, 2016), we decided to utilize multi-
swarm PSO, with five sub-swarms, with varying particle sizes from 5 to 10 particles per 
swarm. The control parameters were set as follows: 
• Population Size: {5,6,7,8,9,10} 
• Iterations: 5 
• vinitial:  10% of the position 
• wmax:  0.9  
• wmin:  0.4 
• c1, c2 = 1.49445 (learning factors) 
 The multi-swarm PSO is based on the local version of PSO with a new 
neighborhood topology.  Many existing evolutionary algorithms require larger populations, 
while PSO needs a comparatively smaller population size. A population with three to five 
particles can achieve satisfactory results for simple problems. According to many reported 
results on the local version of PSO, PSO with small neighborhoods performs better on 
complex problems. Hence, to slow down convergence speed and to increase diversity to 
achieve better results on multimodal problems, in the MSPSO, small neighborhoods are 
used. The population is divided into small-sized swarms. Each sub-swarm uses its own 
members to search for better regions in the search space.   
 The multi-swarm optimization algorithm works as follows:  
Input: MOP (1) 
Swarm_size: number of the swarm particles 
No_subswarms: number of subswarms 
Step 1:  Calculate Subswarm size= Swarm_size/No_subswarms 
Step 2:  For subswarm = 1 to No_subswarms do 
For t=1 to Max_iterations do 




Update leaders archive 
Update external archive 
End For 
Return final result in the external archive 
Append the result to the results file 
End For 
3.9.2 Additional Heuristics 
We applied column generation and additional solutions techniques to provide 
additional comparisons for speed and results.  To expedite the column generation method, 
we again had to consider breaking apart the algorithm to accommodate a large number of 
options.  This separation inspired the two heuristics mentioned below.   
Heuristic 1, we took the full set of portfolio options, randomized the list, then broke 
them apart into buckets of 250 combinations each and optimized that subset of the portfolio 
options across all 440 airports.  250 portfolios was a suitably small subset that still allowed 
for the optimization to complete in a reasonably fast manner, especially compared to 
overall column generation.  Not all fidelity is lost in using heuristics due to maintaining all 
440 airports in each subproblem and keeping quantity assignment variables intact.   
In Heuristic 2, we continued the theme of breaking down the problem into 
subproblems.  We separated portfolios into randomized buckets but did the same with the 
airports as well.  Each subproblem then represented a subset of both the airports and the 
possible combinations.  In both randomized heuristics, optimization is performed at every 
iteration. The selected combinations (not the quantities of security measures) are placed 
into a pool of optimal combinations.  The pool of possible portfolios is then used in a final 




3.10 Empirical Results 
 The test problems/information used were collected from all of the articles that 
presented strong models ((Sewell et al., 2012), (Sewell et al., 2013), (Poole & Passantino, 
2003), (Nie et al., 2009), (McLay et al., 2006), (Virta et al., 2003)). The fixed and 
installation costs are determined through the expected useful life of the device and on the 
amount of time the device would spend in operation over one year. Thus, these values 
reported in Table 1 reflect the yearly cost divided by the total number of hours spent in 
operation over the year, based on a peak 6 hours of operation per day, per device. Note that 
all cost values are in US dollars. 
Passengers are assigned to a two-class system based on perceived risk information 
generated through a prescreening system (e.g., Secure Flight). This classifies passengers 
as being either high-risk (e.g., selectee) or low-risk (e.g., non-selectee), where the majority 
of passengers constitute the latter group. In the computational examples, 85% of 
passengers are deemed low-risk and assigned to Class 1, while the remaining 15% of 
passengers are assigned to the higher risk security Class 2. 
The total number of passenger enplanements is actual enplanement data from 2016 
collected from faa.gov (Transportation, n.d.). The hourly airport budget is based on an 
estimated annual budget value to be distributed across all airports.  Individual airport 
budgets were simply distributed based on the proportion of passengers with a set minimum 
value. Next, the total number of passengers screened per hour at an airport is based on the 




day. The operating cost of each security screening device or method is based on the annual 
operating cost of that method divided by the average hourly passenger screening rate. The 
maximum and minimum hourly screening rates per device are pulled from actual 
manufacturer device specifications.  Last, the perceived risk values are generated from a 
normal distribution with mean 0.26 and standard deviation 0.12 for the low-risk passengers 
assigned to Class 1, and with mean 0.55 and standard deviation 0.12 for the high-risk 
passengers assigned to Class 2. 
All combinations of all of the possible subsets of device types are generated for 
evaluation. The combinations of the security measures are grouped by screening group and 
are estimated by assuming which security measures should always be constant and which 
are optional. For example, as seen in Table 3.3 below, for the checked baggage screening, 
it was assumed that all checked luggage is screened by a CT scanner with additional 
screening performed by hand search. Therefore, all combinations must have both methods 
employed. Canine units and Explosive Trace Detection are both treated as secondary 
screening measures since they are not typically a primary line of defense at any airport, 
and there is no way to provide support to all airports. Based on this information, there are 
then four possible combinations of checked baggage security measures that can be 
employed. This same approach was conducted for the other screening measure groups. 
Table 3.3 - Example of Security Measure Combination Restriction 
 
Disruption Rate 1-DR Security Measure 1 2 3 4
SM1 50% 50% Hand Search 1 1 1 1
SM2 80% 20% Canine Unit (unit consists of two to four teams, 1 handler/2 Dogs per team) 0 0 1 1
SM3 70% 30% Explosive Trace Detection (open bag trace) 0 1 0 1




A potential combination of device types is chosen from these 1024 possible 
configurations for each passenger class for every airport, where each airport may have a 
different combination from any other airport. We obtain the number of device types used 
at each airport by dividing the hourly rate of passengers screened at that airport by the 
device hourly throughput rate. 
3.10.1 Results and Analysis 
 This section describes the computational test problems used to evaluate the 
proposed solution approach. The binary integer programs in (3.35)-(3.40) were generated 
in Python 3.7.3 using the gurobipy module and solved with Gurobi 9.0. The Gurobi 
parameters were kept at their default values, apart from turning off the pre-solve option so 
that Gurobi would spend less time expanding the node structure. The computational 
experiments were conducted on a personal computer with an Intel dual-core processor, 2.4 
GHz processor speed, and 16 GB of RAM. Sensitivity analysis was completed on the 
Georgia Institute of Technology High Throughput server cluster. 
The data for all independent scenario instances remained consistent and 
incorporated all 440 airports. 10242 different combinations were produced, based on the 
security measures available. Below we report on the results from the solution methods 
described above.  All of the results from the multi-swarm PSOs, heuristics solutions, and 
column generation are presented and compared below. Herein, we report 11 modeling 
methods to contrast the results.  




    • Model 2: Multi-Swarm PSO – 6 particles  
    • Model 3: Multi-Swarm PSO – 7 particles  
    • Model 4: Multi-Swarm PSO – 8 particles  
    • Model 5: Multi-Swarm PSO – 9 particles  
    • Model 6: Multi-Swarm PSO – 10 particles  
    • Model 7: Combined Solution MSPSO 
    • Model 8: Heuristic 1  
    • Model 9: Heuristic 2 
    • Model 10: Column Generation Pricing with Multi-Swarm PSO 
    • Model 11: Column Generation  
Table 2 presents the computational results for 11 different model formulations.  All 
results in the equally weighted outputs were generated after converting the objectives into 
a unitless scalar to improve the ability to compare values.  The first six models are the 
multi-swarm PSO results with varying results due to changing the size of the population.  
The first four columns display the equally weighted multi-objective results. When 
comparing the results just from the MSPSO results, the population size does not appear to 
be significant. Heuristic 1 and Heuristic 2 are the slightly different greedy heuristics.  The 
Combined MSPSO took all of the portfolio results from each of the MSPSOs and solved 
the optimization problem based on all of the options. The CG Price MSPSO model takes 
the column generation construct but solves the pricing problem using the MSPSO instead 
of having to solve the individual subproblems for each airport. CG Final is the full column 





Table 3.4 -  Summarized Model Results 
 
The triangle radar plot in Figure 1 displays the normalized results.  What we look 
for in the radar plot is for the colored lines to reach as close to 1 in each corner as possible.  
If the model lines reach 1, then the objective has reached the maximum value amongst the 
various models.  If a color is barely registering, then the objective value result was basically 
inconsequential in comparison. 
   
Obj 1 Obj 2 Obj 3 Total Obj 1 Obj 2 Obj 3 Total
MSPSO 5 0.792 0.121 0.533 1.446 0.968 0.123 0.565 1.657
MSPSO 6 0.777 0.150 0.257 1.184 0.949 0.153 0.0 1.102
MSPSO 7 0.620 0.070 0.432 1.122 0.743 0.071 0.358 1.171
MSPSO 8 0.793 0.098 0.441 1.332 0.970 0.100 0.376 1.446
MSPSO 9 0.513 0.001 0.614 1.128 0.602 0.0 0.730 1.333
MSPSO 10 0.684 0.059 0.628 1.370 0.826 0.060 0.758 1.644
Combined MSPSO 0.676 0.475 0.734 1.885 0.816 0.485 0.976 2.278
Heuristic 1 0.603 0.480 0.746 1.828 0.720 0.490 1.0 2.210
Heuristic 2 0.598 0.467 0.696 1.761 0.713 0.477 0.898 2.089
CG Price MSPSO 0.535 0.519 0.675 1.729 0.631 0.531 0.855 2.016
CG Final 0.816 0.978 0.645 2.439 1.0 1.0 0.793 2.793





Figure 3.1 - Triangle Radar Plot, Performance Metric Comparison 
These scenarios allow us to observe how security measure allocations differ when 
varying the number of inputs into the overall model. This technique gives us insight into 
determining whether or not it is beneficial to dedicate the time to find an optimal solution. 
The PSO methods take the least amount of time by far, and if the solutions are potentially 
just as strong, then it is possible that they can be utilized regularly. The decision-makers 
are also able to witness multiple options and consider what results remain consistent 
throughout the runs or what results change drastically depending on the model. 


















Table 3.5 - Model 1: Multi-Swarm PSO – 5 particles 
 
Model 2 (Table 3.6) displays the results of multi-swarm PSO with six particles.  
Table 3.6 - Model 2: Multi-Swarm PSO – 6 particles 
 
Model 3 (Table 3.7) displays the results of multi-swarm PSO with seven particles.  
Airports 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
1 49 2 0 19 22 15 0 22 15 1 1 0 15 15 15 19 15 19 0 22 22 24 0 0 37 0
2 42 2 0 14 0 14 44 20 14 1 1 0 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 0 0 0 24 0
3 39 2 0 13 0 14 44 20 14 1 1 0 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 0 0 0 21 0
4 30 2 0 11 0 14 44 20 14 1 1 0 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 0 0 0 21 0
5 25 2 0 11 0 14 44 20 14 1 1 0 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 0 0 0 21 0
6 23 2 0 11 0 14 44 20 14 1 1 0 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 0 0 0 21 0
7 20 2 0 10 0 14 44 20 14 1 1 0 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 0 0 0 21 0
8 16 2 0 8 0 14 44 20 14 1 1 0 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 0 0 0 21 0
9 16 2 0 9 0 14 44 20 14 1 1 0 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 0 0 0 21 0
10 16 2 0 8 0 14 44 20 14 1 1 0 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 0 0 0 21 0
PSO - 5
Security Measures
Airports 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
1 49 2 0 19 0 15 48 22 15 1 0 3 15 15 15 19 15 19 0 22 22 24 0 0 37 0
2 42 2 0 14 0 14 44 20 14 1 0 3 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 22 0 0 24 0
3 39 2 0 13 0 14 44 20 14 1 0 3 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 22 0 0 21 0
4 30 2 0 11 0 14 44 20 14 1 0 3 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 22 0 0 21 0
5 25 2 0 11 0 14 44 20 14 1 0 3 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 22 0 0 21 0
6 23 2 0 11 0 14 44 20 14 1 0 3 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 22 0 0 21 0
7 20 2 0 10 0 14 44 20 14 1 0 3 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 22 0 0 21 0
8 16 2 0 8 0 14 44 20 14 1 0 3 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 22 0 0 21 0
9 16 2 0 9 0 14 44 20 14 1 0 3 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 22 0 0 21 0






Table 3.7 - Model 3: Multi-Swarm PSO – 7 particles 
 
Model 4 (Table 3.8) displays the results of multi-swarm PSO with eight particles.  
Table 3.8 - Model 4: Multi-Swarm PSO – 8 particles 
 
Model 5 (Table 3.9) displays the results of multi-swarm PSO with nine particles.  
Airports 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
1 49 2 2 19 0 15 48 22 15 1 1 0 15 15 15 19 15 19 0 22 22 0 0 0 37 0
2 42 2 2 14 0 14 44 20 14 1 1 0 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 0 0 0 24 0
3 39 0 2 13 0 14 44 20 14 1 1 0 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 22 11 0 0 0
4 30 2 2 11 0 14 44 20 14 1 1 0 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 0 0 0 21 0
5 25 2 2 11 0 14 44 20 14 1 1 0 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 0 0 0 21 0
6 23 2 2 11 0 14 44 20 14 1 1 0 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 0 0 0 21 0
7 20 2 2 10 0 14 44 20 14 1 1 0 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 0 0 0 21 0
8 16 2 2 8 0 14 44 20 14 1 1 0 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 0 0 0 21 0
9 16 2 2 9 0 14 44 20 14 1 1 0 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 0 0 0 21 0
10 16 2 2 8 0 14 44 20 14 1 1 0 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 0 0 0 21 0
PSO - 7
Security Measures
Airports 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
1 49 0 2 19 0 15 48 22 15 1 0 3 15 15 15 19 15 19 0 22 22 24 0 0 37 0
2 42 2 2 14 20 14 0 20 14 1 0 3 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 22 0 0 24 0
3 39 0 2 13 0 14 44 20 14 1 0 0 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 22 0 0 21 0
4 30 2 2 11 20 14 0 20 14 1 0 3 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 22 0 0 21 0
5 25 2 2 11 20 14 0 20 14 1 0 3 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 22 0 0 21 0
6 23 2 2 11 20 14 0 20 14 1 0 3 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 22 0 0 21 0
7 20 2 2 10 20 14 0 20 14 1 0 3 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 22 0 0 21 0
8 16 2 2 8 20 14 0 20 14 1 0 3 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 22 0 0 21 0
9 16 2 2 9 20 14 0 20 14 1 0 3 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 22 0 0 21 0






Table 3.9 - Model 5: Multi-Swarm PSO – 9 particles 
 
Model 6 (Table 3.10) displays the results of multi-swarm PSO with ten particles. 
Table 3.10 - Model 6: Multi-Swarm PSO – 10 particles 
 
Model 7 (Table 9) displays the results of the heuristic 1. 
Airports 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
1 49 0 0 19 0 15 48 22 15 1 0 0 15 15 15 19 15 19 0 22 22 24 0 0 37 0
2 42 2 2 14 0 14 44 20 14 1 0 3 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 22 9 0 0 0
3 39 2 2 13 0 14 44 20 14 1 0 3 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 22 11 0 0 0
4 30 2 2 11 0 14 44 20 14 1 0 3 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 22 11 0 0 0
5 25 2 2 11 0 14 44 20 14 1 0 3 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 22 11 0 0 0
6 23 2 2 11 0 14 44 20 14 1 0 3 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 22 11 0 0 0
7 20 2 2 10 0 14 44 20 14 1 0 3 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 22 11 0 0 0
8 16 2 2 8 0 14 44 20 14 1 0 3 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 22 11 0 0 0
9 16 2 2 9 0 14 44 20 14 1 0 3 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 22 11 0 0 0
10 16 2 2 8 0 14 44 20 14 1 0 3 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 22 11 0 0 0
PSO - 9
Security Measures
Airports 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
1 49 2 2 19 22 15 0 22 15 1 0 0 15 15 15 19 15 19 0 22 22 24 0 0 37 0
2 42 2 2 14 20 14 0 20 14 1 0 3 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 22 0 0 0 27
3 39 2 0 13 0 14 44 20 14 1 0 0 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 22 11 0 0 0
4 30 2 2 11 20 14 0 20 14 1 0 3 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 22 0 0 0 21
5 25 2 0 11 0 14 44 20 14 1 0 0 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 22 11 0 0 0
6 23 2 0 11 0 14 44 20 14 1 0 0 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 22 11 0 0 0
7 20 2 0 10 0 14 44 20 14 1 0 0 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 22 11 0 0 0
8 16 2 2 8 20 14 0 20 14 1 0 3 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 22 0 0 0 21
9 16 2 2 9 20 14 0 20 14 1 0 3 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 22 0 0 0 21






Table 3.11 - Model 7: Heuristic 1 
 
Model 8 (Table 10) displays the results of the heuristic 2.  
Table 3.12 - Model 8: Heuristic 2 
 
Model 8 (Table 10) displays the results of the column generation.  
Airports 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
1 49 2 2 19 0 15 48 22 15 1 1 0 15 15 15 19 15 19 0 22 22 24 0 0 37 0
2 42 2 2 14 0 14 44 20 14 1 0 0 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 22 0 0 24 0
3 39 2 2 13 0 14 44 20 14 1 1 0 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 22 0 0 21 0
4 30 2 2 11 20 14 0 20 14 1 0 3 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 22 11 0 0 0
5 25 2 2 11 20 14 0 20 14 1 0 3 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 22 11 0 0 0
6 23 2 2 11 20 14 0 20 14 1 0 3 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 22 11 0 0 0
7 20 2 2 10 20 14 0 20 14 1 0 3 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 22 11 0 0 0
8 16 2 2 8 20 14 0 20 14 1 0 0 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 22 0 0 21 0
9 16 2 2 9 20 14 0 20 14 1 0 0 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 22 0 0 21 0
10 16 2 2 8 20 14 0 20 14 1 0 3 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 22 11 0 0 0
Security Measures
Heuristic 1
Airports 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
1 49 2 2 19 0 15 48 22 15 1 1 0 15 15 15 19 15 19 0 22 22 24 0 0 37 0
2 42 2 2 14 0 14 44 20 14 1 0 0 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 22 0 0 24 0
3 39 2 2 13 0 14 44 20 14 1 0 0 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 22 0 0 21 0
4 30 2 2 11 0 14 44 20 14 1 0 0 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 22 0 0 21 0
5 25 2 2 11 0 14 44 20 14 1 0 0 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 22 0 0 21 0
6 23 2 2 11 0 14 44 20 14 1 0 0 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 22 0 0 21 0
7 20 2 2 10 0 14 44 20 14 1 0 0 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 22 0 0 21 0
8 16 0 2 8 20 14 0 20 14 1 0 0 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 22 0 0 21 0
9 16 2 2 9 0 14 44 20 14 1 0 0 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 22 0 0 21 0










The classical portfolio optimization model uses the variance as the risk measure 
and relies on the covariance matrix. Without reliable estimates for the 
covariance/correlation, we needed to adapt network analysis techniques to make a pseudo 
correlation matrix. We constructed a network of interdependent risk factors that can be 
represented by a weighted adjacency matrix (Ravasz et al., 2002). This matrix is then 
combined with the TOM, similarity measure for biological networks (Yip & Horvath, 
2007) and (Agliari et al., 2015), to define and quantify the topological and interdependent 
relationships between the security measures and the risk factors. 
As a means to integrate the risk factors and security measures that are put in place 
by TSA, the method to calculate Risk Posture is developed. Risk Posture is calculated 
based on the optimal security measure portfolios selected and their interdependent 
`
Airports 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
1 49 1 2 19 0 15 48 22 15 1 1 0 15 15 15 19 15 19 0 22 22 24 0 0 37 0
2 42 2 2 14 0 14 44 20 14 1 0 0 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 22 0 0 24 0
3 39 2 2 13 20 14 0 20 14 1 0 3 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 22 11 0 0 0
4 30 2 2 11 20 14 0 20 14 1 0 3 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 22 11 0 0 0
5 25 2 2 11 20 14 0 20 14 1 0 3 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 22 11 0 0 0
6 23 2 2 11 20 14 0 20 14 1 0 3 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 22 11 0 0 0
7 20 2 2 10 20 14 0 20 14 1 0 3 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 22 11 0 0 0
8 16 2 2 8 20 14 0 20 14 1 0 0 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 22 0 0 21 0
9 16 2 2 9 20 14 0 20 14 1 0 0 14 14 14 19 14 18 0 21 21 22 0 0 21 0






relationship with the TSA risk taxonomy. With Risk Posture, we are trying to maximize 
the resilience of the system so that no matter the risk, we should be able to face it. There 
are no standard Risk Posture calculations, and the term has been typically associated with 
Cyber-security readiness. Our goal is to maximize the overall improvement in risk posture 
by minimizing our risk. 
Nearly all security measures have been addressed in small groupings in past 
research over the past 16 years, but none all together in an optimization model. Stewart and 
Mueller (Stewart & Mueller, 2017) are the only publication/s that include all security 
measures. No prior optimization model has attempted to incorporate multiple screening 
areas into a single model. We were able to incorporate Stewart and Mueller’s (Stewart & 
Mueller, 2017) reliability construct to include Checked baggage, Carry-on baggage, and 
Passenger screening. ERM portfolio optimization models are typically tied to the Insurance 
and Finance industries and follow a very traditional modeling approach. Sewell’s SADM 
model and Nie’s model are sub-models within our overall resource allocation model. This 
new model expands upon previous research and combines all models into a resource 
allocation optimization model with a new primary objective concentrated on Risk Posture. 
The output of the model allocates limited quantities of security measures/screening 
devices across airports nationwide to  
    • Minimize the probability of false clears  




    • Maximize the risk posture of the TSA (threat detection capability concerning 
the interdependent network of TSA risk elements)  
3.11.2 Conclusions 
The biggest knowledge gap in the research is any type of optimization model 
concerning enterprise risk management performs at an operational level. This would be the 
first model that covers a full multi-tier enterprise risk management (strategic, tactical, and 
operational levels). This would also be the first model to concentrate on risk posture. The 
device allocation problem, combined with a passenger risk assessment policy, can be used 
to structure a risk-based screening strategy to use limited screening resources effectively. 
The model continues to be very flexible and can comfortably accommodate different 
resources, new constraints, and additional objectives 
This chapter extends the work by (Sewell et al., 2013) and (Nie et al., 2009) to 
present an optimal solution methodology for solving the security screening device 
allocation model across multiple airports. Given budget constraints, including the 
installation, operation, and fixed costs associated with screening devices and procedures in 
an airport checkpoint, the purpose of this model is to allocate limited quantities of new 
screening technology across airports nationwide to maximize the total security level (i.e., 
probability of threat detection) over all the airports under consideration. To accomplish 
this, we compute a risk factor for security classes using either the new or existing detection 
devices, based on the hourly throughput rate of each of the device types and the perceived 




CAPPS and allows security operations to partition passengers into high or low-risk 
categories for undergoing higher or lower intensity screening, respectively. This chapter 
presents a Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition approach to the nonlinear problem, where 
optimal solutions are shown to be obtained in several seconds through several 
computational examples. The device allocation problem, combined with a passenger risk 
assessment policy, can be used to structure a risk-based screening strategy that makes 





CHAPTER 4.  CBP RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
4.1 Introduction 
The large influx of immigrants across the US-Mexico border has severely strained the 
government’s capacity to handle border safety and protection. The situation is further 
exacerbated with thousands of immigrant children separated from their parents or family 
members and being held at Border Patrol facilities. Although there have been numerous 
debates regarding strategies and policies in securing border safety and in mitigating the 
risks and danger migrants go through to arrive in the United States in search of a better 
future, an effective unifying theme of border security and operational infrastructure has not 
materialized.  
Immigration and security along the southern border have long been a topic of 
discussion and is a well-publicized struggle. We acknowledge that there are social and 
humanitarian issues present in this area of research, and we are exploring some of these in 
additional research papers. We, the authors, do care about illegal immigrants and their 
physical and social well-being, but this is not a political paper. This research focuses on 
constructing a mathematical model that aids the government in how they spend their budget 
on selecting resources for the U.S. operational security infrastructure. The simple fact is 
the U.S. does have a southern border where hundreds of thousands of immigrants attempt 
to enter the country illegally. The popular proposition is to construct additional wall 
segments and update existing structures along the border. This paper presents a 




investment to the safety and security of all people involved or if there are security 
investments that can aid in detection and aid in non-physical deterrence. 
There is a large amount of academic research studying security between ports of entry, 
but almost none of it is mathematical. There is a host of research that describes security 
between ports of entry, and more than anything, it focuses on the leveraging of mortal 
danger the migrants face in navigating remote wilderness locations as the prime mechanism 
of deterrence. The leveraging of mortal danger as deterrence was an explicit part of Border 
Patrol’s deterrence-based strategic planning. In large part, what brought the most 
considerable academic attention to a deterrence-driven border policy was that the ratio of 
deaths to CBP migrant apprehensions skyrocketed and had been steadily increasing into 
the latter 2010s, even as projected migration rates declined (Chambers, 2019). The 
misconception with non-mathematical usage and explanations of these numbers is that 
migrant deaths have been increasing for years across the border.  The truth is the annual 
number of deaths is approximately 21% lower than the 20-year average, 26.5% lower than 
the number of deaths ten years ago, and 7.6% higher than the number of deaths 20 years 
ago (U.S. Border Patrol Southwest Border Deaths by Fiscal Year, 2019). The drastic 
difference/increase in the ratio of deaths to apprehensions is due to the 75% decrease in 
apprehensions in the last 18 years (U.S. Border Patrol Total Illegal Alien Apprehensions 
By Fiscal Year).  It is correct that the number of deaths has increased in specific sectors 
due to the “Funnel Effect” or avoidance of enhanced border surveillance technology in 




2019). Overall, this tells us that deterrence-based strategic efforts are possibly contributing 
to the reduction in attempted illegal crossings.   
There are arguments that deterrence based strategies increase injuries to 
immigrants. The literature presents the scenarios where immigrants attempt to cross the 
border over the large border fences and have injured themselves from falling off of them 
(Jusionyte, 2018). It is evident in the results presented in this paper that spending additional 
funds on the wall is not the best solution and that other more effective and less physical 
methods can deter immigrants. Obviously, any loss of life is tragic, but our mathematical 
model can be used to encourage funding of deterrence and detection methods, even in 
remote areas. Not only would this aid in decreasing migrant attempts in the dangerous 
routes, but it would also assist CBP agents and first responders in assisting those 
individuals that are injured in their crossing attempts.    
 The US-Mexico border spans approximately 1,933 miles long. As a result of the 
Secure Fence Act in 2006, hundreds of miles of physical fence were constructed along 
the border. Currently, 1,279 miles, 66% of the border is unfenced, with the Rio Grande 
River making up much of this unfenced border. The current position of pedestrian fence 
and vehicle barriers can be seen in Figure 4.1 - U.S. Mexico Border (Mark & Kiersz, 
2019). 
In the study, we present a dynamic systems modeling approach to analyze how best to 
establish effective border strategies in deterrence and detection through optimal security 





Figure 4.1 - U.S. Mexico Border 
Within the field of portfolio investment research, there is a severe gap in 
incorporating ERM within the operational level. Chapter 3 analyzed strategies for security 
measure allocation for optimal aviation security and incorporates a computational 
framework for multi-tier risk taxonomy modeling and strategic assessment. In this chapter, 
we leverage the modeling framework to tackle the borders, taking into account the full 
multi-tier enterprise risk management (strategic, tactical, and operational levels).  
4.2 CBP Prior Work 
Little has been reported in the literature regarding the measures of the effectiveness 
of existing border security. Merely looking at the number of apprehensions could be very 
misleading. A decrease in the number of apprehensions could indicate either successful 
border enforcement or failed border enforcement. Success could be due to rising deterrence 
and fewer attempts. Failure could be due to more successful illegal entries. Hence some 




detained are much needed. Similarly, knowing what type of security measures are 
responsible for the identification of border crossers being apprehended is essential. Our 
objective is to establish a combination of security measures by sector to increase the 
apprehension rate or deterrence rate. 
The current state of enforcement is a work in progress. Arizona is the first state to 
experience technology upgrades at its border. The original upgrade plans called for 52 
Integrated Fixed Towers, underground sensors, night vision scopes for trucks, and remote 
video surveillance systems. 
This study establishes a mathematical model that supports border security and 
includes both physical and technological security measures. The model determines the best 
combination of security measures based on their detection characteristics and capability 
(and potentially other factors). Security measures can be tailored to each sector and an area 
of coverage based on the average number of apprehensions per month and physical 
attributes of each sector. This could be further tailored to specific station requirements. The 
apprehension rates used in the model (Table 4.1) are based on the FY18 statistics. The 
monthly average sector rates are used to determine the quantity of each security measure 




Table 4.1 - Total Apprehensions by Sector per Month (U.S. Border Patrol Southwest 
Border Apprehensions by Sector (2018)) 
 
There is very little academic research about border security between immigration ports. 
Bristow provided the only model that analyzed the border wall in Arizona (Bristow, 2017). 
The model focuses on infrastructure on the Arizona border and how to decide to upgrade 
infrastructure based on current effectiveness levels. There is a severe lack of mathematical 
models developed to support border decision-making strategy. It is a timely opportunity to 
analyze resource allocation across all sectors holistically to maximize global effectiveness. 
4.3 Our Contributions 
A quantitative construct for optimizing security measure investments is established 
to achieve the most cost-effective deterrence and detection capabilities for the CBP. A 
large-scale resource allocation optimization integer program was successfully modeled that 
rapidly returns good Pareto optimal results. The model incorporates the utility of each 
measure, the probability of success, along with multiple objectives. To the best of our 
knowledge, our work presents the first mathematical model that optimizes security 




and detection impact. The model accommodates different resources, constraints, and 
various types of objectives. The solution methodologies being put in place are complex, 
current state-of-the-art, and very effective. 
We leverage our recent multi-objective resource allocation model developed for 
TSA airport security analysis (Leonard, Lee, Booker, 2019). Specifically, we introduced a 
large-scale integration and expansion of the work by Nie et al. and Sewell et al. (Nie et al., 
2009, Sewell et al., 2012, Sewell, et al., 2013). The systems TSA model determines an 
optimal allocation of threat detection devices and measures for screening checked baggage, 
carry-on baggage, and passengers across a set of airports so as to 1) maximize risk posture, 
2) maximize the number of threats detected, and 3) minimize the overall false alarm rate 
while considering passenger threat classification. Constraints are imposed on the time 
available at each check station, flow capacity at security stations, budget, as well as staffing 
needs at each check station. We employ the TSA construct for the CBP border security 
model herein but with a primary objective of maximizing the utility of the security measure 
portfolios employed in each sector of the border wall.  
The chapter is organized as follows. Section “Mathematical Model” presents the CBP 
system resource allocation problem as a multi-objective nonlinear integer program. Section 
“Solution Methodology” first describes a Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition approach to 
handle the nonlinear constraints and objective and the binding constraint of allocating 
resources across the sectors. It also describes a column generation approach implemented 




empirical results from several problem instances to demonstrate the Pareto optimal 
solutions and their respective trade-offs.  
4.4 Requirements Analysis 
We model the U.S. Customs and Border Protection ERM in 3 tiers. Tier 3 is 
comprised of satellites monitoring the geographic area of the border. This allows for 24/7 
surveillance and data gathering, pinpointing high-frequency crossing areas, and addressing 
vulnerable locations. Tier 2 employs High Altitude Long Endurance (HALE) drones with 
high fuel capacity for extended surveillance. They provide higher resolution images 
compared to Tier 3 and are equipped with infrared capabilities to find hidden smuggling 
camps, etc. Tier 1 is the ground layer, which includes a variety of security surveillance 
systems and manned outposts. This operational layer is equipped with quadcopter drones, 
intermittent outposts along the border, and sensor technology in between. The outposts 
serve as command posts for drone swarms and also as home bases for analyzing 
information streams from all tiers. The sensors can identify border crossings as well as 
attempted tampering with existing wall structures and the ground below. Swarms of drones 
can be sent out as quick response teams to identify crossers further or interdict them. An 





Figure 4.2 - A Three Tier Security Capability Architecture 
CBP has made positive strides in protecting the border. However, multiple 
challenges remain. A critical element is to utilize the border agents' time more efficiently 
and effectively. The number of CBP agents has grown several times over in the past two 
decades, but the quantity of manpower is never quite enough. The requirements of a 
physical agent presence for identification, verification, or detection are continuously 
straining the manpower resources.  Some of this pressure can be alleviated by employing 
“smart” security measures.  For example, false alarms could be identified by drones or 
surveillance equipment.  Risk levels and priority scores can be dynamically generated to 
better allocate different resources on a day to day basis with real-time information coming 
from the “Smart Wall.” With the use of surveillance technologies and drones, illegal 
immigrants can be deterred from illegal crossings non-violently. Drones play a big part in 
surveillance, but can also be used to scare away potential smugglers. The loud sound of the 




to scatter or deter groups of smugglers. Detecting “unseen” threats are much easier with 
the use of advanced technology. Tunneling has become a common smuggling method and 
can go undetected until actual contraband reaches the other side of the border. With smart, 
highly sensitive sensors, the consistent vibrations of digging could be detected and 
separated from the interference (such as animals) using pattern detection technology. 
Agents can be alerted in real-time, allowing for pre-emptive security. 24/7 information 
flow will enable agents to monitor and learn smugglers' patterns. It may even be possible 
to determine the patterns of smugglers/smuggling (favorite combinations of routes, time of 
day, weather, etc.) through machine learning to be steps ahead.  
In determining requirements, Tier 3 is omitted and assumes satellite systems are 
already in place. Tier 2 includes military-grade surveillance technology.  For example, the 
cost of acquisition of HALE drones, such as the MQ-4C Triton, is roughly 20 million each. 
Tier 1 requirements include commercial drones. Commercial drone technology is 
developing at a rapid rate, and top of the line is constantly changing. We use the DJI Mavic 
Air as the base drone for our analysis. This drone has an effective range of 6.2 miles and 
costs 00 each. With a border length of ~1,934 miles long and an effective drone mission 
range of 6.2 miles, an outpost to act as the command center for these drones will need to 
be placed approximately every 12.4 miles to ensure 100% coverage. This leads to about 
162 outposts along the border, which would need to be staffed accordingly.  Unattended 
ground sensors would be located between outposts and would send alerts when suspected 




CBP’s primary objective is border security. There are over 60,000 employees, a 
third of which are border patrol agents. The southern continental border includes the border 
states of California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas. The border is split into nine 
“sectors,” which are divided into 74 “stations,” with each containing specific patrol zones, 
Figure 4.3, (Office of the Inspector General(1), 2017). In the current state, CBP only has 
effective (physical) control of 680 miles of the border, while the Rio Grande River serves 
as a natural barrier of over 1,000 miles, (S&T Impact: Borders & Ports of Entry). 
  
Figure 4.3 - Map of the Nine Border Sectors along the US-Mexico Border  
CBP annually collects data from frontline border patrol agents and chiefs from each 
of the nine patrol sectors along the Southwest border. There are roughly 500,000 illegal 
entries per year. The data collected identifies vulnerability or “capability gaps.” CBP then 
catalogs preliminary requests for solutions to address capability gaps that include 




identifies the relative priority of various segments along the border for the proposed border 
wall. The inputs are based on the feedback from the sector chiefs. (Committee of Homeland 
Security & Governmental Affairs (2018)) 
Focusing on CBP’s highest priority vulnerabilities across all capability gaps (902 
total), we observe the following key findings (Committee of Homeland Security & 
Governmental Affairs (2018)) 
• Less than 0.5% of the proposed solutions from CBP agents and sector chiefs 
included a request for a “wall.”  
• Less than 4% of proposed solutions from CBP agents and sector chiefs included a 
request for additional “fencing.”  
• Only one “Urgent and Compelling” request (out of 14) mentioned either a wall or 
fencing.  
• 25% of vulnerabilities can be addressed using the man-made infrastructure of any 
kind.  
• The remaining 75% indicate the need for technology and personnel approaches to 
advance border security.  
 
The report presents a uniform opinion of CBP personnel’s desire to integrate 
technology along the entire border to advance and improve border security. The physical 
border wall does exist and has been in place for many years, with some areas being 
modernized in the last five to seven years. The cost of upgrading the remaining legacy 
fence is cost-prohibitive at an average of .494 million per mile and would exhaust all 
available funds (Office of the Inspector General(1) (2017)). The remaining two-thirds of the 
open border contains terrain where technology is much more useful. 
A modular multi-layered (tiered) system is desirable for achieving operational 




technology will facilitate this system's approach. New technology includes UAVs, tethered 
drones, unattended ground sensors, infrared detection, surveillance systems. They have 
generated a shift in security tactics that many believe can be very beneficial. (Office of the 
Inspector General (2017)) 
In this study, we apply risk-based modeling to determine the most cost-effective 
security measure investments. The effectiveness is based on reducing the likelihood of 
attack (increasing detection and/or deterrence). Such models empower policymakers to 
make sound and informed decisions in allocating funds. (Lavender, 2017)  
4.5 Data Collection 
      Geographically, approximately 90% of the primary border fencing on the SW border 
is in the five western-most sectors, with the remaining 10% of primary fencing located in 
the four eastern-most sectors where the Rio Grande River delineates the majority of the 
border. The current percentage estimates of legacy and modern fencing are shown in Figure 





Figure 4.4 - Existing US-Mexico Border Fencing  
 CBP employs a system of interconnected security layers to deter and detect illegal 
immigration and criminal activity. Table 4.2 summarizes a sample list of existing security 
measures and the estimated values across the nine sectors. Some of these values are derived 
from existing documentation, while others are estimates based on public announcements 
of new installations (Office of the Inspector General(1) (2017)). Specifically, the physical 
and Tier 3 security measures are known quantities and locations. Tier 2 and Tier 1 security 
measures do exist; however, their exact values or positions are uncertain. We demonstrate 
the use of our system by inputting the Tier 3 measures and allowing the model to determine 
the initial purchase and assignment quantities across the sectors and stations. Other security 




Table 4.2 - CBP Sample Existing Security Measures 
 
The border surveillance systems are comprised of combinations of surveillance 
technologies that are designed or utilized to assist the CBP in enforcing U.S. laws and to 
detect, identify, apprehend, and remove persons and illegal contraband.  Since the 2014 
BSS assessment, CBP has deployed new technologies, including mobile, fixed, and other 
technologies. (Luck (2018)) 
Mobile surveillance technology includes Tactical Aerostats (TAS), lightweight 
Counter-Mortar Radar/Lightweight Surveillance and Target Acquisition Radar 
(LCMR/LSTAR), and Man-Portable Aerial Radar System-Kits (MARS-K). (Luck (2018)). 
The TAS units are significant to the program and provide a low-cost, low-flying satellite 
system.  The TAS units include wireless transmitters, are capable of detecting all aircraft 
within a 200-mile range, and all data is downloaded and integrated to the Air and Marine 
Operations Center (AMOC). (Long)  The LSTAR radars provide 360 degrees 3D electronic 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
El Centro San Diego Tucson Yuma Big Bend Del Rio El Paso Laredo Rio Grande Valley
New Bollard Wall (miles) (30 ft tall) 42 12 144.1 98.28 0 4.2 90 0 54.6 5.50$                    
Primary Fence (miles) (10-20 ft tall) 16.1 33 65.5 8.82 2.55 0 18 0.855 0 2.00$                    
Secondary Fence (miles) 0 13.2 0 10.08 2.55 0 14.4 0 0 1.00$                    
Tertiary Fence (miles) 0 1.2 0 10.08 0 0 1.8 0 0 0.50$                    
Tier 3 Tactical Aerostats 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 8.90$                    
Commercial Drones 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00$                    
IFT 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 18.48$                 
Remote Video Surveillance System (RVSS) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4.42$                    
RVSS Upgrades 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4.42$                    
Mobile Surveillance Capability (MSC) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.23$                    
Agent Portable Surveillance System (APSS) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.77$                    
Mobile Video Surveillance System (MVSS) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.15$                    
Thermal Imaging Device (TID) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.33$                    
Unattended Groud Sensors (UGS) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00$                    












scanning capabilities for detecting and tracking airborne targets.  The LCMR systems 
provide continuous 3D 360-degree surveillance and 3D rocket, artillery, and mortar 
location using a non-rotating electronically steered antenna.  Integrated Fixed Towers 
(IFTs) are integrated with the Tracking and Signcutting Modeling (TSM).  The IFTs 
include day and night cameras, radar, and laser illuminator sensors that can be monitored 
from local sector facilities. (Luck (2018))  
Other surveillance technology includes the cross-border tunnel threat (CBTT) 
program, the border tunnel activity detection system-point (BTADS-P), linear ground 
detection systems (LGDS), and unattended ground sensors (UGS).  The CBTT program 
employs tunnel detection technology to enhance the tunnel activity monitoring capabilities.  
It is a network of subterranean ground sensors collecting seismic information that includes 
people walking near the border, climbing over fences, digging near the sensors, vehicles or 
animals near the border, and low flying aircraft.  The BTADS-P, LGDS, and UGS are all 
different types of sensors used in the CBTT that are useful for detecting when a tunnel is 
actively being constructed or provide long-term physical intrusion detection. (U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection (2015))  
4.6 Mathematical Model 
We establish here the mathematical programming model to determine the optimal 
allocation of security devices and measures such that we can maximize the utility of the 




To construct this model, we leveraged the same resource allocation model 
developed for TSA airport security analysis in Chapter 3. Specifically, we introduced a 
large-scale integration and expansion of the work by Nie et al. and Sewell et al. (Nie et al., 
2009; Sewell et al., 2012; Sewell et al., 2013). The systems TSA model determines an 
optimal allocation of threat detection devices and measures for screening checked baggage, 
carry-on baggage, and passengers across a set of airports to 1) maximize risk posture, 2) 
maximize the number of threats detected, and 3) minimize the overall false alarm rate while 
considering passenger threat classification. Constraints are imposed on the time available 
at each check station, flow capacity at security stations, budget, as well as staffing needs at 
each check station. We employ the TSA construct for the CBP border security model 
herein. Specifically, a single large scale mixed integer programming portfolio optimization 
problem is constructed with a primary objective of maximizing the utility of the security 
measure portfolios employed in each sector of the border wall.  
The parameters and decision variables used in the model are as follows: 
Parameters Description 
T The total number of border sectors  
k Index for border sector k=1,2,…,T  
d Index for detection device type d=1,2,…,D 
Bk Number of apprehensions to resolve per month by sector k 
Id Installation cost ($/device) associated with security measure type d 
Cd Maximum throughput (apprehensions/month) of security measure type d 
Edk Number of existing devices of security measure type d at sector k 
Kdk Capacity of the quantity of security measure type d at sector k 
Pd Conditional probability of detecting a threat given there is a threat for 
device type d 








xdk Binary variable where xdk = 1(0) if security measure type d is (not) used to 
deter/detect apprehension station k 
ydk Number of security measure type d to be used at sector k (integer) 
sdk Number of security measure type d to be installed at sector k (integer) 
Our constraint development begins with assigning the device types, 𝑑, and 
numbers, 𝑦𝑑𝑘, of detection devices to each sector in constraint (4.1). To accomplish this, 
the number of devices of type 𝑑 to be installed in each sector, 𝑠𝑑𝑘, is found by subtracting 
the number of devices of type 𝑑 currently existing from the number of devices of type 𝑑 








𝑠𝑑𝑘 = max  { 𝑦𝑑𝑘 − 𝐸𝑑𝑘, 0}, (DeviceInstallationConstraint) (4.2) 
for 𝑑 = 1,2, … , 𝐷 and 𝑘 = 1,2, … , 𝑇. 
The sector installation budget constraint, (4.3), can be found by summing up the 
installation costs of each security measure at each sector, and verifying the total sum is less 







𝐼𝑑𝑠𝑑𝑘 ≤ Budget, (SectorInstallationBudgetConstraint) 
(4.3) 
Next, the number of new security measures installed in all sectors must be less than or 
equal to the total number of new devices available (4.4), and so, the device resource 




𝑠𝑑𝑘 ≤ 𝑈𝑑 , (ResourceAvailabilityConstraint) 
(4.4) 




Lastly, the sector resource capacity (4.5) is defined by the number of new security 
measures less than or equal to the number of available billets within each sector. 
𝑠𝑑𝑘 ≤ 𝐾𝑑𝑘, ∀ 𝑑 ∈ 𝐷 and 𝑘 ∈ 𝑇  (Sector Resource Constraint) 
(4.5) 
There are three objectives.  The first (primary) objective is to maximize the utility 
of the applied portfolios (4.6). 𝑇𝑖 is the utility value of each sector that is equivalent to 
(#Agents)×(BorderMiles)×(#Stations)
(SqMiles)
. This calculation is then normalized to prevent overly 
large objective values. The weighted, adjusted Risk Posture, covering all sectors, all 









The second objective is to maximize the total probability of detection (4.8) and is 
based on both the probability of a device correctly detecting a threat and the rate of 
apprehensions generated by each security measure. Pd is the conditional probability that a 
threat is detected by security measure type 𝑑, given that a threat is present.  Lk, (4.7), is the 
probability that at least one of the security measures used detects the threat. 
𝐿𝑘 = 1 −∏
𝐷
𝑑=1
(1 − 𝑥𝑑𝑘𝑃𝑑) (4.7) 





The third objective, (4.9), is to minimize cost. Even though there is a budget in 
place, the total number of dollars spent is still essential. Placing a limit on the budget allows 












In short, the multi-objective problem is defined by the objectives in (4.10)-(4.12) 




















4.7 Solution Methodology 
The primary objective of this problem is to maximize the utility associated with 
improving the security posture of the border sectors. The utility improves by adding 
stronger security measures to a sector that sees larger rates of apprehensions on average 
and having a larger region of coverage with less manpower. Each security measure has a 
probability of detecting a threat, with the system as a whole having an overall threat 
detection probability. Since the system is layered, this is a conditional probability that at 
least one of the measures/devices in place will detect a threat given there is a threat. From 
here, a system reliability analysis can be performed with the intent of maximizing risk 
reduction or threat detection. Since all of the security measures/devices currently in use or 
proposed use are independent, this is modeled as a series system, as shown in (Leonard & 










(1 − 𝑃(𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑝ℎ𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒))
× (1 − 𝑃(𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒))
× (1 − 𝑃(𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠))
× (1 − 𝑃(𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑎𝑖𝑟 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠))
𝑒𝑡𝑐.
 (4.13) 
Our problem is a mixed-integer program based on the three different decision 
variables. We can reduce the number of decision variables by eliminating 𝑦𝑑𝑘, which are 
the total number of security measures to be put in place in each sector. 𝑦𝑑𝑘 = ⌈𝐵𝑘𝑥𝑑𝑘/𝐶𝑑⌉ 
and 𝑦𝑑𝑘 ∈ ℤ
+. We can relax the integrality requirement with the following steps. 
    • 𝐶𝑑𝑦𝑑𝑘 ≥ 𝐵𝑘𝑥𝑑𝑘(1)  
    • 𝐶𝑑𝑦𝑑𝑘 < 𝐵𝑘𝑥𝑑𝑘 + 𝐶𝑑(2)  
    • let 𝑦𝑑𝑘
′ ∈ ℝ, then 𝑦𝑑𝑘
′  satisfies both equations (1) and (2)  




 ∀ 𝑑 and 𝑘  
    • Now 𝑦𝑑𝑘 can be obtained directly from 𝑦𝑑𝑘
′ ≤ 𝑦𝑑𝑘 ≤ 𝑦𝑑𝑘
′ + 1  
 If 𝑦𝑑𝑘 is obtained directly, then we can also determine 𝑠𝑑𝑘. However, we still want 
to decide how many security measures to purchase and distribute so we retain the decision 
variables 𝑠𝑑𝑘. 
Even though we are considering additional constraints, the foundation of the 
problem is a direct derivation of the TSA allocation model from Chapter 3. Now that we 
have reduced the decision variables to s, we can enumerate the combinations that satisfy 














, … , 𝑥𝑀𝑘𝐷
𝑘𝑗






, … , 𝑦𝐷
𝑘𝑗
). 
Define 𝑛𝑘 as the number of feasible solutions for sector k. Then notice that all of 
the feasible solutions for sector k can be generated by generating all of the binary arrays 
for 𝑥𝑑
𝑘𝑗
 and then computing 𝑦𝑑
𝑘𝑗
. Next, we will define a binary variable 𝑟𝑘𝑗 for each feasible 
solution for each sector, where 𝑟𝑘𝑗 = 1(0) if solution 𝑥𝑘𝑗 is (not) selected to be used in 
sector 𝑘. The master problem can now be written as the following binary integer program 























𝑟𝑘𝑗  (1 −∏
𝐷
𝑑=1
(1 − 𝑥𝑑𝑘𝑃𝑑)) 
(4.15) 











subject to  
















𝑠𝑑𝑘𝑟𝑘𝑗 ≤ 𝐾𝑑𝑘                 ∀𝑑 = 1,2, … , 𝐷,   𝑘 = 1,2, … , 𝑇 (4.19) 
𝑟𝑘𝑗 ∈ 0,1 (4.20) 
𝑠𝑑𝑘 ∈ 𝑍
+ (4.21) 
Although the model has been decomposed, the two remaining decision variables 
are now being multiplied by one another in one of the objective functions as well as in 
multiple constraints. We will introduce a new decision variable into the model to be 
represented by the equation 𝑧 = 𝑠 × 𝑟 where 𝑠 is a positive integer variable, and 𝑟 is binary. 
If s is bounded below by zero and above by any large value, M, then we can add the 
following constraints to the model:  
    • 𝑧 ≤ 𝑀 × 𝑟  
    • 𝑧 ≤ 𝑠  
    • 𝑧 ≥ 𝑠 − (1 − 𝑟) × 𝑀  
    • 𝑧 ≥ 0 
We can then substitute any expressions of 𝑠 × 𝑟 within the model with the new 
integer variable 𝑧. 
4.8 Empirical Results 
 The BORDER_RESOURCE_IP ((4.14) - (4.21)) was generated in Python 3.7.3 
and solved with Gurobi 9.0. The Gurobi parameters were kept at their default values, apart 




node structure. We conducted the majority of the computational experiments on a personal 
computer with an AMD Ryzen 7 quad-core processor, 3.8 GHz processor speed, and 16 
GB of RAM. Sensitivity analysis was completed on the Georgia Institute of Technology 
High Throughput server cluster. 
4.8.1 Scenario Analysis 
 We design multiple experiments to gauge the interplay and tradeoffs of the 
objective functions and the constraints. All initial models solved in this section were solved 
using the standard discrete programming method found in Gurobi. Herein, we report eight 
scenarios to contrast the outcome.  
    • Model 1: Maximize Utility (Obj. 1)  
    • Model 2: Maximize the Probability of Detection (Obj. 2)  
    • Model 3: Minimize Cost (based on a lower bound of $2.5 B) (Obj. 3)  
    • Model 4: Maximize Cost (based on an upper bound of $5 B) (Obj. 3)  
    • Model 5: Tri-Objective Model (Max Obj 1 & 2, Min Obj. 3)  
    • Model 6: Tri-Objective Model (Max Obj 1 & 2, Max Obj. 3)  
    • Model 7: Tri-Objective Model (Max Obj 1 & 2, Min Obj. 3 with lower weight)  
    • Model 8: Tri-Objective Model (Max Obj 1 & 2, Max Obj 3 with lower weight)  
These scenarios allow us to observe how security measure allocations differ when 
different primary objectives are emphasized. We can also observe the tradeoffs – how 
different primary objectives impact the other objectives (positively or negatively). This 
allows the decision-makers to see multiple options and to consider what results remain 





Model 1 (Table 4.3) displays the results of maximizing the utility function 
(Objective 1). Maximizing the utility sees upgrading or installing a modern bollard wall in 
several sectors. Commercial drones, IFTs, and Imaging sensors are critical for surveillance.  
Table 4.3 - Model 1 Results 
  
Model 2 (Table 4.4) displays the results of maximizing the probability of detection 
(Objective 2). Maximizing the detection capability alone provides a lesser solution due to 




Table 4.4 - Model 2 Results 
 
Model 3 (Table 4.5) reports the results of minimizing cost based on a lower bound 
of $2.5 billion (Objective 3). Minimizing cost alone places slightly more emphasis on 
upgrading or installing new portions of the bollard wall  
Table 4.5 - Model 3 Results 
 
Security Measure\Sector El Centro San Diego Tucson Yuma Big Bend Del Rio El Paso Laredo Rio Grande Valley
New Bollard Wall (30 ft) 19 43 39 21 0 0 26 0 0
Pedestrian Fence (miles) (10-20 ft) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Secondary Fence (miles) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tertiary Fence (miles) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tacical Aerostats 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 2 2
Commercial Drones 11 9 23 18 0 31 29 25 37
IFT 11 0 0 0 0 0 39 0 0
Remote Video Surveillance System (RVSS) 4 0 13 6 26 0 0 0 0
RVSS Upgrades 4 0 13 0 26 0 14 0 0
Mobile Surveillance Capability (MSC) 0 0 0 16 0 27 35 0 0
Agent Portable Surveillance System (APSS) 0 3 0 5 0 9 12 0 11
Mobile Video Surveillance System (MVSS) 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 3 0
Thermal Imaging Device (TID) 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 3 5
Unattended Groud Sensors (UGS) 5 4 15 8 33 0 18 11 16
Imaging Sensors (IS) 0 22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maximizing Probability of Detection Only
Security Measure\Sector El Centro San Diego Tucson Yuma Big Bend Del Rio El Paso Laredo Rio Grande Valley
New Bollard Wall (30 ft) 18 48 39 21 0 0 26 0 0
Pedestrian Fence (miles) (10-20 ft) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Secondary Fence (miles) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tertiary Fence (miles) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tacical Aerostats 0 1 0 0 3 1 0 2 1
Commercial Drones 8 9 23 18 74 31 29 25 37
IFT 11 0 0 18 32 0 0 0 0
Remote Video Surveillance System (RVSS) 4 0 0 0 26 0 0 0 0
RVSS Upgrades 4 0 0 6 26 0 14 0 0
Mobile Surveillance Capability (MSC) 0 0 0 16 0 26 0 0 0
Agent Portable Surveillance System (APSS) 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 0 11
Mobile Video Surveillance System (MVSS) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Thermal Imaging Device (TID) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Unattended Groud Sensors (UGS) 0 0 0 0 33 0 0 0 16





Model 4 (Table 4.6) displays the results of maximizing cost based on an upper 
bound of $5 billion (Objective 3). Maximizing cost concentrates on remote and mobile 
surveillance systems versus introducing low-cost commercial drones.  
Table 4.6 - Model 4 Results 
  
Model 5 (Table 4.7) displays the results of the full triple-objective model while 
minimizing objective 3, using equal weights. The optimization, including minimal cost, 
concentrates resources on commercial drones, and IFTs.  
Table 4.7 - Model 5 Results 
 
Security Measure\Sector El Centro San Diego Tucson Yuma Big Bend Del Rio El Paso Laredo Rio Grande Valley
New Bollard Wall (30 ft) 19 48 39 20.99999784 0 0 26 0 0
Pedestrian Fence (miles) (10-20 ft) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Secondary Fence (miles) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tertiary Fence (miles) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tacical Aerostats 0 1 0 0 3 1 0 2 2
Commercial Drones 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 37
IFT 11 0 38 18 74 0 39 0 0
Remote Video Surveillance System (RVSS) 4 0 13 6 26 0 14 0 0
RVSS Upgrades 4 0 13 6 26 0 14 0 0
Mobile Surveillance Capability (MSC) 0 0 0 16 0 27 35 0 0
Agent Portable Surveillance System (APSS) 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Mobile Video Surveillance System (MVSS) 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 2 0
Thermal Imaging Device (TID) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Unattended Groud Sensors (UGS) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0
Imaging Sensors (IS) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maximizing Bounded Cost
Security Measure\Sector El Centro San Diego Tucson Yuma Big Bend Del Rio El Paso Laredo Rio Grande Valley
New Bollard Wall (30 ft) 18 48 39 21 0 0 26 0 0
Pedestrian Fence (miles) (10-20 ft) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Secondary Fence (miles) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tertiary Fence (miles) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tacical Aerostats 0 1 0 0 3 1 0 2 1
Commercial Drones 8 9 23 18 74 31 29 25 37
IFT 11 0 0 18 32 0 0 0 0
Remote Video Surveillance System (RVSS) 4 0 0 0 26 0 0 0 0
RVSS Upgrades 4 0 0 6 26 0 14 0 0
Mobile Surveillance Capability (MSC) 0 0 0 16 0 26 0 0 0
Agent Portable Surveillance System (APSS) 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 0 11
Mobile Video Surveillance System (MVSS) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Thermal Imaging Device (TID) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Unattended Groud Sensors (UGS) 0 0 0 0 33 0 0 0 16
Imaging Sensors (IS) 0 0 0 0 0 0 98 46 0




Model 6 (Table 4.8) displays the results of the full triple-objective model, 
maximizing three objectives using equal weights. The optimization, maximizing cost, 
focuses on the IFTs, but concentrates on remote and mobile surveillance instead of small 
drones.  
Table 4.8 - Model 6 Results 
 
Model 7 (Table 4.9) displays the results of the full triple objective model by 
minimizing cost and with a lower weight. The optimization, while minimizing cost, shows 
a very good distribution of technologies.  
Security Measure\Sector El Centro San Diego Tucson Yuma Big Bend Del Rio El Paso Laredo Rio Grande Valley
New Bollard Wall (30 ft) 19 48 39 20.999998 0 0 26 0 0
Pedestrian Fence (miles) (10-20 ft) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Secondary Fence (miles) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tertiary Fence (miles) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tacical Aerostats 0 1 0 0 3 1 0 2 2
Commercial Drones 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 37
IFT 11 0 38 18 74 0 39 0 0
Remote Video Surveillance System (RVSS) 4 0 13 6 26 0 14 0 0
RVSS Upgrades 4 0 13 6 26 0 14 0 0
Mobile Surveillance Capability (MSC) 0 0 0 16 0 27 35 0 0
Agent Portable Surveillance System (APSS) 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Mobile Video Surveillance System (MVSS) 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 2 0
Thermal Imaging Device (TID) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Unattended Groud Sensors (UGS) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0
Imaging Sensors (IS) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0




Table 4.9 - Model 7 Results 
 
Model 8 (Table 4.10) displays the results of the full triple objective model, by 
maximizing cost and with a lower weight. The optimization, while maximizing cost, shows 
a very good distribution of technologies.  
Table 4.10 - Model 8 Results 
 
Models 7 and 8 (Table 4.9 and Table 4.10) both provide two robust options in terms 
of optimizing multiple critical criteria while meeting different budgetary options. When 
Security Measure\Sector El Centro San Diego Tucson Yuma Big Bend Del Rio El Paso Laredo Rio Grande Valley
New Bollard Wall (30 ft) 0 0 39 1 0 0 26 0 0
Pedestrian Fence (miles) (10-20 ft) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Secondary Fence (miles) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tertiary Fence (miles) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tacical Aerostats 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 1
Commercial Drones 11 9 23 18 74 31 29 25 37
IFT 0 0 0 0 73 0 0 0 0
Remote Video Surveillance System (RVSS) 0 0 13 6 26 0 14 0 0
RVSS Upgrades 0 0 13 6 26 0 14 0 0
Mobile Surveillance Capability (MSC) 0 0 0 15 0 27 35 0 0
Agent Portable Surveillance System (APSS) 0 3 0 6 0 9 12 0 11
Mobile Video Surveillance System (MVSS) 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 3 0
Thermal Imaging Device (TID) 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 3 5
Unattended Groud Sensors (UGS) 5 4 15 9 33 0 18 11 16
Imaging Sensors (IS) 26 22 95 46 187 77 98 63 92
Tri-Objective Model (Min weighted Cost)
Security Measure\Sector El Centro San Diego Tucson Yuma Big Bend Del Rio El Paso Laredo Rio Grande Valley
New Bollard Wall (30 ft) 19 47 39 21 0 0 26 0 0
Pedestrian Fence (miles) (10-20 ft) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Secondary Fence (miles) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tertiary Fence (miles) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tacical Aerostats 0 1 0 0 3 1 0 2 2
Commercial Drones 11 9 23 18 74 31 29 25 37
IFT 9 0 38 18 74 0 39 0 0
Remote Video Surveillance System (RVSS) 4 0 13 6 26 0 14 0 0
RVSS Upgrades 4 0 13 6 26 0 14 0 0
Mobile Surveillance Capability (MSC) 0 0 0 16 0 27 35 0 0
Agent Portable Surveillance System (APSS) 0 2 0 5 0 9 12 0 11
Mobile Video Surveillance System (MVSS) 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 3 0
Thermal Imaging Device (TID) 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 3 5
Unattended Groud Sensors (UGS) 5 4 15 8 33 0 18 11 16
Imaging Sensors (IS) 26 22 95 46 187 77 98 63 92




only optimizing a single objective, certain security measures are left out that may be 
important to some missions.  
Table 4.11 provides a consolidated model overview of how the allocation values 
change as we iterate through the eight models discussed above.  The values in each cell 
represent the total units of security measures to be distributed across all sectors (sum of the 
rows from Table 4.3 - Table 4.10.  Although each solution presented is Pareto optimal for 
its specific model, each model provides a trade-off solution that might be of importance to 
the decision-maker.  We observe how different detection measures are directly impacted 
by emphasizing different objectives over others or using equal weights among them.  
Important values to acknowledge are if concentrating on minimizing cost as in Model 7, 
installing new Bollard Wall along the border becomes the least essential security measure 
to focus on while maximizing the number of commercial drones available is still a priority.  
In every model, it is vital to install IFTs within the sectors.  This is interesting since there 
are hardly any IFTs operational at the moment, and they are the most expensive security 
measure to put into place.  The model, in this case, determines that IFTs are a critical 
security element.  Another interesting observation, if possible, it seems prudent to allocate 
as many drones and IFTs as possible.  However, when the cost is an issue, it is important 
to install as many drones as possible and reduce the number of IFTs or vice versa.  We see 




Table 4.11 - Overall Model Comparison 
 
4.8.1.1 Measures of Performance  
Purely comparing the three objectives (Utility, Detection, Cost) in Table 4.12, we 
see that Models 1, 6, and 8 are the three strongest models. The three objectives are almost 
the same and at peak points in these solutions.  
Table 4.12 - Measures of Performance Results 
  
Table 4.13 summarizes the measures of performance when normalized between 0 
and 1.   This emphasizes the equivalence among Models 1, 6, and 8.  The triangle radar 
plot in Figure 5 displays the normalized results.  What we look for in the radar plot is for 
SM\Different Model Results Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
New Bollard Wall (30 ft) 153 148 152 153 152 153 66 152
Pedestrian Fence (miles) (10-20 ft) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Secondary Fence (miles) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tertiary Fence (miles) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tacical Aerostats 8 7 8 9 8 9 4 9
Commercial Drones 257 183 254 46 254 46 257 257
IFT 178 50 61 180 61 180 73 178
Remote Video Surveillance System (RVSS) 63 49 30 63 30 63 59 63
RVSS Upgrades 63 57 50 63 50 63 59 63
Mobile Surveillance Capability (MSC) 78 78 42 78 42 78 77 78
Agent Portable Surveillance System (APSS) 40 40 22 1 22 1 41 39
Mobile Video Surveillance System (MVSS) 8 7 0 6 0 6 7 8
Thermal Imaging Device (TID) 11 11 0 4 0 4 11 11
Unattended Groud Sensors (UGS) 110 110 49 2 49 2 111 110
Imaging Sensors (IS) 706 22 144 0 144 0 706 706
Total Cost per Model Plan 4,996.66$     2,500.55$     2,500.00$     5,000.00$     2,500.00$     5,000.00$     2,502.50$     4,999.29$     
Note:  Totals are cumulative across all 9 sectors
Comparison between Various Objective Models
Total number of each security measure to install
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Objective 1: Utility 2458.335 919.1804976 1143.309129 832.4948118 2291.727179 2457.712656 2292.992739 245.02
Objective 2: Detection 8.999957 8.999928 8.986102 8.999588 8.999957 8.999957 8.999957 8.999957






the colored lines to reach as close to 1 in each corner as possible.  If the model lines reach 
1, then the objective has reached the maximum value amongst the various models.  If a 
color is barely registering, then the objective value result was inconsequential in 
comparison.  
Table 4.13 - Normalized Model Results 
 
Figure 4.5 - Triangle Radar Plot Contrasting Models 
 

























Pareto optimality is a state of resource allocation from which it is impossible to 
reallocate to make any single objective improve without making at least another objective 
worse off. The efficient frontier represents the set of Pareto optimal portfolios that offer 
the highest expected return for a defined level of risk. The efficient frontier in this problem 
displays the tradeoff among the multiple objectives and offer a Pareto optimal solution. 
The decision-maker can follow the efficient frontier and select Pareto optimal alternatives 
that provide the same overall level of return but emphasize different levels or values of 
each objective.  Identifying potential combinations of assets is a long researched concept 
originally introduced by Markowitz (Markowitz, 1952).  Typically, the objectives 
represented in a multi-objective portfolio optimization problem are competing.  In this CBP 
analysis with multiple objectives that are being maximized (utility and probability of 
detection) versus one minimization (cost), there are several potentially reliable alternative 
solutions.  Any portfolios that exist along the efficient frontier have equivalent optimal 
values but offer up varying combinations and quantities of security measures to be 
allocated amongst the border sectors.   
We run the optimization instances thousands of times, varying the individual 
weights of the objective functions while ensuring they sum up to 1. In Figure 4.6 below, 
diagram A shows the variations in overall objective value while adjusting Objectives 1 and 
2. What we would look for is for both objectives to be maximized, so we refer to the upper 
right corner of the graph for the Pareto portfolio combinations. Figure 4.6 diagram B 
compares Objective 1 and Objective 3, comparing maximizing utility and minimizing cost. 




least amount of funding. For Figure 4.6 diagram C, we lastly compare Objectives 2 and 3, 
again looking to the bottom right corner for the best combinations of portfolios that achieve 
the highest level of detection while minimizing cost.   
 
Figure 4.6 - Comparison of Objective Functions (A – top left, B – top right, C – bottom 
middle) 
Several methods have been proposed for generating the complete Pareto efficient 
frontier for multi-objective optimization problems with greater than two objectives. The 




growing with the number of objective functions. Finding a Pareto optimal point involves 
solving an IP, and the number of IPs to solve grows rapidly through the process. Table 
4.6Error! Reference source not found. shows the behavior and interaction of the three 
fluctuating objective values together. It becomes obvious that the more funding that is 
available, the higher utility and threat detection capabilities are. If we reduce the budget, 
which is the goal, the maximum utility decreases drastically. Fortunately, the efficient 
frontier displays the range of possible solutions that are available for consideration to 
achieve acceptable good values for all three objectives simultaneously.   
4.8.2 Multi-Swarm Particle Swarm Optimization Sensitivity Analysis 
The purpose of this section is to answer questions about the performance of MSPSO 
when varying the different iteration parameters.  We looked specifically at the number of 
sub swarms, iterations, runs, and the population size.   
• Sub swarms: 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 
• Iterations:  10, 15, 20 
• Runs: 10, 15, 20 
• Population Size: 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 
Fluctuating these parameters impact the overall solution time, the number of full solution 
sets running through each iteration, the amount of time spent adjusting the solutions sets, 
and the number of completely different solutions that are considered.  Overall, we compare 
324 MSPSO instances to the exact solution of the mixed-integer program provided by the 




In Table 4.14 below, we show a subset of the top 26 solutions generated from the 
analysis.  We observed these solutions primarily because their combinations of parameters 
were able to select portfolios that would generate solutions within 0.01% of the optimal 
solution. Aside from noting that the MSPSO solutions did get very close to the optimal 
solution, we can quickly point out two main results. First, the larger the number of 
iterations, the better the solution.  Half of the “best” scenarios used 20 iterations, and 21/26 
of the scenarios used 15 or more iterations.  Half of the “best” scenarios used 15 runs. The 
best population size was the smallest, meaning using five sets of random solutions 
generated the best values.  Lastly, the larger the number of sub swarms, the better.  40% of 
the “best” scenarios used ten sub swarms, and 22/26 using 8, 9, or 10 sub swarms.  This 
may not appear to mean much, but more is not always better, especially when it increases 
memory usage and computation time.  We now know that we can keep the population size 
and number of runs to a minimum as long as we increase the number of iterations and the 




Table 4.14 - MSPSO Sensitivity Analysis 
 
4.9 Conclusion 
 A large-scale resource allocation optimization integer program was successfully 
constructed that easily runs to optimality and provides results using Gurobi 8.1 run in 
Python 3.7.3. This model was directly influenced by the current TSA security screening 
research (Leonard, Lee, Booker 2019). The overall model continues to be very flexible and 
can easily accommodate different resources, new constraints, and additional objectives. 
The solution methodologies that are being put in place are complex, current, and effective. 
They will allow further development of a mathematically supported decision analysis 
% Gap Iterations Runs Population Size Number Swarms Obj1 Obj2 Obj3 Overall Scenario #
0.00% 0 0 0 0 0.89 0.63 0.90 0.61200000 Optimal Solution
99.9926% 20 10 5 10 0.89 0.62 0.90 0.61195474 222
99.9926% 15 15 6 9 0.89 0.62 0.90 0.61195474 155
99.9926% 15 15 5 6 0.89 0.62 0.90 0.61195474 146
99.9926% 20 10 7 5 0.89 0.62 0.90 0.61195470 229
99.9926% 15 20 6 8 0.89 0.62 0.90 0.61195470 190
99.9926% 10 20 9 10 0.89 0.62 0.90 0.61195470 102
99.9924% 20 20 6 10 0.89 0.62 0.90 0.61195374 300
99.9924% 20 15 7 10 0.89 0.62 0.90 0.61195374 270
99.9922% 20 15 6 9 0.89 0.62 0.90 0.61195199 263
99.9922% 20 10 7 10 0.89 0.62 0.90 0.61195199 234
99.9922% 15 15 9 8 0.89 0.62 0.90 0.61195199 172
99.9922% 15 15 5 8 0.89 0.62 0.90 0.61195199 148
99.9922% 15 10 5 10 0.89 0.62 0.90 0.61195199 114
99.9921% 20 20 8 8 0.89 0.62 0.90 0.61195195 310
99.9921% 20 15 6 10 0.89 0.62 0.90 0.61195195 264
99.9921% 20 15 5 9 0.89 0.62 0.90 0.61195195 257
99.9921% 10 10 9 9 0.89 0.62 0.90 0.61195195 29
99.9921% 10 10 8 7 0.89 0.62 0.90 0.61195195 21
99.9920% 20 15 5 8 0.89 0.62 0.90 0.61195102 256
99.9920% 15 15 5 9 0.89 0.62 0.90 0.61195102 149
99.9920% 15 10 9 10 0.89 0.62 0.90 0.61195102 138
99.9920% 10 20 6 10 0.89 0.62 0.90 0.61195102 84
99.9920% 20 15 7 9 0.89 0.62 0.90 0.61195098 269
99.9920% 20 15 7 8 0.89 0.62 0.90 0.61195098 268
99.9920% 20 15 5 5 0.89 0.62 0.90 0.61195098 253




computational tool for the CBP to provide further justification for their capability gaps and 
develop smart investments. 
With a strong model foundation in place, this formulation is very flexible and can 
easily accommodate additional and/or different objectives and constraints. We 
acknowledge our model estimates the following input:  
    • False alarm detection rate for surveillance devices  
    • List of new and potential technologies to be considered  
    • Different measures of performance that can be included  
    • Accurate list of current devices that are employed and their locations  
Working with CBP domain experts is critical to ensure realistic data is being used for 
analyzing the results. 
The biggest knowledge gap in the research is any type of optimization model 
concerning enterprise risk management performs at an operational level. The TSA model 
is the first, which results in close to ½ billion decision variables. This CBP model is more 
manageable with 13,888 integer variables (448 of those are binary) and is capable of 
covering a full multi-tier enterprise risk management (strategic, tactical, and operational 
levels). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first model to mathematically determine 
security strategies for the CBP, as well as to introduce a utility factor to emphasize 
deterrence/detection impact. The model continues to be very flexible and can easily 




 (Leonard et al., 2019) offers an application to the large-scale system developed for 
TSA, and determines an optimal solution methodology for solving the security measure 
resource allocation model across multiple border sectors. Under 
physical/cyber/resource/logistics constraints, this model optimizes the allocation of limited 
quantities of deterrence and detection security measures across the entire southern 
continental U.S. border so as to maximize the total utility of the measures utilized, 
maximize the probability of deterrence and/or detection, and minimize cost. A utility factor 
is introduced to rating the impact of a security measure. The Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition 
approach is used to solve the nonlinear problem MIP problem instances, where optimal 
solutions are shown to be obtained in several seconds through several computational 
examples. Working with CBP, there is an opportunity to integrate a multi-tier risk 
taxonomy framework (Lee et al., 2019), e.g., incorporating migrants, cargos, materials, etc. 
and their risk interdependencies within the resource allocation framework problem to 






CHAPTER 5. TRAUMA RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
5.1 Introduction 
 The purpose of this chapter is to propose a model that facilitates the allocation and 
utilization of resources by the statewide trauma system. The primary objective was 
developed from the Georgia Trauma Center Network Commission’s (GTCNC) objectives. 
The GTCNC desired to maintain and expand Georgia’s trauma centers, strengthen 
emergency medical services in certain regions, and develop a statewide transfer system 
(Commission, 2009). The goal of the model that we created is to replicate the Georgia 
Trauma Network and run scenarios reflecting the objectives of the GTCNC to determine 
where the trauma system funding would have the most positive impact. We develop a 
mathematical model, and computational framework to (1) create the set of all feasible and 
Pareto-efficient portfolios where limited available funding is allocated among several 
requests (investments) from trauma centers, hospitals, and EMS providers, (2) 
quantitatively analyze the impact of each feasible portfolio on the system’s performance 
measures via the Trauma System Simulator and (3) conduct sensitivity analysis to 
determine the best decision making policy to transport/transfer patient and to observe how 
possible changes in the system inputs affect the returns and resource utilization. 
5.2 Emergency Trauma Care Prior Work 
The study of trauma care systems and trauma policy development began after the 
Vietnam War (Nathens et al., 2004). The efforts to designate trauma centers and build 
regional trauma systems have continued for the last four decades.  Many studies have 




of hospitalizations and death (Hulka et al., 1997). The literature covers a broad set of issues 
to improve the quality of trauma care and to improve patient care. One group of articles 
addresses the issues in the transportation of patients (Rittenberger & Callaway, 2009), 
(Blackwell et al., 2003), and (Cameron & Zalstein, 1998) and the impact of improvements 
in patient outcomes. The primary focus of these papers to determine the impact of transport 
time on patient survival rates. It was concluded that the actual transport time from the scene 
of the incident to the hospital does not have an impact. However, the time that it takes for 
the emergency responders to arrive at the scene once they have received the call does have 
an effect (Rittenberger & Callaway, 2009). Several studies that are more patient-centric 
focus on treatment and intervention methods (Hamilton & Breakey, 1995), (Haukoos et al., 
2011), and injury evaluation methods to correctly detect the patient’s condition (Vles et al., 
2004). There is an abundance of retrospective reviews of trauma patient data and related 
statistics to further understand what variables affect the mortality and morbidity of trauma 
patients (Veenema & Rodewald, 1995). Most trauma-related literature concerns the 
operational and tactical levels of trauma care and trauma systems. However, there is a gap 
in the strategic level (top-down) approach to trauma systems from a financial perspective. 
In this paper, we take the Georgia state trauma system and model it as a network of trauma 
facilities, hospitals, and EMS providers. We are interested in designing a long-term 
development model of the network, considering the demands of each component in the 
trauma network and focusing on strategies that will eventually lead to improving patient 




maximize the quality of patient care without creating a heavy burden on trauma centers, 
EMS and hospitals is a critical but so far untouched task. 
The range of assessed subjects is broad and distinct. There are mainly four different 
approaches to improve patient outcomes: (1) Patient perspective, (2) emergency medical 
service (EMS) perspective, (3) hospital/trauma facility perspective, and (4) policy/systems 
perspective. Literature that focuses on the patient perspective usually addresses how the 
survival, mortality, and morbidity rates are affected by the characteristics of patients 
(Hefny & Idris, 2013), (Prin & Li, 2016) and clinical decision making for specific types of 
trauma patients (Palmer, 2007). Published papers that concern the emergency medicine 
perspective consists of studies that assess how the length of emergency response time affect 
patient outcomes (Rogers et al., 2015), and the effect of prehospital trauma care on the 
survival rates of trauma patients (Vles et al., 2004). One class of literature focused on 
developing new rules to predict emergency intervention in trauma patients to improve 
triage effectiveness and efficiency (Haukoos, et al., 2011). Patient transportation strategies 
to trauma facilities or emergency departments (Veenema & Rodewald, 1995), (Brathwaite 
et al., 1998) and trauma system effectiveness are also extensively studied.  
5.2.1 Emergency Trauma Care Problems 
This project originated from Georgia’s desire to improve its trauma care system 
statewide.   The original plan was created in 2009, and the Georgia Trauma Care Network 
Commission (GTCNC) created a 5-year strategic plan designed to address existing 




techniques, and findings have been recommended to the Trauma Commission leaders. The 
methodologies and the results and implications of the work presented are relevant not only 
in Georgia but in many other states throughout the U.S. 
In the literature, discrete-time simulation modeling of emergency medical service 
systems (Wu & Hwang, 2009) has been developed extensively, but there are none that focus 
on trauma systems with an additional feature that analyzes and incorporates future 
investments into the network. In the current state, each component of the network (the 
trauma center) submits their requests to a central agency, or decision-maker, where each 
request has a cost and return. The central agency is responsible for allocating its limited 
budget among the requests. The cost of a request is in dollars, but returns are in terms of 
improvements in patient outcomes as a result of the investments made in the trauma 
network. The impact of any set of investments on the system can be captured via 
performing a simulation of the trauma system. In this chapter, possible quantitative and 
computational methods to handle this problem will be examined and investigated. 
It is important to see the impact of the investments on the quality of care and level 
of trauma system infrastructure. The selection of investments that provide the best patient, 
hospital, and EMS outcomes will benefit both the government finances and public health.  
There is no conflict of interest in distributing taxpayers’ money to healthcare systems the 
best way possible, since the shareholders, which are the taxpayers, will benefit from 
improvements in healthcare infrastructure to the maximum extent. Also, this model 
provides the opportunity for decision-makers to observe how sensitive the system 




complete picture of trauma systems from a dynamic and strategic point of view spanning 
tactical-level decisions would be a unique contribution to strategic decision-making 
literature in healthcare systems. 
5.3 Our Contributions 
Our research contributes to a framework of investment allocation for emergency 
trauma networks. We constructed a simulation to allow a thorough analysis and systematic 
update of the system with given investments and to facilitate the decision-making process. 
The simulation modeled the potential portfolio options and generated the measures of 
performance.  In line with the previous chapters, a MIP was developed to solve for an 
optimal solution. The MIP was formulated as a multi-region, multi-depot, vehicle routing 
pickup, and delivery problem with time windows.  We were then able to include hospital 
and patient constraints to formulate the ambulance routing problem.  Finally, investment 
allocation options are layered onto the ambulance routing problem to reach the full-scale 
model.   
The chapter is organized as follows. Section “Solution Methodology”  describes 
the full design of the simulation.  Section “Simulation Results” provides the results of the 
sensitivity analysis and the description of the measures of performance. 
5.4 Data Collection 
      For the simulation, we developed a theoretical layout of the Georgia 




stations, injury-related statistics, number of ambulances, hospital and TC capacities, 
and population and regional statistics of counties of Georgia are found from various 
public resources, including Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, GTCNC and 
the Georgia Association of Emergency Medical Services. The relevant parameters 
used in the simulation model are given in Table 5.1 below. 
Table 5.1 - Value of Parameters Used in the Model 
 
 The exact incident times of patients are generated following a Poisson 
distribution because this type of data could not be accessed due to patient 
confidentiality issues. Process times throughout the simulations are assumed to follow 
a normal distribution with certain parameters, where negative random variables are 
Parameter Value Unit 
Patient arrival rate per year (P ) (Increase by increments of 5,000) 25,000 patients 
Budget to allocate for investment requests (B) 5 million $ 
Parameters about trauma centers, hospitals and ambulances. 
Number of Level I TC’s (T1) 5 TC 
Number of Level II TC’s (T2) 9 TC 
Number of Level III TC’s (T3) 6 TC 
Number of Level IV TC’s (T3) 5 TC 
Number of non-trauma hospitals (H) 110 hospital 
Number of EMS stations (N ) 285 station 
Number of ambulances (M ) 2300 ambulance 
Radius of circle to scan TC’s to decide destination TC (r) 30 miles 
Probabilistic parameters 
Probability that an ambulance is busy with other type of patients at any time 90%  
Probability that patient type I’s injury severity level reduces to level II 5%  
Probability that patient type II’s injury severity level reduces to level III 10%  
Probability that patient type III’s injury severity level reduces to level IV 15%  
Process times distributions 
Duration between incident and first call to EMS (call time) ~Normal(3.5, 1) minutes 
Duration between call time and ambulance departure from hospital (preparation time) ~Normal(3, 1) minutes 
Duration to carry the patient to ambulance at emergency scene (carry time) ~Normal(5, 1) minutes 
Duration of patient stays in the hospital (treatment time) ~Normal(480, 60) minutes 
Number of submissions by type   
Level II TC ->Level I TC 9  
Level III TC->Level II TC 6  
Level IV TC->Level III TC 5  
Reduce incidents by 11% 10  
Can treat patient 6% faster at that site 50  





omitted. Also, the number of submissions, by type, has been given as well. The TC 
ambulance requests are submitted by the TC’s, EMS stations, and the EMS regions. It 
is not important which element of the system submits the request; it is the 
methodological framework that is being developed where one can apply data from 
anywhere to it to perform an analysis that matters. 
5.5 Solution Methodology 
5.5.1 Theoretical Model of the Problem 
 The first model presented is a simulation. Given that the objectives are concerning 
financial investments, we could have considered optimizing a constrained mathematical 
model to maximize patient impact.  However, based on the initial discussion with the 
committee and information provided, a simulation was much more fitting. In our follow-up 
study, we derive and analyze a risk-driven resource allocation optimization model. Our 
simulation system presented herein allows us to evaluate a large number of alternative and 
realistic trauma investment plans that were identified by the decision-makers in the 
GTCNC. We will not be focusing on generating a single best strategy, but instead 
supporting the decision-makers by evaluating the numerous predefined options with a high 
degree of realism so that the decision-makers can genuinely understand the outcome and 
impact of their investments/decisions on the trauma network and most importantly on the 
patients. Furthermore, there is a high degree of uncertainty involved in the model, which 





Consider a network where there are T trauma centers (TC), H hospitals, N EMS 
providers, and M ambulances. What we refer to as hospitals are hospitals without a trauma 
center. There are T1 Level I TC’s, T2 Level II TC’s, T3 Level III TC’s, and T4 Level IV 
TC’s. The statewide EMS system consists of R EMS regions, and each region may cover a 
number of TC’s, hospitals, and EMS stations. TC’s, EMS regions, and EMS providers 
submit upgrade requests to a central decision-maker. The exact cost and benefit of the 
approval of a request are not known, and each request differs in their impact on the system 
performance measures. The central decision-maker evaluates all of the requests and selects 
a portfolio of investments (the requests to be approved and those to be refused) subject to 
a limited budget such that selection will yield the best patient outcome. The question of 
how to measure the best patient outcome is rather complicated since it is necessary to define 
measures that ensure making quantitative comparisons. The selection of quantitative 
performance measures that give the best representation of the system will be discussed later 
and are shown in Table 5.2. We will define the return of a portfolio as the percentage 
change in the performance measures defined for the system if that portfolio of investments 
is chosen. Since the selection of requests is not independent of the selection of other 
requests, the value of returns for each portfolio will be different from each other. A sample 
description of the submissions, with their costs and returns, are shown in Table 5.2.  
Table 5.2 - Description of Request Types Submitted to Central Decision Maker 
Request         Cost 
Request Type I: Trauma center level upgrade 
Upgrade 1     Level II TC ⇒ Level I TC     $500k 
Upgrade 2     Level II TC ⇒ Level II TC     $250k 




Request Type II: A preventative plan for one region 
Prevent 1      Reduce incidents by 11%       $90k  
Request Type III: An upgrade of equipment 
Equipment 1   Can treat patient 6% faster at that site                $50k 
Equipment 2   Can treat patient 6% faster at that site                $50k  
Request Type IV: Purchase of ambulance 
Ambulance 1   Add ambulance                            $260k 
 
As seen in Table 5.2, we will focus on four types of submissions. The first, a trauma 
level upgrade request, is among the most expensive, and its effect on the system is not 
known explicitly. A higher-level TC is typically better equipped to provide sufficient 
trauma care for the patients than a lower level TC. However, the overall change in the 
system depends on which TC is upgraded from which level due to the number of trauma 
patients within each region. Naturally, TC upgrades cause the pre-hospital patient flow to 
change. For example, some patients who are in serious condition and transported to another 
TC initially can now be transported to the upgraded TC. The change in the patient flow 
may affect the arrival rate, utilization of other TC’s, ambulance assignments, and patient 
outcomes throughout the system. Measuring the difference in the overall performance of 
the trauma system is not straightforward due to the interdependency of system components 
if the TC upgrade takes place. 
The second type of submission is to deploy a preventive measure for a specific 
region. A preventive measure plan includes initiatives that reduce the frequency of trauma 
incidents.  Examples include preventing child maltreatment, preventing motor vehicle 
injuries, preventing falls among older adults, etc. (National Center for Injury Prevention 
and Control, 2018). It concentrates on preventing injuries before they happen rather than 




College of Surgeon Committee on Trauma, trauma systems must develop prevention 
strategies that help reduce injury occurrence as part of an integrated, coordinated, and 
comprehensive trauma system (Trauma, 2008). In our case, we classify a single type of 
preventive plan, with a similar effect on the region where it is adopted. It is assumed that 
the impact of a preventive plan in a region is the percentage reduction of the injuries in that 
region. 
The third type of request is a TC equipment upgrade. Some TCs may lack specific 
equipment and resources to provide the highest quality trauma care. Hence, TCs submit 
requests for equipment upgrades in their facilities, which leads to a reduction in the 
treatment time of the patients and enables higher quality and safer treatments. Similar to 
previous types of requests, upgrades of equipment differ in their costs and impact on the 
trauma facilities. Since there are numerous types of equipment that can be purchased for 
different amounts, there is not a single cost that accounts for everything. We will consider 
equipment upgrades in terms of units, so a TC may request a unit of equipment upgrade 
funding, that if approved, would provide $50,000 for them to put towards their equipment 
purchases. It is presumed that the impact of an upgrade in equipment in a certain TC is 
known as the percentage reduction in the treatment time of patients. We note that 
equipment upgrades could impact other variables than the percent reduction in treatment 
time. For example, it can improve the accuracy of diagnosis, hence a better outcome. We 
caution that speed is not the only variable impacting patient outcomes. 
Lastly, for the EMS submissions, EMS providers may request the purchase of a new 




or patients. Usually, expanding the fleet of ambulances is a good solution to overcome this 
problem, especially if it is proven to be cost-effective. If the request is approved, the 
number of ambulances is increased by one for the region where its EMS provider is 
responsible for.  It will yield improvements in the response times of patients; however, the 
question of how much improvement is achieved is implicit in the system. 
Given the detailed explanation of requests, it is analytically hard to track what a 
certain portfolio of requests will produce in the system if it is approved by the central 
decision-maker. First, we need to understand the structure of the trauma system, which can 
be modeled as an integrated organization of trauma facilities, hospitals, and EMS 
providers. Designing a simulation model allowed us to represent a working trauma system 
realistically and is a useful tool to make quantitative observations on certain characteristics 
of the system. This is a top-down approach in strategic decision making of investments: 
the central decision-maker evaluates all the requests and forms the set of all possible 
investment portfolios; then, the effect of the approval of each portfolio using the trauma 
system simulation is observed. Therefore, the problem is divided into two stages: First, 
given a limited budget, select the feasible set of portfolios, such that the total cost of any 
portfolio in this set does not exceed the given budget, and none of the portfolios are Pareto 
dominant to each other. Second, given the set of feasible portfolios, build a simulated 
trauma system where users update the resources and attributes accordingly so that it is 
possible to see how the system works with different portfolios. This feature allows the 
decision-maker to evaluate all the possibilities of investments and to make a quantitative 




paper, both stages of the problem will be analyzed thoroughly, and helpful conclusions will 
be made. 
5.5.2 Finding the Feasible Investment Request Set 
 Let i = 1, . . ., I be the indices of type of submissions and ai be the number of 
submissions for each type. Given ai for all i, the number of total submissions for the 
central decision-maker is A =∑ 𝑎𝑖
𝐼
𝑖=1 . Let j = 1,…, A denote the indices for each 
submission, where if ai > 1, then it means at least two of the submissions are the same 
type. Finally, let cj be the cost of submission j and B be the size of the budget that the 
central decision-maker wants to allocate among the requests. 
 Obviously, if the total cost of submissions ∑ 𝑐𝑗
𝐴
𝑗=1  does not exceed the size of 
budget B, then all the submissions can be approved. If not, then we have to consider all the 
combinations where the total cost does not exceed B. Suppose that there are K different 
combinations of investments, which we call them ’portfolios.’ Let k = 1, . . ., K denote the 




       if submission j of portfolio k is approved 
otherwise  
(5.1) 
be the binary variable that specifies whether a request in a portfolio is approved or not. 
Although it is feasible to find all the portfolios where the total cost is less than or 
equal to budget size, the number of possibilities is exponential. However, the decision-
makers want to spend as much of their budget as possible; therefore, we can eliminate 
the feasible portfolios in which there is adequate funding in the budget to spend on at 




portfolios. The problem can now be described as finding all the portfolios that have a 
cost of at most B, with no portfolio having any remaining fund that can support a 
potential submission. The number of portfolios is further constrained by a requirement 
to satisfy at least one request from each region.  Let zk denote a portfolio of investments 
[yk1, yk2,…,yk3], where k=1,…, K.  Define Uk as the set of submissions that are not 
selected in portfolio k.  Given A investments and their costs, find all portfolios zk 
subject to the following constraints: 





𝐵 −∑𝑦𝑘𝑗𝑐j ≤ min
j∈𝑈
cj    
j=1
∀ 𝑘 (5.3) 
Equation (5.2) models the budget constraint. Equation (5.3) satisfies the 
requirement that the remaining funding from the budget must always be less than the 
minimum cost of unselected submissions. This ensures that it is not possible to fund 
any additional investments. Any portfolio that satisfies these conditions is called a 
feasible portfolio, and the set of such portfolios is called the feasible portfolio set.  
In general, the number of portfolios K is too large to examine.  If there are A 
submissions to take into consideration, then the number of distinct portfolios is 2A, 
which means it is impossible to evaluate the feasibility of all portfolios for larger 
values of A. Therefore, it is necessary to find an efficient algorithm that generates all 
portfolios that satisfy these three conditions. With such an algorithm, the size of the 




It is worth pointing out that we treat each submission equivalently in terms of 
their impacts. For some submissions, such as upgrading level of TCs, the impact of 
implementation is not known, and even if the impact of one submission is known, the 
output obtained in the system through interaction of several submissions to be 
implemented is unknown. In other words, it is not possible to prioritize the investments 
due to each investment yielding improvements in different metrics of the system. 
Furthermore, there is intrinsic uncertainty in the overall patient impact. Hence, it is 
necessary to evaluate all the possible combinations that a feasible portfolio can take. 
We propose an algorithm that takes the costs of all submissions and the size of 
the budget as inputs and produces the feasible portfolio set. It does not give the best 
feasible portfolio due to the complexity outlined previously. The following recursive 
algorithm performs the task of obtaining the feasible portfolio set: 
The idea of the algorithm is, to begin with the array ’sortedCost,’ and add 
additional investments to the array ’base’ until the total cost exceeds the budget limit 
B. This must be done on a systematic way so that all the feasible portfolios are 
achieved, and there is no repetition of portfolios. Algorithm 2 is essentially a 
procedure that gets the index number, base array, and remaining budget as inputs and 
produces the set of feasible portfolios associated with the inputs. Algorithm 1 iterates 
the procedure that Algorithm 2 performs, for all index numbers between 0 and A. This 
ensures that all possibilities are covered, and all the feasible portfolios are added to 
the list.      




Result: The set of feasible portfolios 
Initializations 
for i ← 1 to A do 
|   base(i) ← 0  
end 
k ← 0 
// Loop function IterateOne(k,B,base) over k 
while k < A do 
|   IterateOne(k,B,base) 
|   k++  
end                                              
                                                 
Algorithm 2: IterateOne(cc,B,base)                     
Input: Cost of each investment(cost) and size of budget (B) 
Result: Feasible portfolios for one iteration are added to the set of                   
feasible portfolios 
Initializations 
// Sort investments from smallest to largest cost 
sortedCost ← sort(cost) 
begin 
|   if sortedCost[cc] > B then 
|   |   addToFeasibleInvestmentSet (base) 
|   else 
|   |   remainingBudget ← B – sortedCost[cc] 
|   |   newbase ← updateBase (base,cc) 
|   |   for j ← cc+1 to A do 
|   |   |   nextBudget ← remainingBudget 
|   |   |   - sortedCost[j] 
|   |   |   if remainingBudget ≥ 2 ×sortedCost[j] then 
|   |   |   |   IterateOne(j,remainingBudget,newbase)  
|   |   |   end 
|   |   |   else if (nextBudget < sortedCost[j] and 
|   |   |      (nextBudget < min(sortedCost)) and 
|   |   |      (nextBudget ≥ 0 then  
|   |   |     newbase2 ← updateBase(newbase) 
|   |   |     addToFeasibleInvestmentSet(newbase2) 
|   |   |   end 
|   |   end 
|   end 





The essential part of the algorithm is the procedure named Algorithm 2. It 
provides the following: Given an index number, it checks whether the cost of 
submission at that index is greater than the remaining budget. If it is, then we stop and 
add the ’base’ array to the feasible investment set. If not, then we need to continue to 
investigate all other investments with a greater index independently. Add the 
investment on index j if cost[j] < remaining budget, where j > index. Also, the 
remaining budget is updated by extracting the cost of the investment that was added 
last if it satisfies three main conditions: 
1) If the updated remaining budget > cost of investment that is added last, then 
continue to iterate the procedure with given inputs (j, updated remaining 
budget, updated base array). This means if we decide to add an investment 
to the portfolio, then we must continue to apply the same procedure starting 
from the index where we arrived last. Recursively, we check all of the 
possibilities for unarrived indices and add investments to the portfolio if 
there is a budget available for that specific investment and then update the 
remaining amount of the budget. 
2) If the remaining budget < cost of investment that is added last AND the 
remaining budget > cost of the cheapest investment, then do not add the 
investment at that index to avoid repetition of the same investment in the 
portfolio. The algorithm does not proceed to search for new investments if 
the remaining budget is less than the cost of the investment that is added 




the remaining budget. At that point, the ’base’ array must be the portfolio. 
However, it is a Pareto dominated portfolio if the second condition, 
remaining budget, is greater than the cost of the cheapest investment, is 
satisfied. The reason is since the array of costs have been sorted, the 
procedure will arrive at the cheapest options at some point in the procedure, 
and if the remaining budget is greater than the cost of the cheapest 
investment, it means that the cheapest option has not yet been added to the 
portfolio. Also, if we add the cheapest investment to the portfolio, it will be 
the same as a portfolio that was created before with the recursive method in 
Condition (1). This condition always leads the algorithm to the correct path 
due to the sorting of costs from smallest to largest. 
3) If the remaining budget < cost of investment that is added last AND 
remaining budget < cost of the cheapest investment, then stop. Do not add 
the next investment because there is no longer enough remaining budget to 
add an investment to the portfolio. We then add the array ’base’ to the set 
of feasible portfolios. 
The feasible set of portfolios consists of an array of 0-1 variables, where 1 
indicates approval, and 0 indicates the refusal of submission at that index. For our 
problem, the inputs are summarized in Table 18. The size of a portfolio is 89, and 
given this cost structure, the number of feasible portfolios in the set is greater than 2 
million. In other words, there are greater than 2 million possible combinations of 




effect of each combination on the trauma system will be evaluated using the Trauma 
System Simulator that we have built and described below. 
5.5.3 Designing the Trauma System Simulator 
 Trauma incidents happen at random times following a Pois- son process with 
rate P/year. This implies that each year, P trauma incidents occur that require a patient 
to be transported to a trauma facility. The moment a traumatic incident occurs, it is 
assumed that this incident happens to only one person, and the location of the patient 
is generated by the steps described next. First, we determine the county where the 
incident occurred. The probability that an incident happens in a county is proportional 
to the ratio of injuries in one county to the injuries in the state. A county has been 
modeled as a square with a center, and patient coordinates are generated uniformly in 
a square where its area is equal to the area of the county. Patient arrival is also 
determined by patient transfers from a lower level TC or non-trauma hospitals. In 
addition, it is assumed that patients’ conditions may differ, and each patient is assigned 
an injury severity level according to the ratio of patients who have been treated in 
Level I, Level II, Level III, and Level IV TCs in the past. 
As it has been stated before, there are N EMS providers and M ambulances 
belonging to the EMS providers, where M > N. The exact coordinates of EMS stations 
are known. It is assumed that ambulances are evenly distributed among the EMS 
stations. Ambulances are not only busy with trauma patients but also other types of 




ambulances are available with a certain probability. This is realistic since the EMS 
resources are not only allocated for trauma patients but also for other types of patients. 
The location and capacities of all TCs and hospitals are known. Capacity is 
defined as the number of trauma units in a TC and the number of trauma beds allocated 
in hospitals. We did not specifically consider the number of human resources or special 
equipment to define the capacity because the usage of those resources is very 
complicated in the hospital environment. The topic of efficient management of 
resources in the hospital is out of the scope of this paper. A TC or hospital has to admit 
the patients who arrive. Once they are admitted, if there are any available trauma units, 
the patient treatment begins. The patients stay in the hospital for a period of time, the 
length of which is determined by a random variable, and they are either moved from 
the emergency department or transported to another facility to receive better treatment 
if necessary. 
The simulation is intended to model the trauma system with its components, 
interactions, and decisions. The system works as follows: An incident occurs, a trauma 
patient is created, then emergency services are called to transport the patient to a 
hospital. EMS assigns the closest available ambulance to the address where the call 
has been made. An ambulance responds to the assignment and quickly drives to the 
address. Once they arrive at the incident point, they carry out the first intervention and 
transport the patient to the ambulance. The target hospital or TC is decided according 
to a procedure, which is summarized in Algorithm 3. The ambulance transports the 




returns to its station once the patient is delivered to the hospital. A patient’s treatment 
starts if there are any trauma units or beds available; if there are none, then the patient 
enters a priority queue, where he/she waits until the next trauma unit becomes 
available for treatment. For trauma beds to become available, the patient who is being 
treated at that trauma unit must be either moved from the emergency department to a 
non-trauma bed or transported to another emergency facility for a trauma bed to 
become available.                       
Algorithm 3: Procedure to decide a patient’s TC or hospital               
Input: Patient’s coordinates and location of all TCs and hospitals 
Result: Decision of TC or hospital where the patient must be transported 
Check all the TCs within radius of r miles from the patient’s location.  
Define set S as the set of trauma centers within the radius. 
case If there are any TCs with higher level in S do 
|   ⇒ Send the patient to the closest TC with higher or   
|   equal level.  
case If there are only equal AND lower level TCs in S do 
|   ⇒ Send the patient to the closest equal level TC 
case If there are only equal level OR lower level TCs in S do 
|   ⇒ Send the patient to the closest TC 
case If no TC within the radius. S=∅. do 
|   ⇒ Send the patient to the closest hospital, since there is |   no TC within the 
radius.    
end                                              
 
 If the patient has been transported to a lower level trauma facility or an ordinary 
hospital, this patient is considered to be a candidate for transfer to a higher-level TC 
to receive better and/or more suitable treatment for his/her injury. With a certain 
probability, the patient’s severity of injury may reduce, and there is no need to transfer 
the patient to another facility. However, if the injury remains too severe and requires 




initiated. The patient transfer process is almost identical to the process of responding 
to a first-time patient. In a transfer situation, the location of the patient is the hospital 
where he/she is treated. Similarly, the EMS is called, and the closest available 
ambulance is assigned for patient transfer; when the ambulance arrives at the hospital, 
the patient is picked up and transported to the most appropriate TC. There is a 
decision-making process to determine which trauma center the patient should be 
transferred to. In this case, we ignore whether there is any TC within a radius r; instead, 
we simply send the patient to the closest available TC, where the level of TC is greater 
than or equal to the patient’s injury severity. If there is no available higher-level TC 
due to capacity limitation, then the patient is sent to the closest available TC, where 
the TC level is higher than the current facility’s level. If there is none in this case as 
well, which is quite exceptional, then the patient is left in the current hospital. 
Treatment continues for a certain time, and then the possibility of patient transfer is 
considered again. 





Figure 5.1 - Flowchart of a working trauma system 
5.5.4 Outcome Measures 
      The outcome measures can be categorized into three classes: (1) Patient-
related statistics, (2) EMS related statistics, and (3) TC or hospital-related statistics. 
Some measures can be an element of more than one class. Patient-related statistics 
include the number of patients transported in a year, the number of patients transferred 
from one facility to another facility, average time between the incident and the 
patient’s arrival to the designated TC, the average waiting time for a trauma unit of a 
patient in the hospital, etc. EMS related statistics consist of average deadhead miles 




ambulance is active. Lastly, TC or hospital-related statistics include the average 
number of patients waiting in the queue of the trauma unit, the proportion of patients 
who have waited in the queue to the total number of patients who have arrived, and 
average utilization. While the patient outcome is an important measurement, it is 
difficult to quantify objectively. 
Three metrics among the outcome measures, each from one of these three 
classes, have been chosen to assess the overall performance of the trauma system. The 
chosen metrics are (1) average time between the incident and patient’s arrival to the 
destinated TC, (2) average deadhead miles per ambulance, and (3) the proportion of 
patients who have waited in the queue to the total number of patients who have arrived. 
The first metric is patient-related due to the importance of transporting the patient to 
a TC or hospital as soon as possible. The second metric is ambulance-related since 
average deadhead miles give EMS an idea about ambulance utilization and is used in 
computing the financials of EMS. The last metric is TC-related since the patients who 
have waited in the queue do not receive sufficient quality and timeliness of care in the 
TC, and the proportion of that number to the total number of patients arrived at the 
TCs gives an idea about the quality of the trauma care and treatment in that TC. The 
basic results that are obtained via the Trauma Simulator consist of these three metrics.  
Comparisons among portfolios will be made with respect to those three metrics 






       There is one major assumption modified in order to observe how modifications 
change the results of the system: the rate of trauma incidents. Initially, this rate is taken 
as 25,000 patients/year; we would like to analyze how the system responds if the 
patient arrival rates increase in increments of 5,000 up to 45,000 patients/year. These 
values were selected from the estimated number of trauma patients per year in 
Georgia. The primary reason to observe the effect of the arrival rate change is at first 
to notice whether any of the metrics chosen are in conflict with each other with the 
increasing or decreasing demand. If there is a tradeoff between the metrics, the 
question of how much it is must be addressed in order to understand the interaction 
between different components. However, since all the inputs are empirical, we will 
only present the results of 25,000 patients/year. 
Initially, a second measure, scanning radius, was considered for sensitivity 
analyses due to how it alters the patient flow between scenes of emergency to the TCs. 
However, it quickly became clear that the smaller radius was always in favor of all 
scenarios. For the purpose of our analysis, we maintain a constant scanning radius 
throughout the simulation.  There is a strong, positive correlation between the 
magnitude of radius for scanning and the values of all performance measures. This 
implies that during the decision-making process of patient transportation to a 
TC/hospital, EMS should only include closer TC/hospitals into the set of destination 
candidates. Including hospitals further from the area of incidence may result in the 
selection of TC/hospitals farther away, thus increasing the transportation time. 




decide the assignment of a patient to a TC/hospital. Census results and geographic 
locations of all of the trauma centers in the U.S. have been analyzed and have shown 
that approximately 85% of the U.S.  population is within 30 miles of the nearest trauma 
center. This includes both urban and rural populations. Given these results and how 
similar Georgia’s specific proportion of Urban to Rural populations is to the U.S. 
proportions, we use 30 miles as our ambulance search radius from the location of the 
trauma incident. 
5.6 Simulation Results 
  The Trauma System Simulator is run over a time interval of 2 years. Some 
results of the simulation run for parameters P = 25,000 per year are given in Table 3, 
and the associated best portfolios list is given in Table 4. Each identified portfolio is 
the best considering at least one metric, but it is also possible that some portfolios are 
the best in multiple metrics. Given the number of feasible portfolios, results were 
collected by sets of 1,500 feasible portfolios, and best portfolios by metrics were first 
selected amongst the sets, and then the best of this cohort were selected for further 
analysis. 
Table 5.3 - Best observed values of selected metrics by sets 
Set # Average time between 
incident and patient arrival 
to TC (minutes) 
Average deadhead miles 
time per ambulance 
(minutes) 
Proportion of trauma 
patients who received lower 
level of trauma care 
1 0.9083104 35.25873 0.003879 
2 0.9149609 35.246306 0.003634 
3 0.9260064 35.519721 0.004540 
4 0.9267546 35.437128 0.004423 
. . . . 




10 0.9263578 35.525422 0.004623 
Avg 0.9206751 35.385691 0.004196 
 
Table 5.4 - Index of best portfolios for each metric in each set 
Set # Average time between 
incident and patient arrival 
to TC 
Average deadhead miles 
time per ambulance 
Proportion of trauma 
patients who received lower 
level of trauma care 
1 160 160 359 
2 2602 2919 2603 
3 4002 4002 3598 
4 4541 4596 4589 
. . . . 
9 13074 13074 13262 
10 13558 13558 13960 
 
  It is observed that for each metric, different portfolios turn out to be the best 
ones. We record which portfolios are marked as the best portfolio for each metric and 
count how many times they were observed as the best across their set of 1,500 
portfolios. This is tabulated in Table 22, and it appears that some portfolios are 
dominant to others. However, counting does inform us that some portfolios are 
significantly dominant to others; therefore, we need to define a procedure such that 
we can decide on the best overall portfolio. This procedure is briefly described in 
Algorithm 4. 
Table 5.5 - Values of performance metrics from Final Investment Selection  
Portfolio # m2 m3 m7 
160 35.2539 54.8403 0.00236 
7152 35.4406 55.2292 0.00161 
9268 35.2692 54.8752 0.00253 
11458 35.5353 55.5022 0.00168 
 
m1: Average number of patients not yet transported to the hospital (min)  
m2: Average time between the incident and patient arrival to TC (min) 




m4: Average number of ambulances in service 
m5: Average number of people in all hospitals 
m6: Total number of patients who receive lower-quality care 
m7: Proportion of trauma patients who received lower level of trauma care 
 
The metric outcomes for each portfolio have been plotted in 3-D graphs. Each 
dimension is represented by a metric, and each point represents the corresponding 
portfolio. The convex hull of points gives an idea about the feasible manifold of the 
best portfolios in three dimensions. Here, the corners of the convex hull are of interest. 
The set of corner points are examined in 2-D for each pair of metrics, and for each 
step, the Pareto efficient portfolios are marked. This reduces the number of candidate 
portfolios to a smaller number. Once Pareto efficient portfolios are found for all 
pairwise comparisons, the procedure aims to find a portfolio where it is observed in a 
maximum number of sets of pairwise comparisons. If there exists only one such 
portfolio, it is decided as the best portfolio. If there exist multiple portfolios, then the 
procedure focuses on common investments approved among portfolios. It finally 
reaches a conclusion, where it may be either one unique portfolio or a set of portfolios. 
The decision to select the final portfolio is left to the decision-maker. 
A formal description of the procedure is as follows: 
Indices: 
V = {25000, 30000, 35000, 4000, 45000}: the set of arrival rates per year  
M = {1, 2,…, 7}: the set of metric indices 





Xvmi: the value of metric m for portfolio i, obtained by running the simulator with P=Ii. 
We index the three chosen performance metric indicators as t = 1, 2, 3, and define 
 𝑑𝑣𝑡 = {𝑖: 𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑖
{ 𝑋𝑣𝑡𝑖 }}  ∀ 𝑣 ∈  𝑉, 𝑡 = 1,2,3 as the ID of the portfolio where the minimum 




 Define zv as a 3x3 matrix, where it stores the values of each performance measure 
observed for the portfolio in which a minimum is attained for one of the performance 







What follows is to obtain the Pareto efficient frontier for all pairwise comparison of three 
metrics (dimensions). Since there are three metrics, it comes with (
3
2
)  =  3  possible 2-D 
spaces and all the points on the Pareto efficient frontier are recorded. Define 𝐸𝑣 =
𝐸𝑣(1−2)⋃𝐸𝑣(1−3)⋃𝐸𝑣(2−3)  as the union of elements on the Pareto efficient frontiers for 
all pairs of dimensions. Then, we define 
 𝐸𝐼𝑣 = {ℎ: max
ℎ ∈ 𝐸𝑣





as the set of indices h, where any ℎ′ ≠  ℎ ∈  𝐸𝑣 is observed in all the sets 
𝐸𝑣(1−2),  𝐸𝑣(1−3), 𝐸𝑣(2−3) not more than ℎ ∈  𝐸𝑣. Here we try to find portfolio(s) that is 
(are) the most common among the 2-D efficient frontier index sets. Once EIv’s are found 
for  ∀ 𝑣 ∈  𝑉 , it is possible to track the process backward to find the best portfolios. We 
then look at the set of portfolio ID’s corresponding to the indices that have been most 
commonly observed in all Pareto efficient sets of two dimensions. If the set size is one, it 
implies there is a unique best portfolio for the given parameters v. However, if the set size 
is greater than one, it indicates that there are multiple portfolios where they are non-
dominated with respect to their impact on performance measures. In this case, we can stop 
ignoring the cost of portfolios. In the beginning, we assumed that since all feasible 
portfolios have almost identical costs, we treated them equally and only focused on their 
impact on performance metrics. Now since we performed a systematic reduction on the 
feasible portfolios, we can use the cost of the remaining portfolios as a final step to further 
reduce the size of this set. Hence, let 
 
𝑂𝐹𝑣 = {𝑓: min
𝑓 ∈ 𝐸𝐼𝑣
{𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜 𝑓 ∈  𝐸𝐼𝑣}} 
(5.6) 
be the set of the portfolio(s) in which minimum cost is attained in the set EIv. It is 
noteworthy to emphasize that s (OFv) > 1 is possible for any v ∈ V. In this case, the final 
decision is left to the priorities of the decision-maker.  The application of this procedure to 
our problem produced the selected portfolios with their corresponding performance 
measures for each v ∈ V as tabulated in Table 5.6. The selection of investments has not 




The selected portfolios were then compared across their specific investment sets. 
We observed that all four of the final portfolios were consistent in requiring the reduction 
of trauma incidents within the Regions through prevention methods. Also, they all required 
that each trauma center be allocated both units of upgrade funding ($100,000 total) to put 
towards the purchase of new equipment. The best performing portfolio (160) did not 
require the purchase of any additional ambulances, whereas the other three portfolios 
purchased at least one ambulance. Lastly, portfolio 160 also focused on upgrading Level 
IV TCs to Level III TCs. 
As previously mentioned, we looked at the interaction of all the metrics with one 
another to determine if there were any significant relationships. All combinations of the 
seven metrics were                                            
Table 5.6 - Performance Metrics 
m1 Average number of patients who not yet been transported to the hospital (minutes) 
m2 Average time between incident and patient arrival to TC (minutes) 
m3 Average deadhead miles time per ambulance (minutes) 
m4 Average number of ambulances in service 
m5 Average number of people in all hospitals 
m6 Total number of patients who receive lower-quality care 
m7  Proportion of trauma patients who received lower level of trauma care 
The following general results were observed. Metric 1 and 2 have a strong positive 
correlation, and they behave in a similar manner with respect to all the other metrics. A 
similar positive correlation exists between Metrics 3 and 4. Metrics 1 and 2 have a strong 
positive correlation with Metric 3 and Metric 4, as seen in Figure 2. Meaning the longer it 
takes for an ambulance to respond to a call and get the patient to the TC, the more patients 





Figure 5.2 - Metric 1, Metric 2, Metric 3 Surface Plot 
These values are also related to the average number of miles an ambulance must 
travel to pick up the patient and to get to the TC. The longer the distance, the longer the 
response, and the patient delivery take. All of these are again related to the number of 
ambulances in service. Metric 7 is negatively correlated with Metric 6. There is a slight 
positive correlation between Metrics 1 - 4 and Metric 5 and Metric 7. Metrics 1 - 4 appear 
to have no correlation with Metric 6. Metric 6 and Metric 7 also have a very strong positive 
correlation, but that is simply because Metric 7 is calculated using Metric 6. When Metric 
6 is observed with the other metrics, as shown in Figure 3, we can easily observe that local 
minimums and maximums spread throughout the linearly increasing trend line. There is a 
slight positive correlation with Metrics 1 - 4 with Metric 6, but due to the spikes, we see 
that the number of patients receiving low-quality care is not always consistent with higher 
average times. Metric 5 does not appear to have any correlation with Metric 6 or metric 7, 
as shown in Figure 4, so the average number of TC patients in hospitals is not related to 




in all hospitals maintains a very tight range.   Overall this means that regardless of the 
number of trauma patients, hospitals stay busy at the same rate, which is dependent on the 
number of beds. This is also due to trauma patients having priority over non-trauma 
patients.   
 
Figure 5.3 - Metric 2, Metric 4, Metric 6 Surface Plot 
 
Figure 5.4 - Metric 5, Metric 6, Metric 7 Surface Plot 




     Since we could not access the exact time of trauma incidents, it is assumed that the 
inter-incident times follow a Poisson distribution with rate P patients per year. In general, 
the trauma bed capacity for the TCs is correct, with one or two exceptions, in which case 
we assumed a minimum number of trauma beds. Since non-trauma care hospitals do not 
have designated trauma beds, we assume trauma patient capacity to be equal to the average 
trauma patient capacity of all facilities that are known. Also, there is a complication about 
the ratio of trauma patients who are Level I, Level II, Level III, and Level IV. We assign 
those numbers according to the injury severity score of the patients, but the decision of the 
destination hospital does not solely depend on this. However, we ignored the complexity 
of details during the decision making to simplify the model.  
The next stage in the model development is to formulate the mixed-integer program.  
Although there are similarities in resource allocation, the foundation of the model relies on 
the patient incident arrivals. This naturally drove the formulation to pickup and delivery 
problems.  The ambulances are the vehicles and are stationed at depots, which include fire 
stations, hospitals, and individual emergency stations. The patients are the clients to be 
picked up with a pickup time window based on their injury incident time.  Pickup and 
delivery problems and related, adapted model formulation are described in the following 
sections. 
5.7 Pickup and Delivery Problems 
The general pick-up and delivery problem (GPDP) has been a popular research topic 




is to construct a set of routes to satisfy transportation requests. Each request specifies the 
load size, origin, and destination locations, and each load must be transported by one 
vehicle without transshipment at other locations (Parragh et al., 2008).  
The literature on single-region VRPDPs is quite extensive. (Savelsbergh & Sol, 1995) 
define the general delivery problem (GDP) as a vehicle routing problem where pickup and 
delivery customers must be served. In (Cordeau et al., 2008), PDPs, a special set of GDPs, 
are defined as routing problems where a set of vehicles that begin and end at a depot must 
satisfy a set of requests. A request typically consists of a pair of pickup and delivery 
locations between which goods must be transported. An in-depth review of VRPDPs and 
its variants and analysis on all problem variants can be found in the surveys in (Parragh et 
al., 2008) and (Berbeglia et al., 2007). The dial-a-ride problem (DARP), a PDP variant, in 
which loads and load size are represented by a single person (Guerriero et al., 2014). 
Most of the previously mentioned studies assume a single depot (and a single region) 
setting, although multiple depots are relevant in real-world settings. (Nagy & Salhi, 2005) 
consider the VRPDP with mixed backhauls (also known as VRPMB in (Parragh et al. 
2008)) from both a single and multi-depot perspective. The VRPMB is a special case of 
the VRP in which pickup and delivery customers do not need to be paired. To reach a 
solution, the authors propose a heuristic based on the application of different routines over 
an initial solution for the single depot case and adapt it to the multi-depot case. (Min et al., 
1992) presented a multi-depot model similar to the VRPMB, but all delivery customers 




assigned customers to depots and routes prior to the route optimization. Last, Bettinelli 
presents a multi-depot heterogeneous PDP with soft time windows (Bettinelli et al., 2014). 
Traditionally, heuristics run faster than metaheuristic methods, whereas metaheuristics 
usually outperform simple heuristics with respect to solution quality (Bruck et al., 2012). 
Authors in (Jaw et al., 1986), (Madsen et al., 1995), (Diana & Dessouky, 2004), (Lu & 
Dessouky, 2006) solve the PDPTW with a variety of insertion-based heuristics while 
(Nanry & Barnes, 2000) and (Cordeau & Laporte, 2003) developed Tabu search heuristics 
for the PDPTW. Simulated annealing, genetic algorithm, adaptive and large neighborhood 
search heuristic, and variable neighborhood search heuristic for solving the PDPTW are 
designed in (Parragh et al., 2010), (Li & Lim, 2001), (Pankratz, 2005), (Ropke & Pisinger, 
2006) respectively. (Liu et al., 2013) proposes a genetic algorithm and tabu search method 
for a special simultaneous PDPTW. 
In this section, we study a variant of the DARP that is multi-region, multi-vehicle, 
multi-depot, pick-up, and delivery problem with time windows (m-MRMDPDPTW) with 
paired pick-up and delivery locations. In (Alaia et al., 2015), they take the m-MDPDPTW 
and present it as a multi-criteria optimization problem.  The objective is to define a set of 
solutions or routes that minimizes total travel distance, total tardiness, and the total number 
of vehicles.  In their problem, the requests are transported by a single-vehicle between 
paired pick-up and delivery locations.  The main contribution is the use of a genetic 
algorithm to rank and select solutions along the Pareto fronts with an elitist replacement 




There are many evolutionary approaches to the MDVRP. In (Ombuki-Berman & 
Hanshar, 2009), they use a genetic algorithm (GA)  and introduce a mutation operator to 
target the depot assignment to “borderline” customers, which are close to several depots, 
to solve the MDVRP. An algorithm named fuzzy logic guided genetic algorithms (FLGA) 
to solve VRPs with multiple depots, customers, and products is presented in (Lau et al., 
2009). The authors combine GA search and fuzzy logic techniques to modify the crossover 
and mutation rates. In (Prins et al., 2014), an excellent survey of published papers, with 
more than 70 references, involving order-first, split-second methods are proposed for the 
MDVRP. Also, a solution to the VRP using heuristics methods is proposed in (Nagy & 
Salhi, 2005) to solve the simultaneous VRPPD for both single and multiple depots. Finally, 
(Wang, Xu, & Shang, 2008) designed a new genetic algorithm for MDVRPTW with 
heterogeneous vehicle limits. 
Multiple region PDPs have yet to receive much attention in the literature. To the best 
of our knowledge, they are first presented in (Dragomir et al., 2018), where the authors 
discuss the application of multiple regions to logistic problems and present a mathematical 
model. The multi-region multi-depot pickup and delivery problem (MRMDPDP) is well 
defined in (Soriano et al., 2018). Here they define a region as an area where customers and 
depots are located.  Requests are differentiated by whether or not they are within the same 
region.  They decompose the problem into three subproblems and use an adaptive large 
neighborhood search algorithm to perform their computational studies.   
In line with all the works summarized above, (Leonard & Lee, 2020) continue to 




geographically separated areas, with at least one depot in each of them. Typically there are 
a set of pickup and delivery requests to be serviced, whose origins and destinations are 
located in the same regions. Other requests with endpoints in the other regions can be part 
of the problem, too. A customer has considered any service point in a region being either 
a pickup or a delivery point. Customers are visited by ambulances performing tours on an 
intra-region basis. The goods, in this case, are the injured patients and, once picked up, are 
transported directly to a servicing hospital.  Our problem is a variant of the general setting 
of the family of multiple regions problems previously described and is composed of more 
than two regions and two or more depots per region.  
5.8 Ambulance Routing Problems 
 From the current state, we adapt the previous model into an ambulance routing 
problem (ARP).  Many ARPs in prior literature concentrate on ambulance routing in 
disaster scenarios when a large number of injured people from various locations require 
medical attention (Tikani & Setak, 2019). Although we are not dealing with the same 
emergency state, it is still a critical issue to manage the fleet of ambulances to accommodate 
all trauma requests promptly. 
There are several studies that address issues of locating, dispatching, and 
ambulance fleets. The main concern of EMS is immediate patient care prior to hospital 
arrival since any delay in treatment could affect the patients’ conditions (Lam et al., 2015). 
The growing demands for EMS have made it a very active research area in transportation 




healthcare systems by improving response times and assigning a suitable ambulance to 
injured patients. Besides these complicated factors, ambulance planning in disaster events 
is more complicated than normal circumstances due to increased injuries, casualties, and 
lack of appropriate vehicles. Despite the importance of this issue, few works study vehicle 
fleet routing problem in post-disaster states (Luis et al., 2012), (Pedraza-Martinez & Van 
Wassenhove, 2012), and (Talarico et al., 2015).  
(Andersson & Värbrand, 2007) studied ambulance dispatching determined by the 
urgency of the call and the distance of the ambulance to the incident location. Other models 
are developed concentrating on capturing realistic planning situations like traffic-
dependent traveling times and congestion. For example, (Schmid & Doerner, 2010) studied 
an ambulance location problem using varying travel times throughout the day. By 
considering these variations, ambulance deployment changes dynamically to fulfill 
coverage.  
Knight (Knight et al., 2012) formulates a model to locate ambulances to maximize 
the overall expected survival probability of multiple patient classes. Schmid, (Schmid, 
2012) considers emergency service providers that locate ambulances such that emergency 
patients can be reached in a time-efficient manner. In the proposed model, during the 
dispatching process, incoming emergency requests are assigned to ambulances, and a 
vehicle needs to be immediately dispatched to the patient’s location. After serving the 
patient, the ambulance is relocated to its next waiting location. (Toro-Dı́Az et al., 2013) 




incorporated queuing and traffic congestion with the dispatching decisions by considering 
a fixed priority list for each customer.  
Zhang (Zhang et al., 2015) proposed a patient transportation problem formulated as 
a multi-trip dial-a-ride problem and provided a modified memetic algorithm for solving the 
problem. (Tlili et al., 2017) formulated the ambulance routing problem as an open VRP 
and a VRP with pickup and delivery. They proposed a cluster-first, route-second method 
based on the petal algorithm and the particle swarm optimization to improve the emergency 
response-time of medical service providers. In addition to the mentioned research, various 
studies in the literature address the transportation of patients and the planning of health 
care services in non-urgent situations in a DARP formulation. For example, they are 
transporting patients among hospitals, transporting a patient from home to a hospital, or 
transporting elderly people to their destination. Also, recently (Detti et al., 2017) 
formulated a multi-depot DARP in the healthcare realm under non-emergency situations 
and considering different features such as heterogeneous vehicles, vehicle-patient 
compatibility, etc. See (Parragh, 2011), (Parragh et al., 2012), (Coppi et al., 2013), (Marcon 
et al., 2017). We also refer to the study (Nable et al., 2016) for recent researches and trends 
in emergency medicine systems. 
5.9 Mixed Integer Programming Trauma Network Optimization 
In this section, we present a compact 2-index model and a 3-index partial path model 





Pr,t Set of patient nodes in region r ∈ 𝑅, of trauma level t ∈ 𝑇 (Set of pickup 
nodes, {1…n}) 
Hr,t Set of hospital nodes in region r ∈ 𝑅, of trauma level t ∈ 𝑇 (Set of delivery 
nodes, {n+1..2n})   
Nr Set of all pickup and delivery nodes 𝑁𝑟 = 𝑃𝑟 ∪ 𝐷𝑟 , in region 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅 
Kr,d set of all ambulances, K, in region r ∈ 𝑅, located at depot d ∈ 𝐷 
Cr,h The capacity of hospital ℎ ∈ 𝐻r in r ∈ 𝑅 
𝜏𝑘 Depot nodes that represent the start station of vehicle k, 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 
𝜏′𝑘 Depot nodes that represent the end station of vehicle k, 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 
V Set of all nodes. 
A Set of (𝑖, 𝑗) which is an arc from node i to node j, where 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑉 
dij, tij distance and travel time between node i and node j, for i and j ∈ 𝑁. Travel 
times satisfy the triangle inequality; 𝑡𝑖𝑗 ≤ 𝑡𝑖𝑙 + 𝑡𝑙𝑗 ∀ 𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑙 ∈  𝑉; and are 
nonnegative. 
si Fixed service time when visiting Patient i 
ei Variable service time per item units of node i 
[ai, bi] Time windows when the visit at the particular location must start; a visit 
to node i can only take place between time ai and bi. 





xijk Binary variable where xijk = 1(0) if vehicle k travels from node i to node j 
where 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈  𝑉, 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 
Sik A nonnegative continuous variable that indicates when vehicle k starts the 
service at location i to node j where 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈  𝑉, 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾  
Lik A non-negative integer that is an upper bound on the quantity of goods on 
vehicle k after servicing node i where 𝑖 ∈  𝑉, 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾. Sik and Lik are defined 
only when vehicle k visits node i. 
zi A binary variable that indicates if request I is placed in the request bank 
where 𝑖 ∈  𝑃. The value is one if the request is placed in the request bank 
and zero otherwise.   
HCr,h Integer variable counting the number of patients currently in hospital h, h ∈
 𝐻𝑟, in region r ∈  𝑅. 
 
5.9.1 2-index Formulation of the VRP  
In the following model, let the cost of arc (i, j) ∈ A be represented by both distance, 




amount of time it takes each client to be served.  This model combines the two-index model 
from (Bard, Kontoravdis, & Yu, 2002) with the constraints ensuring the time windows for 
the ATSP (Ascheuer et al., 2001) and is formulated as follows: 
2-index formulation of the Model 
 
Minimize 
𝒛𝑳𝑷 = 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 
(5.7) 
































𝑟,𝑑,𝑘 ≤ 1                                            ∀ 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑃𝑟 (5.12) 
𝑥𝑖,𝑗
𝑟,𝑑,𝑘 = 1 ⇒ 𝑆𝑟,𝑑,𝑖,𝑘 + 𝑠𝑖 + 𝑡𝑖,𝑗 ≤ 𝑆𝑟,𝑑,𝑗,𝑘    ∀ 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅, 𝑑 ∈ 𝐷𝑟 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾𝑟,𝑑, (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐴𝑟 (5.13) 
𝑎𝑖 ≤ 𝑆𝑟,𝑑,𝑖,𝑘 ≤ 𝑏𝑖                                               ∀ 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅, 𝑑 ∈ 𝐷𝑟 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾𝑟,𝑑, (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐴𝑟 (5.14) 
𝑆𝑟,𝑑,𝑖,𝑘 ≤ 𝑆𝑟,𝑑,𝑗,𝑘                                                ∀ 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅, 𝑑 ∈ 𝐷𝑟 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾𝑟,𝑑 , (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐴𝑟 (5.15) 
𝑥𝑖,𝑗
𝑟,𝑑,𝑘 = 1 ⇒ 𝐿𝑟,𝑑,𝑖,𝑘 + 𝑙𝑖 ≤ 𝐿𝑟,𝑑,𝑗,𝑘              ∀ 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅, 𝑑 ∈ 𝐷𝑟 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾𝑟,𝑑, (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐴𝑟 (5.16) 
𝐿𝑟,𝑑,𝑖,𝑘 ≤ 1                                                          ∀ 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅, 𝑑 ∈ 𝐷𝑟 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾𝑟,𝑑, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑃𝑟 
(5.17) 
𝐿𝑟,𝑑,𝜏𝑘,𝑘 = 𝐿𝑟,𝑑,𝜏𝑘





𝑥𝑟,𝑑,𝑖,𝑗,𝑘 ∈ {0,1}                                                  ∀ 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅, 𝑑 ∈ 𝐷𝑟 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾𝑟,𝑑 , (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐴𝑟 
(5.19) 
𝑆𝑟,𝑑,𝑖,𝑘 ≥ 0                                                           ∀ 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅, 𝑑 ∈ 𝐷𝑟 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾𝑟,𝑑, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑉𝑟 
(5.20) 
𝐿𝑟,𝑑,𝑖,𝑘 ∈ {0,1}                                                    ∀ 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅, 𝑑 ∈ 𝐷𝑟 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾𝑟,𝑑, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑉𝑟 
(5.21) 
𝑧𝑟,𝑖 ∈ {0,1}                                                          ∀ 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑃𝑟 
(5.22) 
   
 The objective is to minimize the equally weighted objectives of the distance 
traveled, the total patient response time, and the penalty cost associated with the number 
of requests not scheduled. 
Equation (5.8) ensures that each pickup location is visited or that the corresponding 
request is placed in the request bank. Equation (5.9) ensures that the delivery location is 
visited if the pickup location is visited and that the same vehicle is used. Equations (5.10) 
and (5.11) ensure that a vehicle leaves every start terminal, and a vehicle enters every end 
terminal. Together with equation (5.12), this ensures that consecutive paths between 𝜏𝑘 and 
𝜏𝑘
′  are formed for each vehicle 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾. Equations (5.13) and (5.14) ensure that the variable, 
Sr,d,j,k, is tracking time correctly along the paths and that the time windows are obeyed. 
These constraints also ensure there are no sub tours. Equation (5.15) ensures that each 
pickup occurs before the corresponding delivery. Equations (5.16) - (5.18) ensure that the 
load variable is correctly determined along the paths and that the vehicle capacity 
constraints are enforced. 




(Petersen & Jepsen, 2009) present a solution methodology to the VRPTW by 
implementing bounded partial paths.  The idea is to partition the problem such that the 
solution space is smaller than the original problem.  This is done by splitting the larger 
tours into smaller segments and bounding the path length by the number of nodes.  The 
number of visited customers is the bounding resource, which is particularly helpful since 
an ambulance can only visit a single patient at a time.  For our scenario, the partial paths 
are restricted to an ambulance departing its depot, picking up a patient, arriving at the 
hospital, and returning to the original depot.   




 be the variable indicating the use of arc (𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑙) ∈ 𝐴𝑟. Problem (5.7) - 
(5.22) is rewritten to the following 3-index formulation in equations (5.23) - (5.38): 
 
Minimize 
𝑧1 = 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 
(5.23) 










































∑𝑙∈𝐿 ∑(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝐴𝑟  𝑥𝑖,𝑗,𝑙
𝑟,𝑑,𝑘 = 𝑙𝑒𝑛(𝑃𝑟)                              ∀ 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅, 𝑑 ∈ 𝐷𝑟 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾𝑟,𝑑   (5.28) 
∑𝑖∈𝑃𝑟 ∑(𝑗,𝑙)∈𝐴𝑟  𝑥𝑖,𝑗,𝑙
𝑟,𝑑,𝑘 ≤ 4                                        ∀ 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅, 𝑑 ∈ 𝐷𝑟 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾𝑟,𝑑   (5.29) 
 𝑥𝑖,𝑗,𝑙
𝑟,𝑑,𝑘 = 1 ⇒ 𝑆𝑖,𝑗,𝑙
𝑟,𝑑,𝑘 + 𝑠𝑖 + 𝑡𝑖,𝑗 ≤ 𝑆𝑖,𝑗,𝑙
𝑟,𝑑,𝑘     ∀ 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅, 𝑑 ∈ 𝐷𝑟 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾𝑟,𝑑, (𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑙) ∈ 𝐴𝑟 (5.30) 
𝑎𝑖 ≤ 𝑆𝑖,𝑗,𝑙
𝑟,𝑑,𝑘 ≤ 𝑏𝑖                                              ∀ 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅, 𝑑 ∈ 𝐷𝑟 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾𝑟,𝑑, (𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑙) ∈ 𝐴𝑟 (5.31) 
𝑥𝑖,𝑗,𝑙
𝑟,𝑑,𝑘 = 1 ⇒ 𝐿𝑟,𝑑,𝑖,𝑘 + 𝑙𝑖 ≤ 𝐿𝑟,𝑑,𝑗,𝑘          ∀ 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅, 𝑑 ∈ 𝐷𝑟 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾𝑟,𝑑, (𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑙) ∈ 𝐴𝑟 (5.32) 
𝐿𝑟,𝑑,𝑖,𝑘 ≤ 1                                                      ∀ 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅, 𝑑 ∈ 𝐷𝑟 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾𝑟,𝑑, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑃𝑟 
(5.33) 
𝐿𝑟,𝑑,𝜏𝑘,𝑘 = 𝐿𝑟,𝑑,𝜏𝑘
′ ,𝑘 = 0                                ∀ 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅, 𝑑 ∈ 𝐷𝑟 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾𝑟,𝑑  
(5.34) 
𝑥𝑖,𝑗,𝑙
𝑟,𝑑,𝑘 ∈ {0,1}                                                  ∀ 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅, 𝑑 ∈ 𝐷𝑟 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾𝑟,𝑑, (𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑙) ∈ 𝐴𝑟 
(5.35) 
𝑆𝑖,𝑗,𝑙
𝑟,𝑑,𝑘 ≥ 0                                                        ∀ 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅, 𝑑 ∈ 𝐷𝑟 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾𝑟,𝑑, (𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑙) ∈ 𝐴𝑟 
(5.36) 
𝐿𝑟,𝑑,𝑖,𝑘 ∈ {0,1}                                                ∀ 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅, 𝑑 ∈ 𝐷𝑟 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾𝑟,𝑑, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑉𝑟 
(5.37) 
𝑧𝑟,𝑖 ∈ {0,1}                                                      ∀ 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑃𝑟 
(5.38) 
Constraints (5.24) ensures that all patients are visited exactly once, while the 
redundant constraints (5.25) ensures that no customer is visited more than once.  
Constraints (5.26) maintains flow conservation between the original nodes V. Constraints 
(5.27) maintain flow conservation with a layer. Constraints (5.28) ensure that enough 
partial paths are selected to service all of the patients, and constraints (5.29) limit the length 
of the partial path to at most four nodes.  For this scenario, that allows an ambulance to 
depart the depot, arrive at the patient, deliver the patient to the hospital, and then return to 
the depot. Constraints (5.30) - (5.34) enforce resource limitations. 
After the re-formulation, we use a Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition to reach the 




region, the inputs are significantly different, so we cannot simplify the workload by 
combining it into a single pricing problem and must keep them separated by region.    
Let 𝜆𝑞 be a binary variable indicating where partial path 𝑞 ∈ 𝑄𝑟 is used. We use 
Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition where the constraints (5.31) - (5.34) are kept in the MP. 
Since the vehicles are identical, we can aggregate over the sets to get the following MP: 
Minimize 
𝒛𝐏𝐏 = 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 
(5.39) 








 𝜆𝑟,𝑞 − ∑
𝑞∈𝑄𝑟: 𝜏′=𝑖




 𝜆𝑟,𝑞 ≤ 𝑙𝑒𝑛(𝑃𝑟)                                           ∀ 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅 (5.42) 
 𝛼𝑖,𝑗
𝑞 𝜆𝑟,𝑞 = 1 ⇒ 𝑆𝑖,𝑗
𝑟,𝑑,𝑘 + 𝑠𝑖 + 𝑡𝑖,𝑗 ≤ 𝑆𝑖,𝑗




𝑞 𝜆𝑟,𝑞 ≤ 𝑆𝑖,𝑗
𝑟,𝑑,𝑘 ≤ 𝑏𝑖 ∑ 𝛼𝑖,𝑗
𝑞 𝜆𝑟,𝑞
𝑞∈𝑄𝑟
  ∀ 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅, 𝑑 ∈ 𝐷𝑟 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾𝑟,𝑑, (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐴𝑟 (5.44) 
𝜆𝑟,𝑞 ∈ {0,1}                                                         ∀ 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅, 𝑞 ∈ 𝑄𝑟 
(5.45) 
𝑆𝑟,𝑑,𝑖,𝑘 ≥ 0                                                          ∀ 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅, 𝑑 ∈ 𝐷𝑟 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾𝑟,𝑑, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑉𝑟 
(5.46) 
In this formulation, 𝛼𝑖,𝑗
𝑞
, is the number of times arc (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐴𝑟 is used on path 𝑞 ∈
𝑄𝑟 and 𝜏𝑟,𝑞 and 𝜏𝑟,𝑞
′  respectively indicate the start and end node of partial path 𝑞 ∈ 𝑄𝑟. 




ensures flow conservation and links the partial paths together. Constraint (5.42) is the 
convexity constraint and ensures that the number of partial paths selected is equal to the 
number of patients. Constraints (5.43) and (5.44) enforce resource windows.  
Before discussing the pricing problem, we review the following theorems and 
proofs about the tightness of the bounds obtained by the decomposition.  The following 
theorems and proofs were presented in (Petersen, 2011) to demonstrate that the Dantzig 
Wolfe decomposition of the 3-index partial path formulation provides a higher quality 
bound than the partial path solution.  
Theorem 1: Let zLP (5.7) be an LP-solution to (5.8) - (5.22) and let zPP (5.39) be an LP-
solution to (5.40) - (5.45) then zLP ≤ zPP for all instances of VRP.  
Proof: Since all solutions to (5.39) - (5.45) map to solutions to (5.7) - (5.22), then zLP ≤ 
zPP, originally demonstrated in (Wolsey & Nemhauser, 1999).  
Theorem 2: Let zPP (5.39) be an LP-solution to (5.40) - (5.45), and zEP is the LP-solution 
to the classical decomposition of VRP into an elementary route for each vehicle. Then 
instances exist where zEP < zPP. 
Proof: This can be shown through a simple yet effective proof by example, again 
demonstrated in (Petersen, 2011).  For this proof, Peterson constructs an instance with 
three customers, each with a demand of 1 and vehicle capacity Q = 2, see Figure 5.5 
below. There are six feasible routes ({0, 1, 0}, {0, 2, 0}, {0, 3, 0}, {0, 1, 2, 0}, {0, 1, 3, 




with objective zEP = 5. Using the partial path formulation with max path length L=3 and 
K=1 we find the optimal solution ({0,1,3,0,2,0}) with objective zpp = 6, thereby 
demonstrating zEP < zPP. 
 
Figure 5.5 – There are three customers with a demand of 1 and vehicle capacity Q = 2 
(Petersen, 2011).  
Considering the column generation approach in (Baldacci et al., 2008), where 
columns are enumerated dependent on strong upper and lower bounds, it should be clear 
that the partial path approach should contain fewer enumerated columns due to the smaller 
solution space of the pricing problem. An additional improvement is provided by solving 
the decomposition of the partial path problem.  A powerful strategy should be obtained by 
combining the relatively strong bound with the small solution space. 
To adjust the 3-index VRP into the ambulance routing problem, we modify our 
existing parameters and notation and add additional constraints. For the ARP, the issue we 
face in the formulation is that the system evolves in continuous time.  The amount of 
patients that can be delivered to a hospital at a particular point in time depends on the 














the initial number of patients, patient treatment time, and the time elapsed since the start of 
the planning period).  Consequently, delivery times either must be scheduled carefully, or 
patients potentially have to rerouted to other hospitals.   
This is contrasted with most other inventory routing problems (IRPs).  The planning 
horizon is partitioned into periods, and deliveries take place at the start of the period, and 
consumption occurs at the end.  However, the patient movement takes place continuously 
throughout the day, and a continuous-time variant of the IRP is most appropriate (Lagos et 
al., 2020). In our scenario, we are developing a MIP over a given, uniform, discretization 
of time.  Like the CIRP presented in the article, vehicle routes/patient routes are not 
restricted to start and end in a single time period.    
Our vehicles and patients rely on continuous-time movements, but for ease, our 
hospital inventory is tracked on a discrete-time interval. In this research, we will not set up 
a true continuous-time routing problem or even a partially time-expanded formulation.  
Future work will show that there does exist a discretization of time such that an optimal 
solution to a time-expanded network formulation using the discretization results in a 
continuous time-optimal solution.  Instead, we define N as the full length of the time 
interval and 𝛿 as the length of the time interval. So 𝑁 = 𝐼 × 𝛿 for some positive integer I, 
so I periods of length 𝛿. Recall decision variable 𝐻𝐶 𝑣𝑖
𝑟,ℎ   previously defined as integer 
variable counting the number of patients currently in hospital h, h ∈  𝐻𝑟, in region r ∈  𝑅, 




trauma level requirements, now constraint (5.47).  We add in the trauma level index t, 𝑡 ∈
[1. .4] to the patients and to the hospitals.  
Below we present the additional constraints to be joined with constraints (5.23) - 
(5.38) to form the 3-index partial path ARP.   
 
∑ℎ∈𝐻𝑟 ∑𝑖∈𝑃𝑟 (𝑥𝑑,𝑖,ℎ
𝑟,𝑑,𝑘  ) 
 If 𝛿(𝑣𝑖) < 𝑖 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 time ≤ 𝛿(𝑣𝑖 + 1)
≤ 𝐾 𝑟,𝑑  ∀  𝑣𝑖 ∈ 𝐼, 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅,𝑑 ∈ 𝐷𝑟 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾𝑟,𝑑  
(5.47) 
𝐻𝐶0









𝑟,𝑑,𝑘  ) 







𝑟,𝑑,𝑘  ) 
 If 𝑖 treatment time ≤ 𝛿 × (𝑣𝑖)
    ≤ 𝐻𝐶 𝑣𝑖
𝑟,ℎ    
∀ 𝑣𝑖 ∈ 𝐼, 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅, ℎ ∈ 𝐻𝑟 
(5.49) 
𝐻𝐶 𝑣𝑖
𝑟,ℎ  ≤ 𝐶𝑟,ℎ,𝑣𝑖                                                                             ∀ 𝑣𝑖 ∈ 𝐼,∈ 𝑅, ℎ ∈ 𝐻𝑟 (5.50) 
𝐻𝐶 𝑣𝑖
𝑟,ℎ  ∈ {0,1}                                                                              ∀ 𝑣𝑖 ∈ 𝐼,∈ 𝑅,ℎ ∈ 𝐻𝑟  
(5.51) 
Equation (5.9) is modified to (5.47) enforce trauma level requirements for the 
patient pickups by requiring certain trauma level patients to be sent to the appropriate 
facilities.  In Equation (5.48), we initialize the hospital patient inventory variable at initial 
time 0.  Equation (5.49) modifies the current period hospital patient inventory based on the 
number of patients that have arrived before the end of the time window subtract the number 
of patients that have been treated and moved to a non-trauma bed or have been discharged 
from the hospital before the end of the time window.  Equation (5.50) ensures that the 





From here, we perform the Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition, as previously 
mentioned. The formulation uses the same equations from (5.40) - (5.46).  Again, let 𝜆𝑟,𝑞 





 If 𝛿(𝑣𝑖) < 𝑖 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 time ≤ 𝛿(𝑣𝑖 + 1)
≤ 𝐾 𝑟,𝑑                     ∀  𝑣𝑖 ∈ 𝐼, 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅,𝑑 ∈ 𝐷𝑟   
(5.52) 
𝐻𝐶0







𝑞 𝜆𝑟,𝑞 ) 





𝑞 𝜆𝑟,𝑞 )  
If 𝑖 treatment time ≤ 𝛿 × (𝑣𝑖)




        ∀ 𝑣𝑖 ∈ 𝐼, 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅, ℎ ∈ 𝐻𝑟 
(5.54) 
𝐻𝐶 𝑣𝑖
𝑟,ℎ  ≤ 𝐶𝑟,ℎ,𝑣𝑖                                                                                  ∀ 𝑣𝑖 ∈ 𝐼,∈ 𝑅, ℎ ∈ 𝐻𝑟 (5.55) 
Lastly, we move on to the final formulation of the Resource Allocation ARP 
(RAARP). For the RAARP, we add an indicator variable representing whether or not an 
investment is selected, 𝑟𝑠𝑟,𝑛 ∀ 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅, 𝑛 ∈ 𝐼𝑁, where n is a specific investment from the list 
of investments, IN, for that region r. The previous ARP constraints are then modified to 
include the respective changes if a resource is selected. An example of introducing 
investment 1, instituting a prevention program, is present below in equations (5.56) - 
(5.59). 
If (𝑟𝑠𝑟,1 = 0) ⟶ ∑𝑞∈𝑄𝑟 𝛼𝑖,𝑗
𝑞 𝜆𝑟,𝑞 + 𝑧𝑖 = 1      ∀ 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅, (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈  𝐴𝑟,𝐴𝑙𝑙 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 
(5.56) 
If (𝑟𝑠𝑟,1 = 1) ⟶ ∑𝑞∈𝑄𝑟 𝛼𝑖,𝑗
𝑞 𝜆𝑟,𝑞 + 𝑧𝑖 = 1      ∀ 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅, (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈
 𝐴𝑟,𝑅𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 
(5.57) 




If (𝑟𝑠𝑟,1 = 1) ⟶  ∑𝑞∈𝑄𝑟  𝜆𝑟,𝑞 ≤ 𝑙𝑒𝑛(𝑃𝑟,𝑅𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠)                           ∀ 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅 (5.59) 
The same type of constraint modification is applied to the other constraints when 
accounting for the other types of resource allocation, such as adding an ambulance to a 
depot or upgrading equipment at a specific hospital. Any nonlinearities that are 
encountered from combining the resource allocation with the ARP can be resolved using 
the same technique discussed in Section 4.7.   
5.10 Empirical Results 
This section describes the computational test problems used to evaluate the proposed 
solution approach. The integer programs were generated in Python 3.7.3 and solved with 
Gurobi 8.1. The Gurobi parameters were kept at their default values. The computational 
experiments were conducted on the Georgia Institute of Technology High Throughput 
server cluster on CPUs with 64GB of RAM. 
As in the previous chapters, we ran the multi-swarm PSO, the Column Generation 
with the MSPSO Pricing Problem, and the traditional Column Generation formulation. The 
objective solution results are displayed below in Table 5.7.  Similar to the previous TSA 
and CBP models, we see the standard MSPSO performs the worst.  Some of this 
performance could be improved by increasing the number of subswarms.  The CGMSPSO 




Table 5.7 - Minimum Total Distance Traveled and Travel Time 
 
Lastly, we look at the investment selection variables.  Although the minimum 
time and distance results were greatly different, the investment selection results were 
nearly the same across the methods, seen in Table 5.8.  Regardless of the routes that 
became available during the PSO methods, the problem still selects those routes that 
minimize the travel time and travel distance and will select the resources that will allow 
them to reduce even more.  This is reassuring because less solution time can be used to 
retrieve very similar results to the resource allocation or investment selection which is 
our focus.  Both the full CG and CGMPSO chose to add ambulances and institute 
prevention methods and techniques in all regions.  They also both chose to upgrade 
trauma centers in the same three regions.  The only difference was one of the regions in 
which to add upgraded equipment.  The standard MSPSO has a number of differences but 
still produces satisfactory resource allocation results.   
MSPSO 9487.53 10074.45 25300.08 26865.21
CGMSPSO 6160.44 6318.96 16427.83 16850.57













Table 5.8 - Investment Selection Variable Results 
 
5.11 Conclusions 
     The results are subject to change for a different trauma system, with different 
parameters, cost structures, and submissions. However, the most important contribution of 
this study is that it offers a framework of investment allocation for trauma systems and 
Upgrade Prevention Vehicle Equipment Upgrade Prevention Vehicle Equipment
CG 0 1 1 0 -$        90.00$        180.00$ -$            
$3,550.00 1 1 1 0 250.00$ 90.00$        180.00$ -$            
Total Cost 0 1 1 0 -$        90.00$        180.00$ -$            
1 1 1 1 250.00$ 90.00$        180.00$ 50.00$       
0 1 1 0 -$        90.00$        180.00$ -$            
0 1 1 0 -$        90.00$        180.00$ -$            
1 1 1 0 250.00$ 90.00$        180.00$ -$            
0 1 1 0 -$        90.00$        180.00$ -$            
0 1 1 0 -$        90.00$        180.00$ -$            
0 1 1 1 -$        90.00$        180.00$ 50.00$       
CGPSO 0 1 1 1 -$        90.00$        180.00$ 50.00$       
$3,550.00 1 1 1 0 250.00$ 90.00$        180.00$ -$            
Total Cost 0 1 1 0 -$        90.00$        180.00$ -$            
1 1 1 1 250.00$ 90.00$        180.00$ 50.00$       
0 1 1 0 -$        90.00$        180.00$ -$            
0 1 1 0 -$        90.00$        180.00$ -$            
1 1 1 0 250.00$ 90.00$        180.00$ -$            
0 1 1 0 -$        90.00$        180.00$ -$            
0 1 1 0 -$        90.00$        180.00$ -$            
0 1 1 0 -$        90.00$        180.00$ -$            
PSO 0 1 1 1 -$        90.00$        180.00$ 50.00$       
$3,170.00 1 1 1 0 250.00$ 90.00$        180.00$ -$            
Total Cost 0 1 1 0 -$        90.00$        180.00$ -$            
1 1 1 1 250.00$ 90.00$        180.00$ 50.00$       
0 1 1 0 -$        90.00$        180.00$ -$            
0 1 1 0 -$        90.00$        180.00$ -$            
1 0 0 0 250.00$ -$            -$        -$            
0 1 1 0 -$        90.00$        180.00$ -$            
0 1 0 0 -$        90.00$        -$        -$            




possible ways to evaluate the impact of the investments on the overall performance of the 
trauma system.  It is basically a top-down approach on a strategic level, but it uses the 
tactical level decisions in order to evaluate several strategies to improve the system. 
Simulation is a powerful tool to perform a thorough analysis and systematic update of the 
system with given investments and facilitates the decision-making process of decision-
makers in the trauma network. 
The procedure described in the Results section reduces the number of candidate 
portfolios to a reasonable magnitude via exploiting the existence of Pareto efficient 
frontiers of the values obtained for specified metrics. This type of approach can be applied 
for a broad class of problems involving the selection of investments by considering their 
impact of certain performance measures. The procedure can be extended via increasing the 
number of performance measures (or in other words increasing the dimension size of the 
problem), via assigning a certain utility function dependent on the performance metrics for 
the patient and performing the elimination process with functions, or via increasing the 
time span of interest in the problem and adding a dynamical perspective to the selection of 
best portfolios. It is important to realize that this simulation was intended as a proof of 
concept to demonstrate that improvements to patient well-being can be measured in some 
manner and that alternative solutions can be analyzed. While most of the results from the 
simulation runs were fairly intuitive, there is a possibility that these arguments are not valid 
in a different setting (different distribution of location and time parameters). The validity 





The RAARP model presented above allows us to approach the emergency trauma 
network problem to find an exact solution.  We also implement the CGMSPSO solution 
technique to find good solutions in a shorter amount of time than both the traditional CG 
method and the trauma simulation.        
Future research should involve the application of this modeling technique using real-
world inputs for the portfolio options and the investment amount. This has the ability to 
produce potentially more interesting results based on limited funding and the different 
types of investment available. Other research should investigate such scenarios as the 
difference in portfolios dedicated to urban trauma system upgrades versus rural trauma 
system upgrades. Lastly, a significant area of interest is pediatric trauma care due to 
severely constrained resources. Dedicating a trauma simulation model to measuring how 




CHAPTER 6.  CONCLUSION 
6.1 Summary 
The focus of this dissertation is on public sector resource allocation problems and 
ow to solve them in the context of column generation and particle swarm optimization. The 
emphasis has been on large scale versions of the problem that lend themselves to Dantzig-
Wolfe decomposition and column generation type algorithms.   
We have demonstrated a consistent and practical solution methodology for resource 
allocation mixed-integer programs. In order to solve problems with an exponential number 
of decision variables, we employ Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition to take advantage of the 
special subproblem structures encountered in resource allocation problems. In each of the 
resource allocation problems presented, we concentrate on selecting an optimal portfolio 
of improvement measures.  We explore utilizing multi-swarm particle swarm optimization 
to solve the decomposition heuristically.  We also explore integrating multi-swarm PSO 
into the column generation framework to solve the pricing problem for entering columns 
of negative reduced cost.   
We present a TSA problem to allocate security measures across all federally funded 
airports nationwide.  This project establishes a quantitative construct for enterprise risk 
assessment and optimal resource allocation to achieve the best aviation security. We 
analyzed and modeled the various aviation transportation risks and established their 




with the objectives to minimize the probability of false clears, maximize the probability of 
threat detection, and maximize the risk posture (ability to mitigate risks) in aviation 
security. The risk assessment and optimal resource allocation construct are generalizable 
and are applied to the CBP problem.  
We optimize security measure investments to achieve the most cost-effective 
deterrence and detection capabilities for the CBP. A large-scale resource allocation integer 
program was successfully modeled that rapidly returns good Pareto optimal results. The 
model incorporates the utility of each measure, the probability of success, along with 
multiple objectives. To the best of our knowledge, our work presents the first mathematical 
model that optimizes security strategies for the CBP and is the first to introduce a utility 
factor to emphasize deterrence and detection impact. The model accommodates different 
resources, constraints, and various types of objectives.  
We analyze the emergency trauma network problem first by simulation.  The 
simulation offers a framework of resource allocation for trauma systems and possible ways 
to evaluate the impact of the investments on the overall performance of the trauma system. 
The simulation works as an effective proof of concept to demonstrate that improvements 
to patient well-being can be measured and that alternative solutions can be analyzed. We 
then explore three different formulations to model the Emergency Trauma Network as a 
mixed-integer programming model. The first model is a Multi-Region, Multi-Depot, Multi-
Trip Vehicle Routing Problem with Time Windows.  This is a known expansion of the 
vehicle routing problem that has been extended to model the Georgia trauma network.  We 




There are no known ARPs of this magnitude/extension of a VRP.  One of the primary 
differences is many ARPs are constructed for disaster scenarios versus day-to-day 
emergency trauma operations. The new ARP also implements more constraints based on 
trauma level limitations for patients and hospitals.  Lastly, the Resource Allocation ARP is 
constructed to reflect the investment decisions presented in the simulation. 
6.2 Conclusion 
With the empirical results demonstrated with the scenarios, we have shown that the 
multi-swarm PSO is an effective solution technique for solving these large-scale resource 
allocation problems.  We have also demonstrated that embedding the multi-swarm PSO 
into the column generation framework to solve the pricing problem is more effective still.  
The solution times for the new column generation multi-swarm pricing problem are 
typically much faster than the standard column generation due to reducing the number of 
subproblems to be solved.   
6.3 Future Research 
Many companies and industries face problems that can be defined in a resource 
allocation formulation.  Often these problems are large in inputs, number of constraints, 
and decision variables.  The practical nature of these problems often utilizes multiple 
objectives. Due to conflict between objectives, finding a feasible solution that 
simultaneously optimizes all objectives is usually impossible. Decision-makers also want 




solution. Thus, we would like to explore generating many or all efficient solutions to 
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